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ABSTRACT    May and Singer analysed the impact of innovations in digital music and argued musicians “don’t stick together [and] lack ‘business savvy.’” They concluded the major labels (four dominant music companies) have “little to fear in the long run” to the volatile changes in the music system, rather they “just need to adjust to a new business model” (May & Singer 2001: 128, 129, 136).  Their paper provided a starting point for this study, which explores how digitisation is changing the music sector, and specifically to examine: 1. How the music market is evolving and whether current changes are structural, cyclical or indicate a sustained demise;  2. How the major labels might respond to these changes and placing changes in the music industry in context.  Disruptions that have taken place previously in the music sector and the response of the dominant market incumbents reveal themes for change and defence of market control, or competitive strategies; 3. The inclination and ability of musicians to perform business activities; and   4. Emerging business models in the music industry.   Despite reports proclaiming the ‘death’ of the music industry (Frontline 2004), a review of the music market found that demand for music continues and thrives, despite its dispersion across multiple channels.  With that encouragement, the changes arising from digital innovations need to be placed in context because they are destabilising the dominant music businesses (major labels).  A historical scan of disruptions in the music sector, and the response of the dominant market incumbents revealed themes for change and defence of market control, or competitive strategies.  It highlighted there will always be dominant entities in the music sector while there is a mass market for ‘mainstream’ music, because a mass market requires mass market operators, whose 
 10 influence tends to dominate the market.  The major labels are the current incumbents, however this may change.  Their power within the sector is eroding as the market fragments, and other sector incumbents may emerge.    A literature review highlighted that musicians may not maximise their financial and experiential potential in the traditional mainstream music business system, which involves signing to a major label.  For this reason the study was refined towards musicians who deliver specialist, niche music. Such musicians may attain mass‐market status, however their music tends to be of a specialised style as opposed to mainstream music released by the major labels.  In the current environment emerging digital services and products have been identified that may be used by specialised musicians who are not signed to major labels.  By using a selection of emerging digital tools, they may enjoy sustainable careers outside of the major label system. Musicians who self‐manage were identified, but this study concluded they prefer to use advisors (for example, legal, accounting and management support).   In conclusion this study finds that: 1. The market for music exists, albeit it is undergoing structural change; 2. Emerging products and services may enable musicians to sustain careers outside of the major label system; but 3. Musicians are not inclined towards self‐management. These findings indicate emerging new business models for specialised musicians. 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INTRODUCTION    This study was motivated by the conclusion of a McKinsey Quarterly article written by Brett May and Marc Singer in 2001 titled ‘Unchained Melody’.  At the time of writing the article, Brett May was employed by a company allied with major music label BMG.  They argue the music sector is:   ripe for a change [but] in reality record labels may have little to fear in the long run [and] they just need to adjust to a new business model. [Musicians] don’t stick together and are not, typically, business savvy (May & Singer 2001: 128, 129, 136).  The key points of their conclusion became the core research questions of this study: 1. What is the nature, cause and potential of emerging business models for music in the context of broadband internet and social media software? 2. Can changes in the digital environment facilitate a financially viable, sustainable business model for specialist music? and 3. If so, can musicians use this model to succeed?   This study approaches the music sector from the perspective of a consumer, in contrast to many music sector studies that are undertaken from the perspective of musicians, labels or investors. This study is based upon research undertaken up until July 2008. Because technologies are rapidly changing the study did not focus on specific technologies or companies, instead on trends. Finally, music is increasingly a global commodity, and the market for music in Australia is discussed. This serves the purpose of positioning the study within a local market that is also outside of the dominant systems in the United States and Europe.   
 12  To explore these questions a tri‐part process was undertaken.  The approach of this study is depicted below and is discussed in more detail in the methodology chapter.  It has explored elements of the traditional value chain and emerging value chain; analysed case studies on change agents in the music sector and their impact, with an initial hypothesis that the change agents were successful; and thirdly it has tested the inclination and capability of musicians to manage their own operations. 
Table 1: Outline of study approach  
 1. Discover 2. Develop 3. Test 
Approach Exploratory research Exploratory research Value chain analysis Model development Applied, action research 








 14 identify examples of successful specialist music or structural changes in this chapter. The examples were chosen because they appeared to represent specialist music succeeding (to varying degrees) outside the dominant system.  Strategic themes were revealed by exploring: 1. The current situation; 2. The change agent, change and effect of that change; 3. How the dominant system (the incumbents, for example, the major labels or those in political power) reacted; and 4. Whether the change agent succeeded over the longer term and any key success factors. The analysis highlighted how political, economic, social and technological shifts may impact current and future events.  Musician self management The prior chapters: 1. Identified that demand for music remains strong, despite revenue falls; and 2. Established there will always be dominant players in the sector (but who they are may change).  The May and Singer (2001: 136) argument that musicians lack “business savvy” was tested because many commentators suggest that opportunities within the current environment allow musicians to manage their own sustainable careers (UNCTAD 2008). However there is very little research available that suggests how this can be achieved.  Secondly, if the environment is conducive, musicians may or may not wish to manage their own operations or be capable of doing so. This was analysed in two phases: 1. Decision making is a key activity of business management.  A financial decision support model was developed; and 2. Musicians tested the model and provided feedback via a questionnaire on their interest in the process and ability to use the model.  The questionnaire aimed to gain insights into the ability and inclination to perform management activities. For instance they may be capable of management duties but not interested in doing them.  Findings suggest musicians may be capable of 
 15 self‐management, but typically are disinterested in business tasks.  These tasks may be outsourced, just as any small business operator may outsource legal, accounting and strategic advice.  Value chain analysis The claim by May and Singer (2001: 134) that the major labels just need to “adjust to new business models” warrants exploration.  Value chain analysis provides a systematic way of examining key activities in a sector and how they interact, their cost, relevance and differentiators. Identifying, creating, capturing and protecting value in each element of the chain is fundamental to generating sustainable competitive advantage (Porter 1998).   This chapter analyses elements of the music value chain. They were chosen as being the principle activities in the music system, in terms of time and financial resources. This value chain differs from other studies that may focus on music products or major labels.  The elements are: 1. Production; 2. Publishing; 3. Distribution; 4. Performance; and  5. Promotion.  Chapter six identifies and explores activities that are traditionally undertaken in each element.  It then explores emerging opportunities in each element and discusses their potential.  These opportunities predominantly result from digital innovations.  The results highlight functional strategies for success outside of the dominant music system for specialist niche musicians. The opportunity costs of musicians operating within the dominant system were identified, reinforcing the argument that musicians may not maximise their financial and experiential potential via the traditional model of signing with major labels. The analysis aimed to highlight which segments of the market specialist musicians offer greatest potential for sustainable careers and emerging opportunities.    Chapter seven discusses potential changes to business models arising from emerging innovations in the music value chain.  It highlights opportunities for musicians who operate outside the dominant music paradigm. 





Business models  Although business model references appear in scholarly literature back in the 1960s (Osterwalder 2004), business model theory grew in prominence when Porter (1985) described how technology could affect competitive advantage via:  1. Changing industry structures;  2. Supporting cost and differentiation strategies; and/or  3. Creating new businesses.   Essentially a business model is a framework for how a firm (or entity) can create and sustain value. Porter (1985) defines value as the financial amount that buyers are willing to pay for what a firm provides to them.  It is a revenue measure.  Regarding business models, more specifically Timmers (1998: 4) and Lechner and Hummel (2005:41) all believe a business model is a framework for “product, service and 
 18 information flows,” that describe the:  1. Various business actors and their roles; 2. Potential benefits for the various business actors;  3. Revenue sources. Like Porter, Linder and Cantrell (2000: 2) define a business model as the “core logic for creating value.” They segment business models into 3 elements, being:  1. Components (or framework);  2. Operations (how the components work together); and  3. Change models.   Linder and Cantrell define change models as the core logic of how a firm will change over time to remain profitable in a dynamic environment. The definition of business models by Lechner and Hummel is similar to points one and two of Linder and Cantrell, but rather than describe change models, their definition of a business model describes only the sources of revenue.  The Linder and Cantrell definition appears to be more activity based than those of Timmers and Lechner and Hummel.  Osterwalder (2004: 44) provides a more detailed overview of business models and then presents a framework consisting of nine elements with the value proposition at its core:  
Figure 1: Osterwalder business model framework  
 Source: Osterwalder 2004: 44.  He distinguishes the business model from strategic planning that is undertaken first, and the process of implementation planning that occurs after the business model has been created.  Osterwalder believes the business model translates the strategy into a logical description of how to create revenues, and from this processes will follow.   
 19  Foss (2003) emphasises the competitive environment and its impact on value protection, or the need to protect the source of value from competitive imitation.  Similarly Weill and Vitale (2001) define a business model as a description of the roles and relationships among a firm’s consumers, customers, allies and suppliers. It identifies the major flows of product, information, and finance, as well as the major benefits to participants.  Lechner and Hummel (2005) also define a business model as including: a framework; potential benefits for participants; and revenue sources.  Magretta (2002) and Yip (2004), perhaps sensing the confusion around business models emphasised it is important to distinguish between business models as a framework and system versus competitive strategies.  Magretta describes a business model as a simplified narrative, a story, set to financial metrics and she notes business models tend to fail when the story does not make sense or the financials are poorly estimated. These stories are independent of competition and focus on the firm itself.  However the story would need to include some interaction between the firm and the system.    Amit and Zott (2001: 493) describe a business model as the  “design of transaction content, structure, and governance so as to create value through the exploitation of business opportunities.”  They focus on showing how transactions are enabled by a network of: firms; suppliers; complementors; and customers. They cite Brandenburger and Stuart’s (1996) opinion that the total value of a business model is the sum of value added (or removed) by all parties within the transaction.   From a review of literature, common themes for a successful business model were identified as: 1. A business model is a framework for operation; 2. It highlights how components (products, services) within the framework operate together as a system; 3. It must highlight a process for value creation and sustainability (sustainability may arise from competitive advantage) and this will be discussed shortly; and 4. A business model must be viewed within the context of its environment (to be described in chapter three). Business models are idiosyncratic, each firm has a specific business model and no two 
 20 firms would share identical business models.  However business models can be discussed generically because some components, or the combination of those components, may be similar.  Value chains With regards to points 1 and 2 above, Porter (1985) developed the concept of value chain analysis to highlight how value is created. His value chain approach aims to describe the collection of activities that are undertaken to create and deliver a product or service, from initial inputs to delivery.  By understanding each activity (or link) in the chain and the value it adds, elements may be merged, added or removed, in order to deliver improvements that create value.  Basically, where a company is positioned within the value chain will determine how it seeks revenues and movement around the value chain, in response to industry changes may improve revenues.  It could be said that value in this sense is defined as profit maximisation rather than revenue, because some efficiencies cut costs as opposed to revenue generation, for example the removal of physical distribution activities.  This approach may be applied at company level or it be expanded to a general representation of an industry.  It is more holistic than value stream analysis that focuses on the path to delivery of selected inputs, not the entire suite of offerings (Rother and Shook 1999).  Its focus is on manufacturing and emphasizing leaner production, and so may not be the most appropriate framework for the music sector.    Value chain analysis is more structured than value net analysis, which is applicable to scenarios featuring dynamic digital supply chains, and applies in a digital environment of non‐sequential flexible rapid value creation and close working partnerships between suppliers and customers (Bovet and Martha 2000).  Value net analysis may be a more appropriate framework through which to assess the new media environment, because it reflects changes in distribution and other activities.  However because the music sector still continues some non‐digital activities (touring etc.) value chain analysis is a more appropriate approach to use at this stage.    The applicability of the value chain analysis approach to: volatile industries; the global ebusiness economy; and some service industries, has been questioned (Childress 2008; Shapiro and Varian 1998; Downes and Mui 1998). Regardless it provides a useful 
 21 platform for value creation analysis, particularly for this study because it is not focused primarily on specific technologies.  Innovation, value creation and sustainability Schumpeter (1939) and later Drucker (1969) viewed society and business in continual cycles of creation, growth, stagnation and decline, however Drucker believed innovation might help to avoid the stagnation and decline phases (Wren 2005). Schumpeter’s (1947) theory of creative destruction refers to scientific or technical inventions that, when exploited by entrepreneurs, lead to value creation (the initial phase of the business cycle).  Perez (2004b) reminds us of the distinction Schumpeter made between inventions and innovations, emphasising that innovations require an entrepreneur:  




 22 unexpected way. The return (or Schumpeterian rent) to entrepreneurs is initially high because they have a head start on competitors and consumers may fear switching costs. But the Schumpeterian rent diminishes as knowledge and take‐up of the innovation by competitors’ increases, and the risks or uncertainties of their implementation diminish.  This is represented by the fall of the long wave.  Ultimately the process of creative destruction may transform markets and industries and lead to economic development.  However the transformation (or rise of the wave) can be initially difficult, for example the processes or outputs of established companies may be exposed to obsolescence of industries and skills, causing unemployment and social dislocation (Freeman and Soete 1994).  This is especially the case when innovations are ‘revolutionary’, or sudden and unexpected, as opposed to evolutionary (over time) so companies affected have time to adjust their business model (Schumpeter 1947).  It is the revolutionary, unexpected innovations that can harm industries by necessitating rapid readjustments.  The ‘long wave’ process of creative destruction can take months or years, and at each step may fail, for example, there are many inventions that are released to the market and do not sell. Similarly some innovations may take years before mass take‐up is achieved, due to a variety of reasons.     So what activities do innovators undertake to lessen the lag between innovation and mass social adoption of the innovation?  According to Christensen (2005: 220‐221) disruptive technologies “are typically simpler, cheaper and more reliable and convenient than established technologies,” and established firms confronted by the disruption “typically viewed their primary development challenge as a technological one.”    These ‘waves’ of creative destruction may sustain economic development over decades (the duration of the wave depends upon the strength of the innovation and it’s environment).  Pine and Gilmore (1998) describe how society has transitioned via long waves from economies underpinned by: 1. Commodities (undifferentiated products such as eggs); to  2. Goods (value enhanced, distinctive products such as cake mixes), to  3. Services (activities performed such as bakeries).   They believe the next wave of creative destruction will be driven by experiences, that is, consumers will pay firms that create a unique personal experience, or feeling and 
 23 sense of engagement.  An example may be fast food chains that now offer birthday party services for children, and another may include co‐creation of content with a content expert (Prahalad & Ramaswamy 2004). Alvin Toffler was an early predictor of the shift to an experience economy when he described the “upcoming  “experiential industry”, in which people in the “future would be willing to allocate high percentages of their salaries to live amazing experiences” (Friere 2008: 6; Toffler, 1971).   Competitive strategies Unlike Magretta (2002) and Yip (2004), Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002) believe that competitive strategy is a part of the business model, together with the:  1. Value proposition;  2. Market segment;  3. Value chain structure;  4. Revenue generation and margins; and 5. Position in the value network.   However they distinguish ‘competitive strategy’ with ‘strategy’ by emphasising business models:  1. Focus on value creation as opposed to capture (as do Bowman and Ambrosini (2000)); 2. Focus on economic value as opposed to shareholder value (they claim the business model does not focus on financing methods); and  3. The business models assume limited environmental knowledge, as opposed to strategy that considers environmental variables in more detail.  The value chain approach has been described previously.  To prepare a competitive strategy, the value chain needs to be placed in the context of the system. A system describes a “group of interacting, interrelated, or interdependent components that form a complex and unified whole” (Anderson & Johnson 1997: 2) and may be generally referred to as the environment (in which a firm operates).  Systems work within larger systems, for example the music system operates within a larger economic system. The system components can include:  1. Technologies; 2. Socio‐demographic and cultural shifts; 3. Political, regulatory and economic changes; 4. The rise of competing entertainment options; and 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 27 59) describes “time‐space compression” experienced by citizens as a constant theme of everyday life in modern societies.  She argues this era is experiencing rapid increases in the rates of social and cultural change (c.f. Giddens 1990; Beck 2000).  The effects of  ‘faster lives’ (Gleick 1999) include: 1. Increasingly transient and transparent social bonds (Lash 2002); 2. Hyper reality (consumers increasingly living their lives online, for example in social networks); 3. Visions of “cyborgian de‐humanisation” and telecommercial hypermanic cultures (Land 1995: 131); 4. Increased velocity of ideas (Florida: 2002) within dense clusters of creative practitioners; and  5. Increasingly cursory analysis (Gleick 1999).   Lash (2002) claims this leaves little time for creative action amongst the time poor whose minds are increasing distracted and cluttered. Saul Bellow may concur, when he suggested:    I feel that art has something to do with the achievement of stillness in the midst of chaos. …  I think that art has something to do with an arrest of attention in the midst of distraction (in Singh 1993: 16).  Psychological responses to over stimulation and cognitive overload include: anxiety, a perceived lack of privacy, loss of control, detachment, negative social attitudes, and social withdrawal (Evans and Cohen 1987; McCarthy and Saegert 1978; Fleming, Baum & Weiss 1987; Jain 1987; Baum and Paulus 1987).  Another consequence is “the boredom of being excited all the time” (Gleick 1999: 177) and an “unbearable state of distraction,” of “pointless but intense excitement” (Bellow 1989: 59‐60). The increased velocity of our lives has permeated into the creative industries (Gleick 1999).  Music is downloaded instantly and the emphasis has moved away from albums to songs.  Florida (2007) sees increasing social fragmentation into niche ‘tribes’ of interest groups. Porter (1998) believes this process of specialisation and clustering is accelerating, driven by globalisation. As a result, consumers may use filters to screen and limit the amount of stimuli they receive. These may be technical filters (such as RSS feeds) or cognitive filters (such as ‘tuning out’ and disengaging).  They may increasingly rely information filters, including friend recommendations and ‘collective intelligence’ 
 28 of peers (Tapscott & Williams 2006: 41).  Attention is defined by Davenport and Beck (2001: 20) as “focussed mental engagement on a particular item of information” (or music and ancillary activities) followed by a decision whether to act, and the attention economy as one where the scarcest resource is human attention. This compares with previous economic theories where labour, capital or even knowledge were key drivers.  Goldhaber (1997) and Franck (1999) posited that attention transactions will be more important to economies than financial transactions however at this stage capital is still a critical driver of economies, and a challenge is to convert attention into capital.  Attention is difficult to replicate, and so attention and experience theorists believe consumers are prepared to pay for unique, personalised experiences and/or feelings that will engender rich memories  (Davenport and Beck 2001; Pine and Gilmore 1999).  Kevin Kelly (2008: para’s 11‐18) identifies the key value of intangibles within the attention economy as being: 1.  Immediacy;  2.  Personalisation;  3.  Interpretation (providing support and guidance); 4.  Authenticity;  5.  Accessibility;  6.  Embodiment (ancillary artefacts and experiences); 7.  Patronage; and  8.  Findability. Within each of these value propositions lie opportunities and challenges for music.  For example, charging for personalised attention or experiences is perhaps easier for music entities with smaller fan bases than large mainstream ones.  This is because they can offer increased personalised contact between musician and fan.  For instance using ‘freemium’ pricing for music, which involves staggered prices for music, from free digital downloads to premium pricing which may include music, album artwork, and dinner with the band.  Secondly the fans of a band, especially a niche band, may have similar specialised interests and so be attractive as a base for niche marketing.  These will be discussed in more detail in later sections.   
 29 Music scenes It is important to understand the fundamentals of demand for music.  Why do consumers listen to music? The analysis of music consumption is an established body of enquiry across musicology, creative industries, cultural, media, psychology and sociology schools of thought.   Psychologists Donald Hodges and Paul Haack suggest music is a universal form of human behaviour and song is an integral part of culture.  More specifically, across cultures and through the ages, music: 1. Allows emotional expression; 2. Provides aesthetic enjoyment;  3. Provides entertainment (gives communities a reason to gather); 4. Communicates;  5. Allows physical response (dancing); 6. Provides symbolic representation; 7. Validates social institutions and religious rituals; 8. Contributes to the continuity and stability of culture; and  9. Contributes to the integration of society (Hodges & Haack 1996: 484‐494).  This study acknowledges all of the above points, and focuses on the last four points, namely that music is part of social identity based around communities of interest.  With regards to the symbolic representation of music, Barthes (1972) work on semiotics and signs in specific social groups and how they spread to mass culture and the construction of myths applies.  With regards to the last three points, Adler (2005) discusses why the mainstream mass market will always exist due to the need of consumers to share a common culture.  By contrast a great body of literature exists that studies music scenes within a dominant culture (for example, Frith 2004a and 2004b; Straw 1991; Bennett & Peterson 2004; Cohen 2007b; Hebdige 1979; Watkins 2005).   Specialist music can be defined as that which is not intended for mass sales via mainstream channels. Although not genre specific, mainstream music is typified by the mass‐market popular music Top 40 music charts. To appeal to a mass audience, it tends to be formulaic (based on what has sold before) and is rarely innovative. Director of charts for Billboard magazine, Geoff Mayfield believes the major labels promote music they believe will most easily reach the most people. Furthermore mainstream radio and television entities have little interest in promoting non‐mainstream music (in 
 30 Goodman 2001).  This leads to “music based upon the lowest common denominator” (Green 2002: 796).  The Idol television program franchise is an example of this, where music industry advisers assess and groom new talent for the Top 40 charts. However there are a few examples where specialist music has become mainstream.  Specialist music may be: 1. Localised (for example using instruments or formats unique to a region);  2. Of a genre or style with limited interest groups; and  3. Innovative by using new processes or tools.    This study examines disruptive change agents and to some extent, their subversion of the dominant music culture with a view to competitive strategy and successful innovation.  It has been undertaken with reference to some key theories from other disciplines that have influenced this study, including Jacques Ellul (1965) who believed media is subliminally manipulated by special interests to control society at the expense of individual expression.  This may be evident in Stanley Cohen’s 1972 study of ‘Mod and Rocker’ rebels in the United Kingdom during the 1960s.  It emphasised the role of broadcast media in the resulting ‘moral panic’, in that they react with sensationalism to behaviours that challenge social norms (Cohen 2002).  By contrast, Hallin (1986: 116‐118) notes that journalists working for established media often exclude dissenting (or revolutionary) opinions from the news, preferring to promote ideas that maintain a status quo.  Hallin described a “sphere of consensus,” comprising a circle of three rings: the inner being the sphere of consensus; the mid tier a sphere of legitimate debate; and outside of this is the sphere of deviance, of opinions the media reject as being unworthy of being heard, or any opinions that challenge the consensus.  The Cohen and Hallin approaches are not mutually exclusive, the moral panic as described by Cohen aimed to expose and condemn deviance, revolutionaries, subversives and rebels, whereas Hallin describes their exclusion.  Both are valid strategies used by the dominant paradigm to maintain the status quo.  Another approach is patronage (funding a musician’s activities without requiring financial return), which has sometimes been used to exert control over music and musicians (Volkov 1979). For example opera is costly to perform and has relied upon patronage from government, corporate sponsorship or wealthy sponsors.  Withdrawal of this funding may create financial distress and close operations, especially when there is only one patron. Lebrecht (1997: 28) describes a benefactor who pledged a “fortune” to the Metropolitan Opera, provided the funds 
 31 were allocated to her favourite director only. A patron donated one million pounds to Covent Garden to be used only for “traditional” productions (ibid.).  Volkov (1979) details how artists relied upon patronage and how it was abused by the state in Stalinist Russia for propaganda.   Hebdige (1979) refers to music ‘subcultures’, although Gelder and Thornton (2005) later suggest ‘subculture’ implies deviance from one mass‐market monoculture, with negative connotations, whereas today most societies are multicultural. Instead of the term ‘subculture’, academics today describe ‘communities’ or ‘scenes’ (Hesmondhalgh 2005).  Straw (1991) distinguishes ‘communities’ from ‘scenes’ being that communities are more stable in their composition and centre on a specific physical locality, versus scenes that may include a range of dynamic musical practices.  This study will use all three terms, acknowledging the slight differences.    Some analysts associate sub cultural deviance with criminal behaviour, although Albert Cohen positively believes deviance may act as a safety valve within cultures, by “preventing the excessive accumulation of discontent” where the deviant identifies situations in which “conformity to the rules will defeat” organisation (Cohen 1966: 6‐11). Freilich, (in Freilich, Raybeck, & Savishinsky 1991) believes Cohen’s theory of deviance ties closely to Merton’s (1957) theory of innovation, in which innovators reject institutional behaviour but accept cultural goals.  Similarly Cushman (1995: 91) suggests music provides an “active code of resistance and a template which [is] used for the formation of new forms of individual and collective identities.” Deviance, by challenging the dominant paradigm, appears to be a precondition of social change (whether as a creator or consequence of change).  Sheldrake (2003) however cautions there is a subtle distinction to be made between revolutionaries who seize power to change the system, and rebels who seize power for power’s sake and maintain the system.  This study concentrates on the former type of revolutionary.  Bennett & Peterson (2004: 3) suggest: “in many ways the organisation of music scenes contrasts sharply with that of the multinational music industry, in which a relatively few people create music for mass markets.” They describe three geographies of music scene that arise within a defined time period: local, trans‐local and virtual.  Local scenes describe those tied to a specific locality, or creative cluster (Florida 2002) and 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similar to the Star (1991) description of communities.  The socio‐economic idiosyncrasies of localities correspond to some extent with musical styles that incubate there, and become identified with that locality (Cohen 1972).  Music acts as a place‐making agent, and the locality may become a brand.  Trans‐local scenes are local scenes that physically link to groups of people with similar interests in other localities.  They are interlinked local scenes.  Shared interests are a key reason for these scenes to connect, for example, at music festivals in rural settings, or when fans follow bands on tours. The third distinction is virtual, or digital scenes, communities who share an interest in genres of music and socialise online.  Virtual scenes differentiate from geographical ones, with different rules.  They facilitate a ‘level playing field’ and generally are easier scenes to enter and offer greater control for participants (Williams 2006).   Richard Florida (2007) however says, despite the internet, scenes tend to cluster into cities or regions. Florida believes that a strong correlation exists between creative clusters, the economic growth of cities, the amount of high technology activity and the degree of diversity and tolerance of inhabitants.   He refers to Terry Clark who argues the key to understanding a scene lies in how its “collection of amenities and people serve to foster certain shared values and tastes, certain ways of relating to one another and legitimating what one is doing or not doing” (ibid.: para.11). The percentage of artists and designers in a location (Florida’s ‘bohemian index’) is highly correlated with the high‐tech innovative index (number of patents per head) (Hoegh‐Guldberg and Letts 2005). Employees of high technology sectors tend to be attracted to locations where there is a vibrant specialised entertainment scene because they share similar social characteristics (EU Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services 2002).  Michael Porter believes that pre‐existing conditions of competitive advantage are required to develop strong clusters of companies (James 2002). The existence of specialist music communities may attract high‐tech or innovative employees to a physical location.   The experience economy is another potential realm of opportunity for musicians.  The digitisation of media has enabled the consumer to play an increasingly important role in the music sector.  Experience economy theory as described previously has been criticised by Carù and Cova (2003) amongst others, caution experience economy theory:  
 33 1. Lacks a solid foundation;  2. Is culturally biased in romanticism and escapism from everyday life; and  3. Many goods and services are created by collaborative experiences and so the ‘experience’ is merely an ancillary offering to merchandise.  Carù and Cova (2003: 278) cite Scitovsky (1976), an economist who:   appreciated this romantic root in hedonistic consumption, for which the main aim of daily life is to obtain the maximum possible pleasure from all the sensations permitted by the experiences enjoyed, especially the consumption experiences.  Consumers may be more likely to pay a premium for some experiences or the experience of a product, because they fulfil a fundamental human need for social interaction, identity or cultural enrichment. Maslow (1970) believed self‐realisation was the highest level of consumption in the ‘pyramid of needs’ and consumers may perceive some experiences as facilitating self‐realisation. Carù and Cova (2003) emphasise the promotion of ordinary everyday experiences, but music may serve to release us from our ‘ordinary everyday’.  The provision of experiences delivers competitive advantage because they are very hard to replicate, personalised, or may require scarce resources (e.g. interaction with a musician).  Some music experiences are not daily occurrences, but are special. McKibben (2007: 167) argues the shift of consumers between mass and niche scenes suggests the “syndrome of consolidation, and reaction against it, appears in almost every sphere of our life.” That is, institutions pursue economies of scale, but consumers ‘disappear in the crowd’, and so turn towards smaller institutions that offer personal attention and ‘local’ or niche community.  In response to the claim by Carù and Cova (2003) that “‘experience’ is merely an ancillary offering to merchandise,” an important emphasis for this thesis is that as music product prices decline, the value of the experience that surrounds the use of that music may represent an alternate revenue source.  As discussed previously, Kelly (2008) describes the value of the embodiment experience, being present at a live music performance where the music may be perceived as ‘free’ but consumers pay to attend the experience of music performance. An (perhaps stereotypical) example may be the self‐enlightenment perceived by some attendees who experienced the 1960’s 
 34 Woodstock festival.  The next section details how firms may enhance the consumer experience via crowd sourcing and community based design; co‐creation, produsage and user generated content.  Some experiences may include co‐creation, or the opportunity for consumers to create collaboratively with a firm, and doing so creates value for the firm.  This may be directly (consumers pay for the privilege) or indirectly, (advertising, ancillary sales etc.).   For example while social networks may be replicated, the interaction between social network participants cannot be replicated. It is often the community that attracts consumers to a social network, as opposed to the underlying infrastructure.  Hence, if social networks implement fees for use, users may be prepared to pay or alternately they may move en masse to another social network.  Wikipedia founder Jimmy Wales described the need to manage the mood of their customers: “if the community gets mad at us, they can just leave and take the content with them. That alone keeps the relationship honest” (McNichols 2007: para.39).  A consequence of this transition to consumers as co‐creators is that they may no longer be typified as distinct recipients of a good or service at the end of the value chain, rather they may become involved at various stages in the process. A 2007 Nokia study on the future of music and entertainment forecast that by 2012, twenty five per cent of all entertainment will be ‘circular’, that is, consumer created in peer communities (NokiaGlobal 2007).  Consumers may no longer be typified solely as customers, instead consumers may become co‐creators of value, via interactions with firms, suppliers to those firms, and other entities engaged within the network. Instead of a one‐way communication from firm to buyer, complex and active interrelationships may emerge. Bruns (2008a: para.1) describes this as ‘produsage’, or “the collaborative and continuous building and extending of existing content in pursuit of further improvement”.  Prahalad & Ramaswamy (2004) and Bruns (2008b) suggest the preconditions for interactive co‐creation or produsage include:  1. Transparency (information availability);  2. Dialog (high degrees of personalised interactions, or intimacy) including shared problem solving by the community;  3. Access (ubiquitous broadband technology availability);   4. An absence of hierarchy and authority, with an emphasis on cooperation; and  
 35 5. Risk benefits (awareness by the consumer of the risks versus the benefits of actions and decisions they make) and shared (not owned) content. These preconditions emphasise an environment where tangible value is created via intangible experiences and inter‐relationships.  That is, the firm may focus on the facilitation of an environment that is conducive to co‐creation and/or personalisation and this may lock in consumers to that firm.  By doing so, consumers may pay for this privilege, or revenues may flow from ancillary products or services.    In some instances, one precondition (the absence of authority) may not apply to music firms, who may initially establish themselves as the leader/central focus of their community, and interaction may be mostly between consumer and musician, because fans value their expertise and/or brand. But as the fan base grows they will need to step outside the community more frequently and facilitate fan‐to‐fan interactions, or potentially drown in the volume of digital consumer demand. This approach differs from the traditional view of value being created by the firm selling products and services to consumers who passively receive them.  Secondly it may be the case that smaller firms can offer personal, transparent interactions directly with consumers more easily, quickly and cheaply than those serving larger mass markets.    The phenomenon of user generated content (UGC) merits consideration here, even though it shares similarities with the concept of co‐creation discussed previously.  Flew (2008: 35‐36) describes UGC as a specific activity where users are both “remediators and direct producers of new media content” and “engage in new forms of large scale participation in digital media spaces.” Consumers create content and then openly share it with others, and this ongoing activity helps to build a community around that content.  Echoing Maslow, Wikipedia CEO Gil Penchina claimed, “people contribute because it’s fun, because they want to share, because it’s social, or to show their expertise” (McNichol 2007: para.35).  In addition to the preconditions described by Prahalad & Ramaswamy (2004) and Bruns (2008b) above, UGC content requires attention to brand and legal issues.   These need to be managed carefully so as not to destroy the trust and motivation of consumers whilst protecting the firm from liability or loss of brand value.  A further development on co‐creation, produsage and user generated content is the notion of crowd sourcing and community based design, where a firm may build a 
 36 (usually online) community and then direct tasks or problems to the community to act upon, or call for designs.   The community or crowd may also be used to select the optimal response or solution from amongst the feedback. An example may be where a musician is about to tour and asks their community to suggest appropriate venues and accommodation.  Howe (2006; 1) described, primarily how research and development functions could benefit from the “productive potential of millions of plugged‐in enthusiasts” and “hobbyists, part‐timers, and dabblers suddenly have a market for their efforts,” but more importantly so too may experts who also happen to be in that community.  These practices contain challenges, including relationship management and potential for malicious input (such as copyrighted materials), however the “most efficient networks are those that link to the broadest range of information, knowledge, and experience” (Granovetter in Howe 2006: 3) and a properly managed crowd can theoretically work through large‐scale tasks more quickly than a small team.   The personalisation and experience approaches discussed above aim to lock customers in to the offering of a firm.  If consumers have invested in tailoring or co‐creating the products/services of a firm, they will most likely be loyal to that firm.  Consumer loyalty is one element of competitive strategy.  
Games, decisions and risk theories Let us now explore the microelements of business management, specifically, making decisions and managing risks.  In an environment of volatility and rapid change, decision‐making becomes more complicated because of higher risks.  Using game theory tools helps the strategic decision making process.   Schelling describes strategic situations as: “involving two or more participants, each trying to influence, to outguess, or to adapt to the decisions or lines of behaviour that others have just adopted or are expected to adopt,” and such situations occur in business and daily life (in McMillan 1996: 3).  Game theory is defined by McMillan as the study of rational behaviour in situations involving interdependence (ibid: 6).  For example, it is informally applied when two people negotiate a purchase price and seek to get the best deal.  Each negotiator:  1. Seeks to understand and predict the outcomes of their strategic interaction; 2. Aims to maximise their rewards, and 
 37 3. Doing so requires decisions about the allocation of scarce resources and/or competing interests (ibid.).   More broadly, game theory is a predictive tool that can be applied to business, social networks, popular culture and political science.  There are many examples of game theory in popular culture, and Shor (2006) provides examples of where it has been used by musicians.   Game theory is closely interlinked with decision theory, which involves the selection of a preference (for example a preferred action) amongst alternatives with the aim of maximising reward (Levine n.d.).  Decisions are made in planning, organising, resourcing, leading and controlling a firm towards achievements of its goals. The challenge of making strategic decisions is that they are made in an environment of incomplete information and partial control, which creates uncertainty (Arsham 2005a). Uncertainty is “a lack of predictability, of structure, of information” (Rogers 1962: 6).  There are several challenges in decision‐making.  Decision makers never have complete information, for instance about their competitors (who and how many), allies, economy, regulatory environment, or consumers.  Decisions are made in an active environment where competitors are also taking actions simultaneously.  For example a start‐up business may be allocating additional resources to expansion, whilst simultaneously an entity whose activities are affected by the start‐up may lobby regulators to minimise the impact of the start‐up, as happened with Napster.  Entities are, to some extent unaware of the actions planned by others, however they may make assumptions about behaviours and actions.  Sometimes they may mistakenly interpret events outside their control as signals of the intentions of others. Such assumptions and signals should be kept open to change, particularly in a rapidly evolving and volatile environment.  The decision making process can be summarised as being a continual cycle of: 1. Strategic objectives and goals; 2. Risk management (assessment and reporting); 3. Decision; 4. Action (risk treatment); and  5. Ongoing monitoring and refinement (Institute of Risk Management & The National 
 38 Forum for Risk Management in the Public Sector & The Association of Insurance and Risk Managers 2002: 4).  It involves a process of questions and information gathering, being: 1. What is the aim of the firm?  2. What possible actions can be taken to achieve that aim?  3. What are the expected outcomes (payoffs) of each action? and  4. What is the optimal outcome? (ibid.). For example, the stated aim of a musician may be to grow their business to achieve sustainability, and possible actions may include releasing products for sale, performances etc. Each action has a cost and payoff, for example, touring may be exhausting and minimise time for composing new material, but generates performance and merchandise revenues.  The musician may choose to risk human burnout and tour, and take the necessary actions.  Decision makers consider the risks and consequences of the decision.   As will be described elsewhere, the music sector appears to be positioned in the “initial optimisation” (Perez 2004b: 221) phase of the long wave, as evidenced by the great structural upheaval due to new technologies.  The process of making decisions in a volatile system is complicated by rapidly changing options, so decision‐making skills are vital. Exploring the myriad options in the music environment and weighting the consequences of decisions for risks can become complex, exhaustive and time consuming.  New businesses often fail because they face high degrees of uncertainty (Eisenhardt 1989a), and Simon (1979) says the level of experience, knowledge and the organisational environment of the decision maker can influence their decisions, as can self‐interest.    Within the decision making process, decision tree frameworks may be used to explore the consequences of decisions. Essentially decision trees provide a structure for identifying and analysing:  1. The consequences of actions;  2. The risks/rewards of consequences; followed by 3. Quantification of the impact so that payoffs from decisions made may be estimated. 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 40 process reveals information, insights and a structure in which musicians may make more rational, better decisions.  Decision‐making and the creation of decision trees include the critical process of risk management. Uncertainty differs from risk because risk can be estimated whereas uncertainty cannot (Katzy and Strehle 2007). Everyone performs risk management processes in daily life, but most likely do so subconsciously.  In small businesses, risk management activities may be informal and undocumented.  The global standard (Institute of Risk Management et al. 2002: 2) and Australian standard (Australian Standard 4360, 2004) define risk as the combination of the probability of an event and its consequences.  These consequences present opportunities for benefit and/or threats.  It involves a process of: 1. Risk identification; 2. Risk description;  3. Risk measurement (much like decision trees) and then building a risk profile (the degree of acceptable risk); and  4. Planning, selecting and enacting risk mitigation and limitation.   This framework for the first phase of risk management is illustrated in the table below.  Firstly risks must be identified and described.  This involves scanning the internal and external environments for potential risks and then naming them.  The risk description includes the elements listed in the left hand column of table 24.  A basic example is given in the right hand column as illustration: 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Monitor cash flow and location of sales. Potential action for improvement  Recommendations to reduce risk.  Pursue concept of ‘freemium’ pricing; use P2P as promotional channel. Strategy and policy developments  Identification of function responsible for developing strategy and policy.  Product and promotions.  Based on: Institute of Risk Management et al. 2002: 6.  Risks can come from within the firm, music sector or the external environment.  From the external environment the risks may arise from suppliers, customers, complementors, new market entrants, new products and services, and/or the mega 










Research question The research goal was to discover emerging opportunities in the current music sector, interpret their potential, and then test an opportunity that is frequently claimed by sector participants and observers, that is, that musicians no longer need the major labels to succeed.  This research aims to address the following questions: 1. what is the nature, cause and potential of emerging business models for music in the context of broadband internet and social media software? 2. can changes in the digital environment facilitate a financially viable, sustainable business model for specialist music? and 3. if so, can musicians use this model to succeed?   
Justification It is important for musicians to maximise their economic potential in order to maintain sustainable careers.  If musicians can sustain successful careers, it would benefit: consumers of music; the government (which has several arts funding initiatives); community groups and entrepreneurs who operate in the sector; and ultimately musicians. The traditional business model of signing to a major label may no longer be the most effective model for specialist musicians, who tend to target smaller markets. Therefore emerging models need to be explored.  Exploring musician preferences is important because it indicates whether self management is a viable option for musicians, especially as many sector observers claim that musicians can self manage and no longer need labels or management (Byrne 2008a; Cohen 2007; Gordon 2008; UNCTAD 2008 etc.).  
Implications The goal of this study is to contribute to the emerging body of research on entertainment sector business models in the digital environment.  It aims to build upon the work of Michael Porter’s value chains (1998).    
 46 Music specialisation and risk taking should be encouraged, because it may stimulate innovation and ultimately benefits society.  Creative industries generate flow‐on effects to other sectors. Seventy eight per cent of creative firms actively innovate and are comfortable changing strategies and business structures to leverage off developments in technologies and markets.  Creative firms attribute fifty two per cent of their turnover to new or improved products or services (UKDCMS 2008).  This tends to have a ripple effect across businesses in the same location (Florida 2007).  The music sector is highly risky and innovative, and often a lead indicator of changes to other sectors. This is reinforced by Marie Connolly (in Connolly and Krueger 2005: 3) who describes the music sector as a “breeding ground” for new insights and testing of economics, because: 1. It is a superstar industry, that is, the rewards are highly skewed and so supply and demand theories are exaggerated; 2. The importance of emotional and non‐traditional economic concerns in the music sector, for instance the impact of piracy; 3. As a social, cultural sector it may be used to expose economic trends, as evidenced by protest songs; and 4. It is highly impacted by technology, and usually the first sector to be impacted. If a trend succeeds in the music sector, then it substantiates a further R&D investment in video to obtain multimedia.  For instance: a) Internet sites that facilitated access to digital music were explosively successful (P2P, musician sites etc.).  Software developers then added in a visual element and the same products/services were launched for film (YouTube, Quicksilverfilms etc.); b) Internet telephony (audio) was followed by web cams (visual); and c) The social network site, Myspace, was originally heavily music focussed. Companies in other sectors now regularly use these media; even the Australian Prime Minister uses social networking tools.   Finally, music can facilitate social cohesion across cultures. It is:   one of the things that I think will make the world a better place … we have differences but real commonalities among us. Music is one of the tools that does 
 47 that. You don't even have to know what people are singing about. You can feel the joy or the sorrow in the music (Burrell in Marech 2003: para. 8).  If specialist musicians can successfully sustain careers outside of the traditional music business model then how they do so may be relevant to other small business operators in creative industries.  Findings from this study may apply to other content industries such as film, news and books.  This thesis does not attempt to: 1. Develop or apply a business model, nor provide a solution or outcome to a specific entity;  2. Predict future scenarios, instead it provides an overview of emerging opportunities in the current environment; 3. Focus on specific technologies or providers, because these are subject to rapid change; nor 4. Provide detailed financial analysis, instead it provides a framework.  
Methodological framework  This research is qualitative and is underpinned by epistemological and ontological assumptions that people create their own subjective meanings in an environment influenced by history, experience and social processes (Rowlands 2005; Orlikowski & Baroudi 1991; Morgan 1983). It uses an interpretive theoretical lens to explore, describe and then explain the influence of variables and changes in the music environment on its social context, and vice versa (Walsham 1995a).  These variables were not predefined (Rowlands 2005). Interpretive research may be used where the “intent is to understand the deeper structure of a phenomenon, which it is believed can then be used to inform other settings” (Rowlands: 84).   Interpretive approaches have been criticised.  Mumford (1985) questions the risk of investigator bias and objectivity, however subjectivity is useful if acknowledged, Neuman argues: “interpretive explanation documents the [investigator’s] point of view and translates it into a form that is intelligible to readers” (1997: 72).  Although 
 48 Neuman refers to action research, his argument applies equally to interpretive literature reviews – indeed literature reviews may be more substantive than other areas of interpretive research such as participant observation (Walsham 1995b).  Yin (2003) questions the theoretical standing, validity and reliability of interpretive case studies, but their use is appropriate to rapidly evolving environments with uncertainty (Walsham 1995a; Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991). The digital economy is evolving rather than fixed and measurable, as Rosen highlights:  “social process is not captured in hypothetical deductions, covariances and degrees of freedom” (Rosen 1991: 8).     Interpretive research practice requires inductive sense making processes.  Interpretive traditions aim to question the meaning of texts (Radnitzky 1970), and often these are hidden and clouded in publicly available literature, especially where literature was from non‐academic sources. Taylor argues:    Interpretation, in the sense relevant to hermeneutics, is an attempt to make clear, to make sense of an object of study …  a text … which in some way is confused, incomplete, cloudy, seemingly contradictory ‐ in one way or another, unclear.  The interpretation aims to bring to light an underlying coherence or sense (Taylor 1976: 153).  The exploration, selection, filtering and interpretation of literature has involved a degree of subjective assessment, for example the assessment of reliability and opinions.  Case topics were selected on the hypothesis that they represented examples where a change agent succeeded against the dominant sector incumbent.   Following this a grounded theory technique was used.  A decision model, named ‘Musical Map’ was created from data obtained via the interpretive research. The development of the ‘Musical map’ model was influenced by design science, which is an attempt to create things that service human purposes (March & Smith 1995). March and Smith consider that building models and evaluating those models are key issues in design science.  Questionnaires are appropriate for systematic collection of attitudes, behaviours or opinions (Dillman 1978).  This systemic approach, combining interpretive research and grounded theory is useful for explanatory and process oriented research (Eisenhardt 1989b).  
 49  
Methods Exploration was required to: 1. Understand the structural dynamics within the music sector; 2. Interpret the key success factors of change agents who challenged control;  3. Identify and contrast the traditional versus emerging music value chains; and 4. Apply findings by developing a model and then testing its application. The table below summarises the approach of this study, which will then be described.  
Table 5: Outline of study approach 
  1. Discover  2. Develop  3. Test 
Approach  Exploratory research  Exploratory research  Value chain analysis  Model development  Applied, action research 







 50 Case studies: change agents and control A challenge in researching niche music entities is that they have tended to operate (at least initially) underground and outside of the mainstream. Blow and Heibutzki (2003: 2) confirm this, asking:   Why  is  it  so  difficult  to  sort  out  hip‐hop's maze  of  claims,  counterclaims,  and contradictions? Nobody worried about documenting what remained essentially a  local  scene, nor  the diehard separation between  the B‐Boy and disco camps, which never acknowledged each other's contributions.  As  such  source material was  often  outside  of mass media  ‐  in  local  street  press  and music  newspapers,  or  verbally  (as  in  the  case  of  African  music).    To  find  reliable publicly available literature presented a research challenge.  A  second  challenge  involved  identifying  case  study  examples  of  success  outside  the dominant music paradigm, perhaps because: 1. Success generally requires sustainability and examples sometimes relied upon the use  of  emerging  technologies.  It  may  take  some  years  before  emerging technologies can demonstrate sustainability; 2. Musicians  with  sustainable  careers  who  operate  outside  of  major  labels  are sometimes musicians who used to be signed to a label and so have an established fan base; and 3. A  literature  review does  not  easily  reveal  the  financial  sustainability  for  smaller unsigned bands, because this information tends not to be publicly available.  Musician self management This chapter applied the findings from the value chain analysis (Chapter six).  It involved primary research comprising:  1. Model development and  2. The model was then tested by musicians who then  3. Answered a questionnaire seeking feedback on their reactions to the model and attitude towards the model.  




music environment Approach  Exploratory research Method  Literature review   Output  Description of the current state of the sector, sector drivers and their impact on growth rates.  Key findings  The music sector is highly volatile and uncertain. The revenue mix is changing. The major labels have been slow to respond or responded inappropriately and have lost market share.  Chapter title  Chapter four: Case Studies:  change agents and 
control Chapter aim  Identify key success factors for musicians outside 
the dominant paradigm Approach  Exploratory research Method  Literature review of case studies Output  PEST analysis highlighting opportunities and barriers to sustained success of specialist music Key findings  There will be a dominant system for as long as there is a mass market, but the incumbents and their role, ownership and nature may change.  Key themes for success were identified.   Chapter title  Chapter five: Musician self management Chapter aim  Test the inclination and ability of musicians to self 























Table 8: Australian music sales (wholesale units)   Format  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  %     Wholesale units ‘000s  Change 2004‐05 CD singles   12,367    11,343     9,464    9,285     7,450   ‐20 CD albums   49,670   46,954     50,641    48,234    46,288   ‐10 Digital            4,985    Music VHS/DVD, Vinyl, Cassettes  1,818  3,196  5,464  5,608  4,573  ‐22 Other*   2    0.784    53    11    59    461  Totals   63,857    61,495    65,621,996    63,138    63,355   0.3   *Other includes mini discs and SACD formats    Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers 2006: 104  Music is an important, albeit generally underpaid and part‐time, industry in Australia, according to official statistics. Consumers spent about $2800 million on music in 2003‐04, including audio equipment, concerts, CDs and nightclub entry fees (Cultural Ministers Council 2007).   In 2001 roughly 8840 persons in Australia listed music as their main occupation, and over sixty two per cent reported an income less than $30,000 per annum (Cultural Ministers Council 2007; ABS 2003).  In 2004 nearly 250,000 people worked in some way as live music performers, however eighty five per cent of these worked less than ten hours per week when they were involved.   Music events are well attended in Australia, reflecting high consumer demand for the social aspects of music. In 2004 over five hundred entities were involved in producing live music, generating income of over $400 million.  About seventy per cent of them performed popular music. In the year 1995 about forty five per cent of the Australian persons aged over fifteen attended at least one music event, and this grew to an estimated fifty five per cent in 2005‐06, as can be seen below.  The attendance rate at popular music performances appears generally constant over ten years at twenty five per cent of the population: 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Table 9: Attendance at cultural venues and events 1995 versus 2005­06   Persons (million) per annum Genre    1995  2005‐06 Popular music performances  3.8  4 Classical music performances  1.1  1.5 Musicals and Opera  2.7  2.6 Dance performances  1.4  1.6 Total  9  9.7  Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics catno.4114.0, 2006: 41  In 2005‐06 it was estimated sixty one per cent of the population aged over fifteen attended at least one musical event during the year.  By comparison, cinema attendance (65.2 per cent) was the most popular activity (ABS 2006). As mentioned previously, official sources generally haven’t fully captured the economic importance of the sector because a significant proportion of it comprises entities that are too small to be captured, operate informally, or music is a non‐core operation.    At a micro‐economic level, live music performances in Australia are threatened by the declining number of venues. These include pubs and clubs, which are increasingly threatened by:  1. Noise complaints from nearby residents; 2. Alternate revenue opportunities from poker machines (pokies) which replace the performance space previously in venues (with an exception of RSL clubs);  3. Late night violence (although not often associated with music venues); and  4. Increasing regulation (taxes and licensing legislation).  However there is an increasing recognition of the importance of live music as an entertainment form within the night time economy (Flew et al. 2001) and various regulatory actions have occurred that recognise the importance of the night time economy and aim to protect entertainment zones.  Initiatives include increased protection for venues against residential noise complaints in the Brisbane Fortitude 
 63 Valley zone, and in Melbourne following a 2003 ‘Fair Go for Live Music’ Campaign there.    Melbourne appears to enjoy the most thriving music sector in Australia.  This is in part due to the high number of pubs and other venues that allow musicians to develop performance skills, with 47.5 per cent of non‐gaming venues located in Victoria (ABS 2005).  Music performance in pubs and clubs is difficult to measure, however the ‘What’s on’ section of street press (Beat 2003) shows that in one week 564 bands and 431 DJ’s were performing in Melbourne.  This conservatively translates into over 50,000 performances per year in over 170 Melbourne pubs and clubs. Revenues from such activities not only include ticket sales, but also merchandise for performers, and alcohol sales for the venue.  Most venues operate as small independent, owner‐operated businesses but in aggregate they are significant to the Melbourne economy.    
The emerging global digital music environment Wolf (1999) says the underlying principle of a digital society is that content can be expressed in the same binary code of ones and zeroes.  This has changed the music product from tangible to intangible, with far reaching consequences on music products and services.   In 2006, global music sales totalled a trade value of US$19,587 million, or a retail value of US$31,813 million (IFPI 2007).  Eleven per cent of sales were in digital formats. Digital formats include online downloads, ringtones, mastertones, full tracks delivered to mobile handsets and internet and mobile subscription services, as well as CD sales.  As discussed previously, the rise in digital music formats has to some extent offset losses the CD format.  The major labels invested heavily in CD manufacturing plants and infrastructure so perhaps needed to balance the timing of their move to digital formats in order to minimise the cannibalisation of their manufacturing assets, and this perhaps has hindered the speed of their response to digital music.  It is noteworthy that the CD still maintains the bulk of the official market revenues for music products, so the, as Schumpeter (1947) theory that mainstream consumption is slow to adopt 
 64 innovations, so perhaps, by continuing to supply CDs, the major labels are simply responding to consumer demand.  However change is occurring, in another sign that digital music is eroding CD sales, an estimated 1200 ‘bricks and mortar’ retail music stores closed in the United States between 2002‐2004.  Similarly in Australia prominent independent pure music retailers closed as the market consolidated into large entertainment retailers such as JBHiFi and HMV, who carry music in addition to other entertainment offerings (hardware, DVDs etc.).  A smaller, premium market still exists for stores offering niche, rare music.  These tend to focus heavily on service delivery to a community, such as sourcing rare titles upon request and organising or supporting events within communities.  The explosive take‐up pf music available via Peer‐to‐Peer (P2P) software, whilst illegal, and other technological developments have stimulated musical innovation, by:  1. A price point of ‘free’ stimulates demand, and consequently interest in music;  2. Stimulated the digital music market by demonstrating demand; and  3. Weakened the concentration of power by the major labels in the music sector. Wikstrom (2005: 69) cites various studies showing the decline in music innovation is linked to the increase in the level of concentration in the music sector.  P2P, although illegal, was a major innovation in the distribution of music.  In 2001 the five major labels launched legal action preventing copyright abuse by P2P facilitators such as Napster (May & Singer 2001).  So from 2002 onwards a decline in P2P use might have been expected, but did not occur. As at January 2008, over five hundred legal music download sites worldwide were in operation (IFPI 2008).  Illegal peer‐to‐peer (P2P) networks outnumber legal download sites and outweigh them in scale of content.  The IFPI argue illegal downloads outnumber legal ones by twenty to one (ibid.). However the identification and measurement processes for statistically capturing P2P traffic are highly contentious, primarily because it is illegal so difficult to identify.   The increasing proliferation of music across formats and ancillary music offerings has to a large extent been driven by digital technologies. There are hundreds of digital music services in operation worldwide (IFPI 2008), both legal and illegal. Bridge ratings (2007) argue the main reason consumers purchase music (apart from 
 65 enjoyment) is to fill mobile device players, and secondly consumers buy new music they have discovered.   The ease of digital music use may motivate consumers to discover and acquire more music.   As can be seen below, music consumption has increased, but not necessarily music expenditure. The impact of piracy may explain the fall in revenues between 2000 and 2006.  Note this is based upon a survey of four thousand United States residents (aged over thirteen years) so is an indication only, but similar data is provided by another market research agency, NPD Group (2008):  
Table 10: United States music consumption      % of U.S. population buying music  U.S. Music sales (US$bn pa.) 1980  20  9 1990  21  11.6 2000  26  16.7 2006  32  11.5  Source: Bridge Ratings 2007: table 1, 2.   Despite a sixty two per cent increase in the music buying population, revenues have only increased 7.8 per cent between 1980 and 2006.  The impetus for increasing music consumption may be that it is now (illegally) available at no cost, but also because it is more prevalent in other formats such as computer games.  In 2007, the number of global digital tracks downloaded increased fifty three per cent from the prior year to 1.7 billion, with a value of US$2.9 billion (IFPI 2008), or fifteen per cent of the global legal music sector revenues.  But perhaps the growth in legal digital music is not happening quickly enough to offset the rapid decline in music product sales and revenues, as evidenced by the chart below.  During 2007 it was estimated that about eight million people worldwide were on file‐sharing networks at any one time, and file sharing was the most used service on the internet in 2007 (Nugent 2008). In 2008 it was claimed there were more than nine hundred million illegal music files available for download on file‐sharing networks, including BitTorrent, Limewire, Soulseek, Gnutella, eDonkey, Pirate Bay, and KaZaa (ibid.).  The IFPI cite studies that show up to eighty per cent of all ISP broadband capacity is taken up by P2P file sharing (IFPI 2008).  The heaviest usage was recorded 




 68 Noting the move to digital downloads, May and Singer (2001: 129) claimed the value chain of CD music products is “ripe for a change” when compared with new digital formats.  Using four sources (including McKinsey analysis and industry interviews, which cannot be verified) they a breakdown of physical versus virtual costs. The table below indicates how digital music may reduce the costs of traditional CD formats:    
Table 11: Savings of digital formats  Cost Breakdown  %  Low case $  High case $ Change* 










  Entertainment   Music     Video games Source: Rizzo et al. 2007: 5  Sylva and Garlick (in Fox 2002) describe how the internet has benefited consumers and artists, including: 1. Consumers now believe content should be free.  Seventy eight per cent of internet users who download music do not believe it is stealing, according to a study by Lenhart and Fox (ibid.). In February 2001, 2.8 billion songs were downloaded using Napster (ibid.). That same year the five major labels commenced legal action preventing copyright abuse by massive online facilitators of music sharing, including Napster. Leung and Lombardi (2001:18) believe that downloading music may be a “form of protest against music companies,” against the charging of unjustifiably high prices and other tactics which have “alienated a large number of militant kids, resulting in a defiant backlash” (ibid.);   
 72 2. The ‘Content is king’ (sic) concept, where content is considered the primary driver for success in digital societies.  Obtaining and maintaining a digital music collection is equally as valid as a physical collection; 3. Consumers have gained greater control. Consumers can produce their own music compilations in different formats (Berst 2000). They participate in and belong to global communities of interest, including interacting directly (and safely) with artists. Consumers now create their own content, taking music from a variety of sources and remixing it, or using generic recording tools such as Apple’s Garageband; 4. The internet has reduced costs and removed barriers to entry, allowing some musicians to operate without the record label intermediary. For example, digitisation can make the manufacture of music easier and less costly.  Fox (2002) believes this releases funds for other activities such as marketing and website development.  Whilst musicians cannot match the marketing strength and business networks of the major labels, labels cannot match the enthusiasm of fans.  For example hundreds of fan pages may be dedicated to a band and their music; and  5. Musicians within the labels have traditionally had limited creative and strategic control over their music (Pfahl 2001). Tensions between the interests of musicians and their labels has been well documented (Holson 2002; Albini 2003; Avalon 2005), for example Pfahl says the relationship is similar to:  that of indentured servants forced to serve corporate bosses concerned mostly with filling their coffers, … artists have constantly asked for more control over their work, but realise they cannot live without the benefits provided by record labels, that is, until the internet arrived (Pfahl 2001: para. 19).    ‘Radiohead’ Singer Thom Yorke in 2004 said it would give the group a certain amount of pleasure to “give the finger” to a business model that was “headed the way of dinosaurs” (Haskins 2007: para. 26).   The challenge of market fragmentation is that “music has become so confused that the target group has its hands full finding what is it looking for” (van Deelen 2001: para. 4), and increasingly consumers need content filters, or rely upon the opinions of peers or 
 73 music genre experts. But this should reinforce their reliance on communities or peers and role models, and profiling agents that search according to a person’s preference.  
Market fragmentation  Demand for music is thriving. This is evidenced by the prevalence of music in various formats (legal and illegal) across an increasing range of mediums and attendance at musical events.  Demand for music services and product continues and grows.  Much of this growth is in small start‐up entities not captured by mainstream statistical agencies so it is difficult to get an accurate and complete picture of activity within the music sector.   Within this growth there are some contradictory trends: 1. Thriving demand for music is not necessarily leading to increasing revenues in the music sector; 2. The revenue mix is changing, with a shift away from the music product to related activities such as live performance; 3. Musicians generally are still earning less than other sector participants;  4. The dominance of the major labels appears to be weakening as the market fragments; 5. Emerging technologies and companies can potentially improve market efficiency; and 6. The role of the consumer is changing from a passive to an active participant.  The market is fragmenting, with many niche start‐up businesses with innovative business models, which are creating change across the sector (Hicks 2002; Knab 2008).  Entities that use emerging technologies and/or techniques to operate more efficiently to deliver music services are emerging. Conversely the number of music acts that the major labels invest in is declining as their market share falls.  Simultaneously a few high profile music acts are leaving the major labels to sign with smaller labels, tour operators or to self manage their operations.   In 2007 Paul McCartney terminated his contract with a major label because, after decades with the same label, he was bored with them and their reliance on traditional 
 74 business models. Instead he went outside the music sector and signed a deal with coffee retailers Starbucks (Collett‐White 2008).  Future music suppliers may include entities across other sectors or independent musicians, including: 1. Consumer portals (for example social networks such as Myspace); 2. MSPs (Music Service Providers such as iTunes or Last.fm); 3. Media companies; 4. ‘Bricks and mortar’ retailers (Walmart); 5. Online retailers (Amazon); 6. Internet service providers (Bigpond music); and 7. Hardware manufacturers (Nokia);  and others.  With some exceptions such as Starbucks, these will tend to be on‐selling music catalogues owned by the major global entertainment companies.   The major labels are negotiating with telecom companies to supply their music catalogues with mobile phones, such as the ‘Nokia with free access to the Universal music catalogue for a year’ mobile phone deal (planned release in 2008). ISPs may introduce access to majors’ music catalogues for minimal amounts as part of their monthly invoices, similar to the way consumer’s pay for channels on pay TV.  This develops the concept of music as a utility, bundled with other products for free.  Consumers may pay a fixed fee for unlimited access or a variable fee based upon usage.  No formal release of this plan had been made as at July 2008.  With regards to revenues in emerging music sector business models, the following table highlights key elements of a variety of models that have been identified and discussed within this thesis. The table describes potential revenue sources in each approach. It is provided for illustrative purposes and is not a mutually exclusive classification.  The prevalence of niche start‐up businesses is noteworthy.  Many that survive the start‐up phase and gain market traction are then acquired by major media companies, for example, Last.FM: 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Table 12: Music revenue sources 













• Fixed price with periodic payments.  • Proposed ISP add‐on charge  • Surcharge payment is an informal protection against piracy claims.  • Unproven model as at 2008;  • Difficult for payments to ultimately reach musicians. 
• In theory yes, but complex in practice so most likely no. 
           
Publish
ing  • Publishers seek and disburse license and royalty payments from use of music.  • Song placements in media (movies, broadcasting).  • Lump sum and/or ongoing revenue stream payments to musicians. 
• Various channels slow the process of payment;  • Low likelihood of placements.  • Contract dependent.            
User  genera
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• Interim strategy to transition consumers to digital music (CD Baby also sells digital music).  • Consumers must wait for music to arrive by post.  • 100% minus $4 per CD ; 91% of digital sales. 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• 2004 Prince Australian tour offered premium 'onstage' seats.  • Can, to some degree, predict sales based upon location of fanbase.  • Distinction between access based upon propensity to pay.  • Ticket value minus Venue and Agency fee. 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Music system competition Colin  Brumelle,  a  musician  and  music  software  developer  has  said  that  when  the phonograph  was  invented  in  1877,  it  was  a  radical  invention  able  to,  in  Thomas Edison’s  own words,  “annihilate  time  and  space”  (LaPlante  2008:  2).      The  response from the music business was immediate and alarmist. John Philip Sousa wrote an essay titled “The Menace of Mechanical Music” that warned how recorded music would cause the music industry to go into a disastrous decline.    “Of course, much of the subtext of this  was  economic,”  said  Brumelle.  “Musicians  were  understandably  worried  that recorded music would undercut their ability to command fees for performance” (ibid.).  Similar  responses were  issued  to  the advent of  radio, and home cassette  taping. This sounds  very  similar  to  the  response  of  today’s  music  incumbents  to  digital  music eroding the ability to command fees from compact discs.  Revolutions, inventions and socio‐demographic cycles are an inevitable part of the business cycle and the music sector has historically been a lead indicator and a ‘test bed’ for developments (Perez 2004b), or as Attali suggests:     Music is prophecy. Its styles and economic organisation are ahead of the rest of society because it explores, much faster than material reality can, the entire range of possibilities in a given code. It makes audible the new world that will gradually become visible, that will impose itself and regulate the order of things; it is not only the image of things, but the transcending of the everyday, the herald of the future (1984: 11).  New technologies have vastly altered the musical landscape throughout time, including the invention of: instruments; the phonograph; wireless transmission; and the MP3 
 80 format.  The volatility within the music sector since the inception of digital music needs to be placed in historical context, in order to more realistically assess the impact of digitalisation and offset media hype around “the end of the music industry” (McQuivey 2008: para.1). As at 2008 uncertainty and indecision appears to prevail in the mass‐market music industry according to media, for example a major label executive claimed “right now everyone is paralysed" (Christman 2008: para. 6).  Current uncertainties include: 1. Consumers ‐ what price point will they accept for music and ancillary offerings? What is the role of user generated content in the music sector?;  2. Competitors ‐ to what extent and how will the major labels dominate this sector? who will emerge as the dominant players? will consumer demand for music continue in light of  emerging competing entertainment options?; 3. Macroeconomic variables ‐ will the current levels of household disposable income continue?; 4. Technology ‐ what is the impact of collaborative tools and social networks? How quickly will home recording tools improve in quality?; and  5. Regulation ‐ will a solution to simplifying global copyright and licensing be identified and implemented?  This chapter examines the impact of change agents in the music sector, and analyses the reactions of sector incumbents, and outcomes. Scenarios of successful strategic change were created using case studies.  Lessons learnt from the scenarios may put today’s ‘creative destruction’ into perspective (Kaplan & Foster 2001). These scenarios are not forecasts, they are descriptions of a combination of variables at any discrete point in time (Schnaars 1992).  The ultimate aim of this analysis was to identify common themes of competitive strategies for musicians operating outside the dominant system of the mainstream and major labels, because, as discussed previously, mainstream musicians are rarely able to achieve sustained success.  Can success be enabled within the digital society?  To identify competitive strategies, an exploratory scan was undertaken to identify examples of specialist music or trends in music that appeared to be successful. All cases were chosen based on the hypothesis that initially they appeared to be examples of specialist music, musicians or change agents sustaining success.  Success in music is 




 Description Protest music challenges the operations of power – social, economic and political – through songs, chanting and dance. Randall (2005) makes no claim for the power of music itself to persuade, coerce, resist or suppress; rather she addresses the uses to which music is put, controls placed on it and discursive treatments of it.  Situation The 1948 South African government legalised the segregation of blacks and whites and initially mandated:  1. Whole townships of black Africans be forcibly moved onto new land zones and their historic communities were razed;  2. Blacks were required to carry passports at all times;  3. Removal of people from their homes to work in mines far away;  4. The forced use of Afrikaan language in schools. The African National Congress (ANC) represented black South Africans and was non‐violent until the final years of apartheid.  Despite this the South African government banned the ANC, and it’s members either imprisoned or exiled.   Change agent Vuyisili Mini was a prominent singer in the emerging anti‐apartheid movement.  Change Folk singer Vuyisili Mini was central to the anti‐apartheid movement because his lyrics, music and actions exemplified defiant resistance. His song (translated as) ‘Beware Verwoerd, the black man’s going to get you’ referred to Prime Minister Verwoerd, the ‘architect of apartheid’, set to a jaunty upbeat dance rhythm.  It became a prominent protest chant, in local languages not understood by whites, sung constantly during rallies and even by domestic workers in the homes of whites (Beale 2003).  Another 
 83 prominent resistance song was ‘Ubani Okumule Inzinja na?’ (Who let the criminals out to abuse us?).  Following the 1960 brutal wounding and killing of several hundred unarmed protesters by South African Police to repress a march (the Sharpeville massacre), songs took a mournful tone, as exemplified by ‘What have we done?’ that laments dead comrades and imprisoned leaders (Hirsch 2003).   Vuyisili Mini was hanged for ‘sabotage’ in 1964, one of the first members of the ANC to be executed, but even in death was defiant.  According to an ex‐prisoner in ‘Amandla’, when prisoners were led to their execution other prisoners could hear nothing but their dragging shuffling feet. As Mini walked to the gallows he sang a freedom song with his fist high in the air.  From then on others followed his example as they were led to the gallows (Beale 2003).  The prisoner claimed:   unexpectedly, the voice of Vuyisile Mini came roaring down the hushed passages. Evidently standing on a stool, with his face reaching up to a barred vent in his cell, his unmistakable bass voice was enunciating his final message in Xhosa to the world he was leaving. In a voice charged with emotion but stubbornly defiant he spoke of the struggle waged by the African National Congress and of his absolute conviction of the victory to come. ... they ...  defied all prison rules to shout out their valedictions.. Soon after, I heard the door of their cell being opened. Murmuring voices reached my straining ears, and then the three martyrs broke into a final poignant melody which seemed to fill the whole prison with sound and then gradually faded away into the distant depths of the condemned section (Reddy 1974: para.’s 27‐28).  Change effect Lee Hirsch believes that protest music played a crucial role in protests against apartheid in South Africa (Ebert 2003). Because it was too dangerous to speak out against apartheid the resistance began subversively and non‐violently through music during the 1940’s. The film ‘Amandla’, directed by Lee Hirsch (2003) shows how initially the songs would be sung in local languages, not often understood by the whites.  They contained powerful lyrics of defiance and subversion to rally the oppressed (ibid.).  The music was heavily rhythmic, comprising drums and voices, as both were easily available whereas instruments such as guitars were harder to obtain, 
 84 although a musician describes making a guitar out of tin cans and fishnets (Cohen 2003).   In the 1970’s as Resistance became more militant and the ANC began to use force (for example in Soweto uprising, where Police killed Soweto schoolchildren), the music too changed using a style either intending to uplift spirits or similar to that now known as ‘Kwaito’, which “wants to turn the gun into a microphone,” (Jooma 2003).  It was broadcast on Radio Freedom; a popular yet banned radio station.  During the 1980’s when a state of emergency was declared, dance also became used as protest. The toyi‐toyi was a high‐energy stomping dance using a jogging, knee thrusting marching style that in the 1980s began to accompany their chanting (Beale 2003).  Hirsch (2003) suggests dance when performed by thousands of singing people could be intimidating. A former riot policeman claimed, “that toyi‐toyi scared the hell out of us. … I have guns, I have tanks, I have riot gear, but when they sang, it made me afraid.” (Graham 2003).  Death became commonplace, and again music was used to uplift mourners from their loss, as African musician Vusi Mahlasela says “In South Africa you don’t die of loneliness. With the township vibe, you don’t really go sad for a long time without people noticing that something is not right with you,” (Cohen 2003: 6).  As seen in the movie ‘Amandla’, instead of mournful music during funerals, the songs changed to chants of strength and defiance.  An ANC member explains that a killed colleague would have preferred they keep fighting and not mourn (Hirsch 2003).  Over three decades later music was still being used to protest against apartheid, but it is noteworthy that Caucasians outside of Africa wrote the two most prominent songs: 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 89 Incumbent Major labels were the sector incumbents.   Punk also confronted the ‘establishment’ (Savage 1991; Cohen 2002).  Incumbent reaction The ‘Sex Pistols’ initially self marketed and were ‘anti‐label’ because the labels represented the establishment, then in an ethical u‐turn ‘Sex Pistols’ manager Malcolm McLaren sought a major label recording deal, despite the emergence of a few good independent labels and national distribution channels that could provide autonomy from the music majors (Savage 1991). The ‘Sex Pistols’ signed a global deal with EMI for two years with an additional option for a year.  The deal included no royalty payments on sales or performance.  It totalled a £40,000 non‐returnable advance against future royalties, comprising £20,000 payable on signing and £20,000 a year later.  EMI were to pay reasonable recording costs.  McLaren was to take twenty five per cent (twenty per cent was the benchmark for managers) and fifty per cent from any merchandising.  The deal was heavily skewed towards McLaren.  They later also signed with EMI Publishing, for an advance of £10,000 and this deal was more contentious as EMI Publishing tried to control the artwork, selection of songs and release label, whereas McLaren wanted total control (ibid.).  There were inevitable clashes arising from three competing strategies: 1. A band promoting anarchy while signed to a major label; 2. A major label trying to massage (dilute) the punk message to sell to a mass market; 3. Malcolm McLaren aiming to create a new market as part of a new social movement.  EMI publicised the contract and promoted the ‘Sex Pistols’.  An intensely competitive bidding war followed as other labels signed punk bands to recording contracts including signing bands without having heard or seen them (often because the A&R Representatives were too afraid to enter Punk venues) (ibid.). Signings usually included upfront payments.  The bands signed were then either suppressed (locked into complex legal action, not marketed, recordings put on hold etc.) or groomed to dilute the more unpalatable aspects of their creativity for the mass mainstream market (ibid.)  Broadcast publicity followed, as opposed to publicity in the music media.  The London papers and tabloids printed aggressively negative and titillating news features on the 
 90 punk phenomenon generating a ‘moral panic’ (Cohen 2002). They focussed on the fashion (safety pins, swastikas, leather, ripped clothes etc), attitudes and violence as much if not more than the music.  Savage (1991) believes that the mass media simplifies complexities and overrides ironies and as a result the message punk conveyed was interpreted more basically as a dangerous fascist youth movement.   The ‘Sex Pistols’  appeared on a current affairs television show and swore during the segment.  This unleashed a wave of mass media with titles like “The foul mouthed yobs,”  “Fury at filthy TV chat,”  “The Punks – rotten and proud of it!,” and “Rock group start a four letter TV storm” of moral panic (Savage 1991: 264; Cohen 2002).  Following from their television appearance, EMI packaging staff went on strike, which stopped distribution of the single, a tour planned of northern England (paid by EMI) went ahead but of the nineteen venues initially booked, thirteen cancelled.  At one university a Vice Chancellor cancelled the show, prompting a sit‐in protest by students. EMI Chairperson Sir John Read stated “whether EMI does release any more of their group’s records will have to be carefully considered.  I need hardly add that we shall do everything we can to restrain their public behaviour, although this is a matter over which we had no real control.” (Savage 1991: 270).  The response from the ‘Sex Pistols’ was expletives against the establishment figure of Read.  At this point McLaren lost some control, he could not totally control the mass media.  Trying to regain control, he took over all interviews with the band seen in the background and not heard.   A key factor in the breakdown of the punk movement was that the mass media attention dismantled the sense of community amongst the punks and promoted copycats who, unprepared for the brutal demands of the lifestyle, weakened the movement.  Each band started to vie for attention with ambitions of mass‐market success and the major labels courted them.  The large music label response was to acquire all aspects of this movement.   At this time, the whole music supply chain was taking up punk – agents, bands, labels, promoters, media and the consumers. Punk was becoming commercialised.  The punk community was disaggregating and becoming mass market.    EMI however decided that the artistic prestige gained from signing the ‘Sex Pistols’ was not worth the costs of the negative publicity.  An MP wrote to Sir Read stating that EMI 
 91 was “financing a bunch of ill‐mannered louts who seem to cause offence wherever they go.   Surely a group of your size and reputation could forgo the dubious privilege of sponsoring trash like the ‘Sex Pistols’” (Savage 1991: 287).   A severance deal was negotiated, whereby the band retained £50,000 as per the contract with EMI (ibid.). In retrospect it has been said that there was an enormous opportunity cost to EMI for this, with the financially impaired company forgoing the benefits of being at the forefront of a progressive new music trend, whose financial benefits started to flow several months later.  The ‘Sex Pistols’ were a ‘loss leader’ to EMI, but EMI never capitalised on their status.  A bidding war for the ‘Sex Pistols’ followed between A&M, CBS and Virgin.  Virgin had recently diversified into music when the Government relaxed the recommended retail price on records and owner Richard Branson saw an opportunity to sell music at discounted prices.  The band signed to A&M for two years with annual advances of  75,000.  However in the haste to sign them, the A&M representative hadn’t actually met the ‘Sex Pistols’, who subsequent to signing violently destroyed the A&M offices and offended staff.  During the ensuing days, tracks for an album were recorded, but the contract was terminated after repeated social digressions.  A week after the contract was signed it was terminated, with an additional termination payment of £25,000.  All twenty five thousand copies of the newly manufactured singles were destroyed (ibid.).    Two months later the ‘Sex Pistols’ signed with Virgin for an initial payment of  15,000 to cover one album.  A month later  50,000 was advanced for global sales (ibid.).  However there was a personality clash between Branson and McLaren, who both appear to have the same impresario characteristics and they sparred constantly on deals.  For example, despite a global Virgin deal McLaren attempted to release a ‘Sex Pistols’ recording via a French firm just before the Virgin release was due.  Branson on hearing this rush released the album.  Meanwhile the ‘Sex Pistols’ had combusted in myriad personality clashes, burnout, grievances and substance abuse.  McLaren developed a film based on the ‘Sex Pistols’ (securing at least  300,000 in funding) and when Lydon refused to sing, he hired Ronald Biggs in the Caribbean (ibid.).  However by this time interest in Punk was waning.   The music label response to punk was to sign any punk band they could get, and then groom them into a style that could be marketable to the mainstream.  Byrne (2008a: 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22) notes the record company ultimately decides who or what has priority:  “if they "don't hear a single," they can tell you your record isn't coming out.”  The acquisition frenzy led to a flooding of the market, an oversupply of ‘punk’ music and dilution of the culture as it became mainstream. Following on from the punk of ‘The Clash’, ‘Sex Pistols’ and ’The Buzzcocks’, was the new wave of the ‘Boomtown Rats’, ‘Elvis Costello’, ‘Madness’ and ‘Dexy and the Midnight Runners’.  Then came the new romantics of ‘Spandau Ballet’ and ‘Duran Duran’, then ‘Culture Club’, the ‘Thompson Twins’, ‘Tears for Fears’ and ‘Adam and the Ants’.  Even though these bands were groomed for the mass market they incubated within the punk environment, where music quality wasn’t the priority and experimentation was encouraged. .  So whilst the major labels failed to profit from the ‘Sex Pistols’, ultimately the ensuing bands became significant revenue earners for the labels.  Was success sustained? As a business model the ‘Sex Pistols’ had high impact, but were unsustainable and disbanded within two years. The ‘Sex Pistols’ succeeded in attracting large investments from major labels for no product, purely on the media they generated. The media attacked the ‘Sex Pistols’, they rarely performed live because no venue would have them, most radio stations banned their music as offensive and most retail outlets wouldn’t stock their product.   However their disruptions had longer‐term, innovative benefits for the sector by stimulating new music genres, for example ‘alternative’ is a genre now entrenched in the mainstream music sector. Malcolm McLaren said “the very destructive nature [of punk] was ultimately its most creative point. To me, that was what it was all about.” (Bordowitz 2004: 175).  Despite the short‐lived nature of the ‘Sex Pistols’, their cultural legacy has been healthy and widespread.  For example, in any shopping centre today people with spiky haircuts wear clothes with studs, rips or slogans.  It is worth noting that John Lydon has sustained a long‐term solo career, and the Sex Pistols have reformed and toured.   Key themes of interest 1. Do it yourself ethos; 
 93 2. Strong deviant community;  3. High media exposure (even if negative and controversial);  4. The selling of ancillary products (clothing, merchandise etc.).   
Hip hop and rap  Our day is coming. It’s inevitable that the president in another five years will be a hip hopper.  The mayor of Chicago will be somebody who has grown up on N.W.A, Chuck D, even Lil’ Kim and Foxy Brown. All of it will make sense then (Rapper KRS‐One in Watkins 2005: 187) 
 Description Rose (1994) argues rap and hip hop music is African protest music.  Hip hop and rap grew out of the South Bronx of New York City and took the rhythms and vocals of African music and melded into it the harder features of a post‐industrial ‘concrete city’ landscape (ibid.). Blow and Heibutzki (2003) distinguish rap from hip hop: 1. Rap is talking in rhyme to the rhythm of a beat; versus 2. Hip‐hop is a culture, a way of life for a society of people who identify, love, and cherish rap, break dancing, deejaying, and graffiti.  Situation The material conditions of the urban poor African American youth steadily declined in the years to the early 1980s.  During the 1970s most blue collar jobs in the Bronx and Harlem of New York had disappeared as manufacturing production moved to lower cost bases, leaving dismal financial prospects for poorly educated youth left there (Shabazz 1999).  As with South Africa whole communities that had previously existed around the manufacturing activities were being razed to make way for “urban regeneration for more privileged groups” (Basu and Werbner 2001: 244).  Violent street gangs featured heavily in the Bronx (Shabazz 1999), which was a district typified by concrete warehouses and an absence of greenery. Young adult residents of the Bronx generally couldn’t afford admission, or the appropriate dress standards to the clubs (let alone relate to the glamour of the disco played in the clubs) (Rose 2004).  
 94 Change agent There was no one leader of the hip hop or rap movement. Blow and Heibutzki (2003) argue Kool DJ Herc (a Jamaican‐born DJ who moved to the Bronx in 1967) was the godfather of hip‐hop. However Public Enemy were one of the earliest hip hop bands and were selected for further analysis as they have sustained successful careers in this field. Public Enemy formed in 1982 with an initial aim described by founder Chuck D as: “We’re out for the preservation and the building of the young black mind: trying to make people aware, makin’ ‘em educate themselves” (Kohn 1989: 41). Kohn suggests preservation requires a “survivalist posture”: ‘paranoid poised and armed’ (ibid.).  Public Enemy were heavily influenced by the Nation of Islam, which advocates black awareness and empowerment.    Although members have changed over the last two decades, Public Enemy generally included the following differentiated roles: 1. Chuck D (the evangelist MC); 2. Terminator X (the DJ who spins the music); 3. Professor Griff (who has been in and out of the band, and is Head of Information and Head of Security of the First World); and 4. Flavor Flav (the partying comic MC). Julian Shabazz claims this structure is similar to the organisational structure of the Black Panther Party (a revolutionary African American empowerment organisation) (in David Shabazz 1999). Contrary to this producer Rick Rubin claims he first signed Public Enemy because of their rapping prowess, and that their political stance developed later as a differentiator from other rap acts (Hilburn 1990).  When Public Enemy performs guards onstage dressed in combat gear and carrying toy Uzi machine guns flank them. They do not contribute to the music, rather they perform military style dancing or drill steps, possibly inspired by the South African toyi‐toyi.  The guards are members of the Security of the First World posse and are followers of the Nation of Islam.  Their link to Public Enemy was through member Professor Griff, the band’s ‘Minister of Information’ and head of security who claims they go onstage to project images of strength and order (Kohn 1989).  Their music has been described as a militant brand of political rhetoric and dislocating noise, or the power‐punk of America’s black underclass (Cosgrove 1988: 47).  Onstage Chuck D quotes from 
 95 Malcolm X speeches between songs, whose titles include ‘Rebel without a Pause’ and ‘Black Steel in the hour of Chaos’, which when performed live create an ambience of confrontation and crisis.  Change The abrasive sound of hip hop with a near absence of melody, seems to be inspired by the Bronx street culture and reflects the concrete jungles and street hip hop lifestyles.  Hip hop incubated in tenement street parties and the 1980s Bronx lifestyle (Shabazz 1999). Performances, deejaying and informal parties were held in warehouses, block parks and houses. The idea of warehouse parties now seems passé, but in the 1970s they were risky because the warehouses were exposed to the elements, unhygienic and dangerous.   A key part of emerging music scenes is a ‘do it yourself’ ethos (Smith & Maughan 1997), a behaviour frequently recognised in start‐up hip hop and rap businesses (Basu & Werbner 2001).   Hip hop lifestyles initially fostered an attitude of ‘bootstrapping’, or creating items from limited materials and ‘making do’, for example recorded music mixes, wearing sneakers and outsized clothes, and creating art in the street from spray cans (ibid.). Rose (1994) claims that budgets for rap videos were lower for other genres, and marketing often relied upon word of mouth within the hip hop and rap communities. Basu and Werbner (2001: 245) cite hip hop biographer Toop, who applauds the bootstrapping practices within hip hop and rap scenes for engendering an “entrepreneurial dynamic that privileged ‘ground up’ ingenuity … to produce an island of relatively undisturbed invention in a sea of go‐getter commerce.”  Aspirational mindsets and behaviours were encouraged.  In their formative years Public Enemy operated outside of major labels, with no mainstream media support, instead relying on student radio, and street press.  Public Enemy founders Chuck D and Flavor Flav deejayed and mixed rap tapes on student radio at Adelphi University in New York.  They would attend Bronx hip hop parties where Chuck D never suspected their music could be put on albums: “Hip hop was a big party thing. It was four hours deep.  How you going to put that on a record?” (Schuetz 2003: B1).  Musicians and DJs would sell their home made tapes from car boots (Shabazz 1999).  
 96  Change effect After over a decade of underground existence using university radio stations and street press, hip hop began to sell in large volumes.  Artists in the hip hop and rap communities began to make careers from their craft.  It transitioned from a local scene and subculture to a mass market, but remained outside of the major music channels, for example quite often using independent entrepreneurs from within the hip hop scene and offering favourable terms for artists.    Below are some key milestones in the emergence of hip hop and rap: 1. 1984: Rappers Dr. Dre and Ice Cube formed their own production companies, labels, and spin‐off ventures;  2. 1987: Run DMC, a rap group that melded rock and rap, released the album ‘Raising 
Hell’ which sold three million copies.  Public Enemy released their first album, at a cost of nine thousand dollars and tend days in the recording studio; 3. 1990: Public Enemy’s album ‘Fear of a Black Planet’ was released and sold a million copies in a week. 4. 1992: Rap generated US$400 million in sales, or five per cent of the total market.  However at this stage rap music was not included in official music charts because it was not sold in the appropriate channels.  In the same year:  a. Ice Cube’s album ‘The Predator’ topped Billboard's pop and R&B charts simultaneously;  b. NWA shocked the major labels when their album ‘Niggaz4Life’ debuted at number two on the Billboard charts; c. NWA split up, Dr Dre established Death Row Records, where he recorded his solo album ‘The Chronic’, which sold three million copies and spent eight months in the Billboard top ten charts. His first artist signing was Snoop Doggy Dogg, who yielded the multi‐platinum ‘Doggy Style’ album; 5. 1993: Rap sales for the year reached US$700 million; 6. 1994: By 1994 Dr Dre had rapped on or produced albums selling nearly twenty eight million copies; 7. 1998: annual sales of hip hop music reached US$100 million, or two per cent of total United States music sales; 
 97 8. 1999: rap sales began to be included in official charts.  At this time hip hop was the highest selling genre in the United States.  Sources: Shabazz 1999, McLeod 1999, musician websites.  Basu and Werbner (2001: 253) point out that a success factor of rap music is the intense and open networking done by people associated with the genre, describing it as a “conspicuous activity.”  They say that access to rappers, entrepreneurs and associated people is comparatively easy, and this enables the flow of information between aspiring and established players. For example Chuck D has his email address on the Public Enemy internet site and personally receives emails. They claim another common theme is that success does not signify selling out to Corporate America.    Rap and hip hop musicians have thrived perhaps because the harsh circumstances of their environment facilitated a strong sense of community, self identity, and celebration of success.  Werbner (1999: 564) claims that African American people may not necessarily possess the entrepreneurial attributes of frugality (or “pious thrift” (Basu and Werbner 2001: 257)) but the ability to sell culture with flair, innovation and an “aesthetic appreciation of the hedonist pursuit of luxury and the cultural imagination needed to tap this quest,” and the desire for novelty.  She claims the newly invented cultures of entrepreneurship include: social and communication networks; willingness to take risks and extend credit; cheap materials and production processes; perceived demand for culturally unique or cheap goods; racism; joblessness; and an appreciation of culture as a commodity to be repackaged and sold (Werbner 1999: 573).  Public Enemy have been, since 1982, a major music entity that is community driven and often at the forefront of changes in the music sector. At times they have operated independently, and at other times they have been signed to major labels.  Key elements of their career include:  1. Public Enemy became the first major label artist to offer songs in the then practically unknown MP3 format.  2. In 2003 Chuck D described the internet as “the most exciting thing in hip hop today” (Barton 2003: para. 10), and argued: 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will 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each and every time. And the whole paradigm of the music business is changing because there is another parallel music world to the one that has been dominated by the former rules. The new rules of music sharing, music distribution, and music exposure are now globalised. (Watkins 2005: 111)   Public Enemy became the first major artist to offer an entire album, ‘There’s a 
poison going on’, over the internet in digital MP3 format (Leyshon 2001). This caused many ‘bricks and mortar’ retail stores to ban the album.  Consequently a CBS executive left a voicemail for Chuck D explaining their position and Public Enemy incorporated his voicemail into a later song. The song ‘Swindlers Lust’ criticised malpractices of major music labels.  A subsequent tour was webcast live over the internet and they have also launched a full service online information network, rap station (artist website); 3. Chuck D has been active on the lecture circuit since 1989 addressing topics relating to rap and race. In particular he has been a critic of the music sector trying to sell black culture as a commodity. He released a book "Fight the Power" in 1997, which provided an “agenda, a manifesto and guideline into the post millennium hip hop mind” (Simon 1999: para. 5); Public Enemy won the Patrick Lippert Award for community service in 1996; 4. Since 2003, they have used direct marketing techniques and are highly approachable via email and frequent tours. Feedback from fans is placed onto the Public Enemy website, and Chuck D blogs actively and responds personally to emails; 5. The 2002 Public Enemy album, ‘Revolverlution’ included four tracks reworked by fans, who could download the vocals from the Public Enemy websites rework them and upload them back to the site. The album artwork and sleeve notes were created by fans;  6. Public Enemy minimise excessive overheads, for example, during their 2003 Australian tour a quality restaurant was booked by the tour promoter for their dinner, however the band and entourage went instead to the burger chain McDonalds; and  
 99 7. Chuck D established a record label, SlamJamz. Contractual deals offered to artists were made publicly available via the Public Enemy website in a gesture of transparency (and can be read in appendix one)  Based on: Simon 1999; Public Enemy 2003; Barton 2003; Eliezer 2003.  Incumbent Incumbents include major labels, mass market media and fashion.  Incumbent reaction Initially the hip hop scenes were ignored by mainstream media, Hallin (1986) would place hip hop within the sphere of deviance, of opinions the media reject as being unworthy of being heard. African American entrepreneurs from the ghettoes of New York whose highly successful operations featured content that was abrasive and challenging did not sit easily with societal stereotypes at the time.  However when the market for hip hop and rap styles had been demonstrated and could no longer be ignored, as with punk music, the major labels embarked on campaigns to sign rap bands to recording contracts. This caused many hip hop and rap observers to express anxiety about the growing influence and control of outside forces on the movement (Watkins 2005). A hip hop manager warned: “That flooding is a scary thing … they’re putting out too many records and a lot of them don’t mean (expletive). They’re just throwing them out and there can be a backlash” (Hilburn 1990: para. 30).   A twenty nine year old (African American) CEO of an independent record label complained about the move into hip hop and rap music by the major labels and mass market:   There’s a buzz, a sense of  “Why let the same of shit happen with this (rap) as what happened with all our musics?”  We created this shit out of nothing – turntables and electricity, now the shit sells and is earning big bucks.  I know a lot of people are, like, fuck that – this is our thing, and the “Man” ain’t going to take it from us – why let it become just another music that just pays the pockets of some white executive who would die if you ever dated his daughter? (Basu and Werbner 2001: 255). 
 100  Secondly, the 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became, to some extent, sanitised.  The manager also believed that rap’s underground, semi‐outlaw status had helped to keep the music energised and innovative (ibid.).  Once signed to major labels, rappers became afraid to experiment for fear of losing their recording contracts, according to Chuck D (Shabazz 1999: 15).  Dyson (ibid.: 32) notes the dilution of rap, or “taking the blackness out of the lyrics…. For many this means the sanitising of rap’s expression of urban realities, resulting in sterile hip hop which, devoid of its original fire, will offend no one” (ibid.).   Most rap music sales were to Caucasians. Basu and Werbner (2001) argue about seventy four per cent of rap sales in the first  six months of 1992 were purchased by Caucasians.  The major labels tried to whiten rap, promoting Caucasian artists such as Vanilla Ice and the Beastie Boys. The Beastie Boys were teamed with young African American rappers Run D.M.C. and recorded on CBS via Def Jam (the Public Enemy label).  Following from their Beastie Boys success, Run D.M.C. were challenged further with a cover of ageing heavy metal band, ‘Aerosmith’s classic song ‘Walk this way’.  It became a crossover hit in 1986 selling three million copies, revived the career of ‘Aerosmith’ and broadened the reach of Run D.M.C (Bordowitz 2004).  Run D.M.C. became the first rap artists to appear on MTV, which had previously been accused of being a “closed shop” to African American music (ibid.: 189).    Other cross merchandising to monetise hip hop and rap markets included Rappers advertising mainstream fashion, soft drinks, cars and more. The major fashion labels exaggerated the hip hop and rap clothing style in a seeming parody or celebration, combining sagging baggy trousers with ‘bling’ (multitudinous gold jewellery) and by 1993 eighty per cent of teens wore jeans sagging around their hips (and many still do), perhaps inspired by white rapper Marky Marks’ boxers rising above his jeans in Calvin Klein advertisements (Spiegler 1996).  This raised the ire of Chuck D, who argued “human beings can like hip hop but don’t become a parody of what you believe a hip hop person is” (Schuetz 2003: B1).  Public Enemy producer Hank Shocklee argued “we wanted to get rid of the gold chain and bring about a gold brain” (Shabazz 1999: 46).  However in their attempts to whiten rap thinking it would appeal to the Caucasian audience, the major labels did not understand Caucasian purchasing decisions. Spiegler 
 101 (1996: 30) argued “sanitising any element of hip hop culture to make it more palatable for middle class suburban whites was likely to result in failure,” perhaps because it was not real to the origins of hip hop. A Caucasian twenty three year old explained: “by entering into the hip hop sphere, I felt like I was opening a whole world that was closed to me before – it gave me the basis to meet all these people I had been scared of, whose main context for me was that they stole my bikes.”  He then says the attraction was part fascination, part admiration and part fear: “a lot of white kids wouldn’t make it through what inner‐city blacks do,” (ibid.: 31). Thus embracing hip hop lets Caucasians live the dream of a black inner city culture.  This is an amazing reversal of the anti‐apartheid roots of hip hop, but another person interviewed by Spiegler said “most of them don’t understand hip hop … you’ll see a bunch of white kids… trying to dress ‘hip hop’ but really they’re just jocks with rich parents” (ibid.).   Eminem was one of very few successful white rappers.  Following extraordinary music sales, he established his own label promoting African American rappers like ‘50 cent’ (who has been shot not once but seven times); has had an Oscar winning movie; and established his own clothing line.  He differentiates himself from other rappers by rapping about trailer park life as opposed to street life, as befitting his upbringing (artist website). He has a strong alliance with Dr Dre, but whether his success is sustainable or a novelty will be verified over time.  Rap music also had to contend with moral panic (Cohen 2002).  Tipper Gore, the wife of prominent politician Al Gore, in 1990 wrote an opinion piece titled ‘Hate, rape and rap’ in which she claimed that rap’s audience is made up of “angry disillusioned and unloved kids” and that rap tells them “it’s ok to beat people up” (Shabazz 1999: 29).  However Shabazz argues that rap is sold predominantly to sixteen to twenty four year old suburban white males or “hip young white professionals” (ibid.).  To counter this (and criticisms of vulgarity and crassness) though one could look to the levels of violence and misbehaviour in other genres and forms of media, for example computer games.  Public Enemy felt the moral panic after controversial anti‐Semitic comments were made by Professor Griff, whose role in Public Enemy was ‘Head of Information’ (Schruers 2000). Initially Chuck D sacked Griff and issued an apology claiming “we are not anti‐anybody – we are pro‐black,” (ibid.: 48) then under continuing pressure the band broke up. Chuck D visited Holocaust centres and spoke with an Auschwitz 
 102 survivor.  Several months later they reformed, with Professor Griff in a non‐speaking role (he later resigned) and released a CD that describes their plight and the subsequent retaliation. Titled ‘Fear of a Black Planet’ critics described it as “antimusic”, “a bed of noise not unlike radio static”, “swirling electroshock therapy”, “a rap opera” and “the sound of urban alienation” (ibid.).  In the modern western society suppression has been a common complaint against new music genres (hip hop and electronica) for instance, most cannot get radio airplay on mainstream stations.  It is very difficult to get airplay on mainstream stations because they receive thousands of songs per week and only select a few and then place them on high rotation.  Historically major labels have been accused of a practice called ‘Payola’ which  is  a  dubious  practice  of  promoters  giving  gifts  and  other  incentives  to  radio stations  in  return  for  high  rotation  broadcasts  of  their  music.    It  is  unfair  because ultimately  it means  there  is  an  uneven  playing  field  for music  and  secondly  because costs incurred have historically been passed on to musicians as promotional expenses.  It  is  illegal  because when  it was  a  common practice  the  incentives  and  gifts  to  radio stations spiralled out of control (for instance offering a Corvette car with new songs). Ultimately the musicians and consumers paid for payola via CD prices (Simpson 2006). Similarly, venues,  retailers and promoters may blacklist performers, preventing  them from performing. An example of this is the blacklisting of musician Prince by retailers who  refused  to  carry  his  new  CD  after  he  gave  it  away  free  with  the  purchase  of  a newspaper in the United Kingdom (Allen 2007).  Was success sustained? From rap and hip hop the African American community created a genre and economy that belonged to them and enabled their empowerment.  The group Public Enemy exemplify this. Public Enemy have succeeded in sustainable careers inside and outside of the mainstream for over twenty years.  What Public Enemy sell is not just music, it’s a lifestyle and community.  Although it has not been well documented, hip hop fostered a highly successful global virtual “ethnic enclave economy” (Basu and Werbner 2001: 257) encompassing at least music, video, management and entertainment companies.  It comprises self employed entrepreneurs who live dispersed around the globe but interact with each other successfully over the long term.   


















 114 2000).  Alternatives to Napster emerged that improved upon Napster, for example Gnutella contained a network of servers instead of one server and used open source programming code.  Thomas Middelhoff, CEO of major label Bertelsmann, noted the threat of file sharing: “if file sharing really has these continued growth rates … in the future content would have no value.” (Alderman 2001: 163).  Incumbent The dominant incumbents in this instance were the major labels, as represented by the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA). Secondly, mass market bands signed to the major labels potentially lost royalty revenues from file sharing, as perhaps represented by Metallica. Issues the major labels had to contend with included: 1. The threat of cannibalising their CD infrastructure and distribution channels; 2. Disagreements among key copyright stakeholders (publishers, musicians and labels) about online distribution royalties; 3. Additional resources were required to develop a legal alternative; and 4. Negotiations between the major labels to develop joint standards and content sharing ventures.  Negotiations were complex and protracted. Hence it may be understandable why the major labels were slow to react.  Incumbent reactions Bordowitz (2004: 215) argues the major labels initially were not concerned because they believed the activity to be centralised on tertiary campuses, because it required high speed internet. They felt they “could control it.”    Public relations and legal action was initially used to defend their businesses from the Napster threat. Fanning’s favourite band, ‘Metallica’, commenced and won legal proceedings against Napster for copyright infringement (Metallica v. Napster 2000). ‘Metallica’ drummer Lars Ulrich and his attorney hand delivered to Napster a printout of more than 317,000 internet user names that ‘Metallica’ claimed had illegally shared Metallica songs via Napster.  This sparked a “ferocious storm of controversy” (Varanini 2000: para. 3) both for and against the Napster model. For example Alan McGee, the manager of UK band ‘Oasis’, argued “how stupid of ‘Metallica’ to, in effect, sue 300,000 of their fans” (Arthur 2000: para. 19) versus USA artist manager Ron Stone, who said 
 115 Napster  “is the single most insidious website I've ever seen… its like a burglar’s tool” (Fisher & Yang 2003: para. 16). Napster’s senior management were subjected to intense media scrutiny, and their past failures were publicly exposed (as described above), and file sharing was said to carry computer viruses (Zetter 2004).  The RIAA had a history of legal action for copyright breaches pertaining to audio cassette and video cassette use (Beckerman 2007).  At the time Napster emerged, the RIAA, on behalf of its members, had already been planning legal action targeted at millions of consumer websites where MP3s had been posted.  Instead the RIAA could simply target Napster. An RIAA lawsuit charged Napster with "contributory and vicarious copyright infringement" and it sought the maximum US$100,000 allowable in damages for each copyrighted work that was infringed (‘A&M Records v. Napster 2001’; Menn 2003: 125). Clearly Napster could not pay damages that may reach “trillions of dollars”, and the RIAA sought an injunction to close Napster (ibid.).  It succeeded and in July 2001 Napster closed (although it later reemerged as a legal subscription offering).   Regulatory tactics used by the incumbents to minimise the threats of change agents include legal action (court cases and appeals) to prevent or at least delay changes. This slows the momentum of the change agents, weakening the impact of the revolution.  This may ultimately impede and frustrate creativity, entrepreneurial activity and cultural diversity, as seen with the legal action surrounding file sharing.  Most dangerously this tactic delays the developments of healthy change, such as new business models. Secondly legal action is costly, and generally incumbents can finance lengthy costly legal battles whereas change agents frequently cannot.  For instance the litigation against file sharer Kazaa lasted for five years (Friis 2008). Legal action is particularly effective because regulatory regimes and processes will never keep pace with the rapid change of volatile industries, and so frequently legislation requires amendments, further frustrating creativity and entrepreneurial activity (not to mention benefits to consumers and musicians) in this sector. Amendments to legislation tend to make it more complex, necessitating highly paid legal professionals to navigate the legislation.  Adding to this, many lawsuits take place across several continents, and this additional complexity adds to the cost of the legal action. It is generally an inbuilt cost to the major labels, that tend to retain in‐house counsel in 
 116 countries worldwide, but for an upstart company the additional complexity of multiple legal territories may be financially crippling.  An example of this is the years it took the federal Australian government to amend their copyright legislation (Copyright Amendment Act 2006) to enable consumers to make copies across formats for personal use (for instance to copy a CD to a computer hard drive). Up until 2007 doing so was illegal in Australia.  Thirdly legal action acts as a deterrent to others, for instance as at  May 2008 there had been over 40,000 high profile legal cases in the United States where consumers were ordered to repay music labels for the cost of illegally downloaded music (Ziemann 2008).    In 2000, a Sony Senior Vice President announced:    The  industry will  take whatever steps  it needs  to protect  itself and protect  its revenue streams...It will not  lose that revenue stream, no matter what...Sony is going  to  take  aggressive  steps  to  stop  this.  We  will  develop  technology  that transcends  the  individual  user.  We  will  firewall  Napster  at  source  –  we  will block it at your cable company, we will block it at your phone company, we will block  it at your  ISP. We will  firewall  it at your PC... These strategies are being aggressively pursued because there is simply too much at stake (Anastasi 2000: para. 8).  Thirdly, the major labels attempted to provide a legal alternative to file sharing.  In July 2000 EMI began offering downloads of about one hundred albums and over two hundred singles. A particular program was required to hear the music, another program required to ensure the download license was obeyed, the music couldn’t be swapped (for example you couldn’t take it off your computer and put it in a CD player), and it cost similar to the price of the physical CDs. An EMI spokesperson said “we want to learn what the users want, how they find the user experience” to which Arthur (2000: para. 38) replies “actually it’s right down the digital road at www.napster.com.  You get it free.” In September 2000 a coalition of music and technology companies called the Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI) launched a CD featuring a digital protection watermark.  They issued a public challenge to anyone who could defeat its newly minted watermark. Hackers succeeded almost immediately, and the coalition ceased activities in 2001 (Craver 2000; SDMI 2006).  Other digital rights management 
 117 software, including ‘root‐kit spyware’ encoded onto CDs was found to be unplayable in standard CD players or damaged personal computers (Palmer & Cox 2007; Tapscott & Williams 2006; Roush 2006). When it was brought to their attention, Sony‐BMG’s President of Global Digital Business said, “Most people don’t even know what a root‐kit is … so, why should they care about it?” (Tapscott & Williams 2006: 35).  Fourthly, attempts were made to acquire control of Napster and implement a revenue model. Napster initially passed up several deals with the record industry, including to license Napster’s software to others, which would have freed the company from potential liability and the acquirer would have gained the software (Menn 2003). At the time it may have been impossible to value the potential business realistically, because it was new and rapidly growing.  In May 2000 Hummer Winblad Venture Partners committed to invest US$13 million for a minority stake, giving Napster an official worth of $65 million. At the time Shawn Fanning said, "There's no real business plan. But we feel strongly people will pay, maybe US$5 to $15 a month to download music files,” (Ross 2000: para. 3).  Most key executive positions in Napster were replaced, resulting in litigation from those who were removed.  Later Bertelsmann (later BMG) acquired Napster from Hummer in stock options.  Bertelsmann believed it had acquired thirty three million ‘customers’ and innovative technology, but as BMG Chief Operating Office, Strauss Zelnick argued: “they aren’t customers ... it’s free and they have zero revenues,” (Menn 2003: 263‐264) and converting those customers into paying subscribers was incredibly difficult, as has been demonstrated by the performance of Napster since 2001.  The major labels (including another section of BMG) pursued Napster for copyright infringements and in May 2002 Napster filed for bankruptcy.  In 2007 three of the major labels settled their legal action against Napster, after Napster costs totalled US$470 million (Laura 2008).  Subsequent relaunches of Napster using a subscription model have failed to replicate its initial success.     Was success sustained? The goal of Napster was to streamline digital music sharing and create a community, including chat rooms that were part of the Napster service (Menn 2003). Shawn 
 118 Fanning noted another goal was social; he wanted to create a community (Greenfield 2000).   As at 2008 there is a global proliferation of higher quality P2P file sharing intermediaries (for example BitTorrent). In 2005, twenty billion songs were downloaded illegally worldwide (IFPI Piracy Report 2006). New forms of digital piracy include  1. LAN file sharing, which is the sharing of large volumes of music via business or university LANs; 2. Digital stream ripping, a process of converting streamed music into a stored file.  This is similar to the old concept of taping off the radio;  3. Mobile music piracy, this includes the transfer of music files via Bluetooth or memory card swapping; and  4. Pre‐release piracy, which is the leaking of music onto the internet before it has been officially released.  This also allows physical pirate copies to be made available simultaneously with official copies at release date. The modes of piracy proliferate in tandem with the increase in communication devices and music formats.   In a study on illegal file sharing, Liebowitz (2006: 32) concluded that it has brought “significant harm to the music industry.”  Napster was created with no commercial incentive, however a sustained effect has been the proliferation of music piracy.  Napster failed because it was illegal and was unable to convert to a legal model and consequent legal action forced its closure.  Secondly it lacked a business model and Menn (2003) argues the Napster senior management was dysfunctional. Initially there was no commercial incentive for Napster (Gorov 2000). Shawn Fanning said questions around the business model and legality were ignored because his focus remained heavily on server maintenance: “even if we make bad business decisions, as long as we keep the servers stable and have it growing. That’s what we know how to do, so we’ll focus on that” (Menn 2003: 127).  Key themes of interest 1. Streamlined access to digital music; 2. Enabled millions of consumers worldwide to share music freely, albeit illegally;  






 122 portion of the Apple and Label charges should be cut.  The primary driver for Apple appears to be to sell iPods, not music, although doing so has created a new revenue stream for them. Similarly the music label is incurring a fee similar to that of a traditional CD product, whereas some costs are negated with a digital format.    The impact on physical music retailers was reflected in store closures.  Increasingly consumers are acquiring their music online.  Apple created an easy one‐stop‐shop for the purchase of legal digital music.  While the trend to music retail store closures cannot be wholly attributed to Apple, it is a new entrant to the competitive landscape.    Was success sustained? iTunes is now an established legal alternative to file sharing, providing generally secure, virus free content.  It is now the leading supplier in the global legal digital music market. Secondly Apple has not only created a new revenue stream, but perhaps more importantly, they have used iTunes to cross‐sell their hardware.  Apple succeeded in negotiations with the major labels, perhaps where many start‐up companies have failed, because they are an equally powerful player, albeit in a different sector. The experience of the music streaming service iMeem (discussed in the conclusion of this chapter) appears to be standard practice for how the major labels negotiate with start up music services.  A similar example is Sonific, a music streaming service that closed in May 2008, claiming :   when we approached the major record label decision makers in order to obtain licenses for some of the music in their catalogues we have routinely faced demands for very large cash advances and fixed per‐stream minimum payments, pressure to give them company equity, and requirements of utterly bizarre usage restrictions.  It seems that the industry’s major stakeholders still prefer this turf to remain unlicensed rather than to allow real‐life, workable and market‐based solutions to emerge by working with new companies such as Sonific.  …  we therefore had to realize that a company that wants to provide interactive streaming music services must either a) risk the constant complaints of their users, due to the lack of hit content  b) proceed to use any and all music (this is routinely done by allowing users to upload their own MP3s) without the 





























Shostakovich  Vuyisili Mini  Subversion  Revolutions  Suppression via Propaganda or Force Sex Pistols  Public Enemy  Bootstrapping  Ancillary products  Acquisitions – bands and niche labels 
Voodoo  Dance music  Culture  Community  Dilute the community   Commoditise the product for a mass market Napster    Cost   Access methods  Legal action   Propaganda  The table above highlights recurring themes that emerged and are of interest to the initial question of how specialist musicians can succeed in the current environment.  From a change agent position, they include: 1. A strong sense of community; 2. Cost;  3. Access methods; 4. Speed, revolutionary behaviours; and  5. Instigators ‐ revolutions are often personified.  Consumers associate more readily a leader, especially a charismatic leader. Rarely have those who hold market power initiated disruptive trends, but they have been successful at defending or leveraging them to maintain their position.  The dominant incumbents in the sector have historically reacted to disruptions and threats by exercising power to defend their position via: 1. Financial action ‐ flooding the market and diluting the music product with imitations.  Incumbents generally may sustain a financial loss for longer than start‐up businesses;  2. Regulatory action ‐ for example lawsuits to prevent or at least delay changes; and  3. Suppression, for example using propaganda and/or violence.  The case studies going back five hundred years, show dominant systems in the music sector maintain their position despite continual disruptive impacts as music has evolved. The nature of the ‘mainstream’ mass market requires a large (and so it follows, dominant) system to service it.  However the composition of the dominant incumbents 
 127 has changed.  This analysis has also revealed that a powerful industry has grown around music over the century to 2008. By looking to history, the study has not been able to disprove the claim by May and Singer (2001: 128) that “in reality record labels may have little to fear in the long run” because the labels are the current incumbents in the dominant system. A mass market will always exist and dominant players successfully react, defend or slowly adapt to revolutionary changes. However the nature and composition of the music sector mass market incumbents is changing and this will be discussed later.  Despite this, it is still apparent that opportunities exist for specialist music. Musicians who operate outside the mainstream music structure can do so, but overall their impact has been limited.  Their music tends to be of a specialist nature. The case studies highlighted recurring opportunities and barriers to innovation in music.    These themes are relevant today as competitive strategies. For instance, the singer of popular United States band ‘The Dixie Chicks’ spoke against the United States invasion of Iraq during an interview.  The band suffered a severe public relations and media backlash (propaganda). The singer later issued an apology and their next album included songs about the controversy.  Some radio stations refused to play the album or advertise their tours or promote a documentary about the controversy. Broadcaster NBC cited a policy “barring ads dealing with public controversy” (Wikipedia 2008b: para.51).  The documentary distributor, Harvey Weinstein noted  “It's a sad commentary about the level of fear in our society that a movie about a group of courageous entertainers who were blacklisted for exercising their right of free speech is now itself being blacklisted by corporate America” (ibid.).    Secondly, May and Singer (2001) argued the major labels simply need to attack the fast growing and efficient internet music companies with legal action while the labels restructure their business models.  However the major labels cannot target all online music startups, instead they target those that are rapidly growing or have gained market traction, such as Napster and MP3.Com.  iMeem is a music sharing social network that streams advertising‐supported music.  It acts as a host to music shared by its users.  As a start‐up, iMeem tried to negotiate with the major labels to allow legal streaming of their music catalogues by Imeem users. It has been said that major labels will not do licensing deals with startups because they do not have “millions of users 






Introduction Adequate information is available and was obtained on elements of new music business models, and has been supplied within chapter six (Music value chains).  A gap in knowledge is in testing the extent to which musicians can manage their operations, for example, to make their own decisions.  What is in question is their propensity and willingness to systematically make decisions rather than act on whims.  Would musicians prefer to focus on their music and let someone else (for example, a manager, or record label) perform these activities?   This next section describes a study undertaken to explore this question.  To analyse this a study was undertaken which comprised: 1. A detailed model of decisions required in the management of a music career was prepared.  Named ‘Musical map’, the model detailed the financial impacts of decisions made. It may be used by some musicians to represent their business model; 2. The model was tested by musicians; and  3. Musicians then answered a questionnaire that sought feedback on their use of the model and propensity to manage their music careers.  Responses were analysed to assess the degree of skills participants currently hold, versus the required skills in order to manage a career and business. Secondly, responses relating to their motivations, inclination and attitude towards using the model were collated and analysed. 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Model construction   The purpose of the model was to highlight financial risks and rewards in the music sector. It included all measurable actions by musicians in the music system and their consequences, as identified in the literature review.   Its value is that it provides a foundation for systematic decision making, as opposed to musicians making decisions based upon whims.  It may represent a decision making tool, because it highlights the costs and benefits of various options at each step in the value chain. By using it musicians may be more aware of the risks and impacts of their decisions. This may result in faster, more informed decisions and increased certainty.  The model encompassed decisions to be made in the music system, for example: 1. Optimal allocation of resources (time, capital, brand, experiences); 2. Scheduling of actions; 3. Distribution methods; 4. Whether actions taken are sustainable; and  5. The interactions, and causes and effects of elements within the value chain (for example if the music is licensed to a soft drink commercial what is the impact on brand value and future sales?).  Initial iterations of the model included risk weightings for non‐financial, human, experiential impacts (such as exhaustion or band disintegration from excessive touring), but the calculations required became too complex for this exploratory study. For example, without training users may not be expected to assign a quantitative risk weighting for the potential impact of exhaustion, however risk professionals can quantify such risks.  Musicians most probably do consider such risks informally, but may face difficulty factoring it quantitatively.  As a result, the model was amended to focus solely on financials, and participants were advised to consider the non‐financial impact of decisions, for example, on relationships, teamwork etc.  This was a practical solution, and in no way implies that the personal and experiential considerations are subordinate to financial consequences in decision making.  Model assumptions The model was based upon a decision tree framework (Bagley 2003).  It was created around each of the five elements of the music system. It lists fields for each cost and 
 132 income within that system.  The data fields used in the model were sourced from publicly available literature.  It used as a basis the financial items cited in the literature review, in particular those provided by Steve Albini (2003) and Courtney Love (2004).  Other sources, including May and Singer (2001), were used as a crosscheck.   Participants were asked to enter their own financial data into the model.  Once completed the model was tested for over forty hours with multiple scenarios before being released.   In structuring the model, judgements were made about types of expenditure and income.  Many of these judgements can be disputed and participants were invited to respond to any they disagreed with.  The judgements included: 1. The model assumes a dollar currency but is flexible enough that any decimal currency can be used. Initially the input data was converted into ratios to minimise the currency effect, for instance if a band tours across countries using different currencies, but this was removed as it became too complex. It is assumed that all financials entered are in the same currency and participants were advised to use a currency converter. If a non‐decimal currency is used it may result in miscalculations; 2. As discussed previously, the model does not cover the non‐financial aspects of a music career (or ‘experiential impacts’), it is purely focussed on financials.  This is a significant omission, but it beyond the scope of this case study.  Participants were asked to consider the human cost ‐ exhaustion, relationships etc. in addition to the financial outcome.  This was especially important where the financial outcome was neutral; 3. Distribution expenses include packaging – in this context it is the physical act of printing and packaging, as opposed to design of packaging, which is a promotion and manufacturing cost (see point twelve).  This assumption was made to distinguish between digital and physical distribution costs. In digital distribution no physical printing or packaging is required.  However some design costs are incurred in digital distribution, and are included (as a promotion item). For example, a website may include song downloads as well as sleeve designs or artwork which can also be downloaded. It is a ‘nice to have’ as opposed to physical distribution packaging which is a ‘must have’; 
 133 4. Merchandising income is not considered as a performance income, it is considered a promotion income, regardless if sales are made during tours.   The bulk of merchandise sales generally do occur on tour where consumers see the performance and, if it is a great performance, they head to the merchandise stand to buy a t‐shirt, performance DVD etc. The t‐shirt will then promote the band every time it is worn.  Merchandising is not crucial to the success of a tour, however it can provide the highest financial margin of tours. The tour may be budgeted as break even, that is door and ticket sales will cover the cost of touring, and merchandise sales can provide a buffer to improve the quality of life for musicians on the road.  Merchandising is financially risky. This is because demand is highly variable and merchandise has upfront fixed costs. For example, the band must estimate and pay for a number of t‐shirts to be made before the tour, and cannot guarantee they would be sold.  It is unlikely that customers would want to order and pay upfront at a performance, then wait for the item to be mailed to them after the tour when the musicians have collated all orders and organised printing. Consumers want to purchase spontaneously. However for the purpose of the model, a performance can be undertaken without merchandise, so it is considered a promotion item; 5. Tour promotion is considered a performance as opposed to a promotion cost.  For example, before they tour musicians may have a farewell party and this is considered a performance cost.  It is directly related to the tour and if the tour is not promoted it will most likely fail. The promotion would not go ahead without the tour, so any tour posters etc are considered a performance cost; 6. The cost of new equipment (instruments etc) is considered a production expense. New equipment may be purchased prior to a tour, but it is to replicate music that has already been produced.  However, if a musician hires equipment for a tour it is a cost that is directly related to performing so there is a separate field for equipment hire. For instance an Australian musician may not want to risk putting guitars through airport luggage and hires equipment for touring through Europe, In this instance the equipment hire would be entered as a performance cost.  Most new equipment though is considered a production expense because without it there is no music; 7. Despite every effort to homogenise this model for a global study, musicians may need to consider country variances when using this.  It has been established on the 






PERFORMANCE    PRODUCTION      
Performance expenses    Production expenses 
     
Variable expenses     Variable expenses  Tour promotion (for example pretour party. Put poster costs in cells M8‐M10)    Producer points (royalties‐ %) Petrol cost ($ per kilometre) (petrol consumption per kilometre * petrol price per litre)    Studio fee (per day) Average km (number per day)    Food and Lodging (per day) Vehicle hire ($ per day)    Equipment hire (per day) Air / train tickets    Recording tape, CD's Instrument and Audio Equipment hire ($ per day)    Recording duration (days) Venue hire? (gross $ amount)     Accommodation ($ per day gross per person)    Total variable expenses Band  ($ per person per day for food, laundry, labour (?) etc.)     Number of band members    Fixed expenses (total) Crew ($ per person per day, including their per diems) ‐ Tour manager, sound mixer, lighting, security, film staff etc.    Producer fee Number of crew    Legal fee Tour duration (Days)    Manager fee Total variable expenses ($)    Agent fee 
    Technician/s fees  
Fixed expenses (total)    Music instrument and sound equipment purchase 
    Other equipment purchase (for example software, hardware) Stage & construction    Transport and cartage Rehearsal space rental    Mastering costs Clothing expense    Manufacturing (cost per item) Legal fee    Number of items manufactured Manager fee    Artwork (for example CD/DVD packaging design) Agent fee    Total fixed expenses Booker fee     Medical (for example vaccinations etc.)    Total expenses Visa/Passports and other travel administration costs     Freight     Insurance    Production Income Filming, recording of performance (payment to a company, not crew)    CD sales (units) Performance webcast / podcast payment    Value of CD unit sale that is returned to Musicians ($ per CD) Total fixed expenses    DVD sales (units)     Value of DVD unit sale that is returned to Musicians ($ per CD) Total expenses    Total return from digital sales of film ‐ iTunes etc Total expenses per day    Total return from digital sales of music ‐ iTunes etc          Total Income 
Performance Income     Performance lump payments     Performance ticket sales (number sold)    Net Production Income Income received from portion of ticket price ($ per ticket)    Continued/ 
 138 Payments received from media entities to appear on tv     Payments received from media entities to appear on internet ( 'premium' access to Musicians online for ie chat, online interviews with consumers etc)     Payments received from media entities to appear on radio     Tour Sponsorship          Total Income          
Net Performance Income       
DISTRIBUTION    PUBLISHING      
Distribution expenses    Publishing expenses      
Variable expenses     Variable expenses  Physical CD distribution ($ per CD)    Publisher fee (time based) Number of CDs    Publisher fee (% of total publishing income) Physical DVD distribution ($ per DVD)     Number of DVDs    Total variable expenses Physical 'other merchandise' distribution ($ per item)     Number of items of 'other merchandise'    Fixed expenses (total)     Publisher fee (if lump sum payment) Total variable expenses    Manager fee     Legal fee 




n/a    Performance royalties ‐ other (ringtones, ecards,  karaoke etc.)      Total Income    Total Publishing Income      












SUMMARY*          Function  Income  Expense  Profit Promotion   $‐      $‐      $‐    Production   $‐      $‐      $‐    Distribution   $‐      $‐      $‐    Performance   $‐      $‐      $‐    Publishing   $‐      $‐      $‐             Total   $‐      $‐      $‐                         
Questions this workbook could answer  Input sheet cells to change        What if CD sales were between x and x?  H7 What if petrol prices increased?  B7 How many units will I need to sell to break even?  E34‐E39 If we tour can we make x% return  column b + n51&52 What is the optimal target level of profit and expenses?  summary sheet* How many CDs need to be sold for us to break even  E34+E35 and summary sheet What if we released music digitally only?  E34+E39         * (do not change the data in this section of the sheet ‐ it feeds from the input page)        Note: Please be aware that this sheet provides an overview of costs and income. So you may choose to amend other cells to impact on the questions above.  In addition other variables do need consideration, such as taxes and government grants, fees from online service providers, non‐financial considerations etc. These you could add in to this workbook  The pages below in the model provided a summary of each segment of the value chain.  Data in these sheets were auto calculated (using macros) based upon data entered in the input sheet. This would automatically give the user a ‘dashboard’ of their operations: 
 141   PERFORMANCE SUMMARY Cost  $  Note  Income   $   Note Tour promotion:  $0    Performance lump payments   $‐      Rehearsal space rental:  $0    Performance ticket sales (number sold)   $‐      Travel  $0    Income received from portion of ticket price ($ per ticket)   $‐      Crew  $0     Payments received from media entities ‐ tv   $‐      Stage and construction  $0    Payments received from media entities ‐ internet   $‐      Equipment cost  $0     Payments received from media entities ‐ radio   $‐      Venue hire  $0    Tour Sponsorship   $‐      Band Living expenses  $0         Recording of Performance   $0    Total Income   $‐      Tour Agent and Booker fee  $0         Manager's fee  $0         Legal fee  $0                    Total expenses  $0           PRODUCTION SUMMARY Cost  $  Note  Income   $   Note Manager fees:  $0    CD sales (units)   $‐      Legal fees:  $0     Element of CD unit sale that is returned to Musicians (unit cost per CD)   $‐      Producer fees  $0     DVD sales (units)   $‐      Technicians  $0    Element of DVD unit sale that is returned to Musicians (unit cost per CD)   $‐      Studio fee:  $0    Total return from online sales of film ‐ iTunes etc   $‐      Cartage and Transportation:  0    Total return from online sales of music ‐ iTunes etc   $‐      Mastering:  $0         New instruments:  $0         Other equipment purchase (for example software, hardware)  $0     Total Income   $‐      Manufacturing  0         Artwork (for example CD packaging)  0                     Total expenses  $0          
 142   PROMOTION SUMMARY Cost  $  Note  Income  $  Note             Video/DVD production (manufacture & distribution)  0    Video/DVD sales ($ per annum received by Musicians)  $0   Posters  $0    Performance Merchandise sales   $0   Album Artwork  $0    Website Merchandise sales   $0   Promotional still photo production (for various purposes)  $0    Retail Merchandise sales   $0   Tshirts   $0    Merchandise sales via other outlets  $0   Advertisements  0    Blog subscriptions  $0   Other merchandise  $0         Mailouts   $0    Net Promotion Income ($ per annum)  $0   Website (construction, maintenance)  0         Merchandising manager's fee  $0         Manager's fee  $0         Legal fees  $0         Public Relations  $0                    Total expenses  $0           PUBLISHING SUMMARY Cost  $  Note  Income  $  Note Publisher fee   0    Performance royalties ‐ digital  0    Business registration   0    Performance royalties ‐ television  0    Manager's fee  $0    Performance royalties ‐ radio  0   Lawyer's fee  $0    Performance royalties ‐ other  0              Total expenses  $0    Gross publishing income  0     DISTRIBUTION SUMMARY Cost  $  Note  Income  $  Note Manufacturing, packaging and distribution:  $0     n/a       Edistribution  $0         Manager's fee  $0         Legal fees  $0                    Total  $0          
Questionnaire The questionnaire was administered electronically, using Survey Monkey, an easy to use internet based survey tool.  It can be accessed anytime from any country via the internet, and was only available in English language.  It included open‐ended questions requiring commentary responses and multiple choice questions that could be quantified and ranked.  A copy of the questions is provided in the Appendix.   
 143  General themes of the questionnaire included: 1. Did it work? Were there any technical issues that may confound the results (for example macro errors); 2. The degree of difficulty in using the model; 3. Perceptions of the model (did they understand it?); and 4. Feedback on their ‘mindset’ during the process (interest levels in the activity). How do musicians feel about systematic decision‐making?  This questionnaire aimed to gain insight of the ability and inclination of musicians in undertaking management activities. For example they may be capable of these functions but not interested in doing them.  The questionnaire is provided in the Appendix and a copy of the model has been supplied with this thesis.  














Cost  US$'000 Recording costs           500  Band manager (20% commission)          100  Lawyer            25  Business manager (accountancy etc.)            25  Tax          170  For the musicians           180  
Total Recording costs       1,000 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Table 18: Indicative promotion costs   Cost  US$'000 Video production*          500  Tour support costs (band pays 100%)          200  Independent radio promotion** (band pays entire cost)          300  
Total promotion costs       1,000   Based on Love 2000: para’s.: 4‐23.  *Total cost of video production is $1 million and is split between band and label **Use of independent promoters so the labels cannot be accused of payola. This is discussed in more detail in the promotion section of the value chain chapter.  Although the initial signing and $1 million advance (repayable) looked very positive, the band now owed the label $2 million.  If all of the million records are sold at full price  (excluding retailer mark‐up and with no discounts or record clubs) the band earns $2 million in royalties, since their twenty per cent royalty works out to $2 a record.  Hence the band made no profit.  The label however grossed $11 million, in part due to keeping the costs of production in‐house. The label profits at just over US$7 million.   In terms of label costs, Love provided them as per the table below.  
Table 19: Indicative label costs 
  Cost  US$'000 CD manufacture          500  Video production**          500  Publishing royalty payments          750  Marketing (retail, for example posters)        2,200  
Total costs to label        3,950  Based on Love 2000: para’s.: 4‐23.  Below is a further breakdown of label costs between fixed, variable and discretionary: 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Figure 10: The music value chain              Most financial analysts (such as in investment banks) investigating the music sector simply assess the value chain within product manufacture and distribution, because investment research focuses on listed companies (for example, the major labels, major retailers) involved in the sector as opposed to musicians.  The bulk of major label music revenues traditionally come from product manufacture and sales. However musicians earn a significant proportion of income from touring, so performance was included as a key link of the value chain. 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 154 some production costs are recouped from royalties which comprise $1.50‐$3 per unit (or nine to nineteen per cent).  That is, production staff may be paid an upfront lump sum but also receive a share of sale royalties.  This complicates a basic breakdown of this type because some royalties are in reality manufacturing costs.   Recording and manufacturing CDs has traditionally been a capital‐intensive process.  Major labels usually advance funds to musicians for the costs of music production.  Advances are loans (Vogel 2007), usually repayable in full from music royalties before the musician receives any proceeds from sales of the completed product.  The labels generally encourage musicians to use the recording studios and staff of the label (or affiliated with the label).  Krasilovsky and Shemel (2007) claim most musicians sign to a label for three or more recordings.  The label tends to set the recording budget.  A generic calculation of advances is that they total two thirds of the average royalties from prior recordings.  If a musician doesn’t sell well, until for example the third album, then the musician doesn’t receive any royalties from the third album until the balance of the first two is paid off.  Generally, major musicians have to sell five hundred thousand CDs before they see any return (Downhill Battle 2004) or profit. At that rate it is common for musicians to never fully repay advances, a situation Vogel describes as an “often fruitless and futile recoupment situation” (2007: 251). An important note is that these contracts may contain exclusivity clauses that prevent musicians from performing outside of the signed label (for example recording with musicians on other labels).  So if musicians do not sell well, they cannot repay their debt to the label and cannot sign to another label.  This is despite the label benefiting from their music via ancillary activities such as charging them for use of the label owned studios and staff. Musician David Byrne (2008b: para. 22) argued:   the typical pop star often lives in debt to their record company and a host of other entities, and if they hit a dry spell they can go broke. Michael Jackson, MC Hammer, TLC — the danger of debt and overextension is an old story.  Steve Jobs believes a key problem for artists (and the recording business) is advances, and the way to minimise the problem is to cut advances, that is, cut the cost of recording and production of music (Goodell 2003: 4).  
 155 Now to look at the elements of production – composition, recording and mastering, and manufacturing ‐ in terms of traditional practices by major labels.  Composing costs include: 1. Musician time; 2. Rehearsal space; and 3. Music equipment hire or purchase; and may also include:   4. Royalty payments from sound libraries (for sound loops or copyrighted sound bites);  5. Hire of composers and or tuition; and 6. Recording tools (for example, basic recording equipment or simply pen and paper and copyists who transcribe the composition).  Rehearsal space is generally the largest cost and this depends upon the site (location, size and soundproofing).  Some bands choose to compose or refine their compositions in the studio, which can be very costly.  Another key composition cost that is often overlooked is musician time.  Usually this isn’t included in budgets but there is an opportunity cost because the musician could be otherwise in paid employment during rehearsal or composition time.  Advances tend to provide for living expenses so that the musicians can focus on their music.     Lebrecht (1997: 434) cites a comprehensive earnings survey that showed music composers on average obtained less than ten per cent of their income from composition.  The bulk of their income came from teaching, copying, performing and non‐music activities.  He claims that no more than two or three composers in any publishers list can earn a living from composition.  Recording  Professional studio use is generally the largest cost in music production.  Example details for studio pricing and equipment are provided as an Appendix.  Studios and rehearsal spaces need to be booked in advance, and often have rigid time schedules due to cost pressures.  An indicative rate for hire of a studio is advertised as AU$850 per day.  An indication of cost to hire an engineer (to use the studio sound recording 
 156 equipment) is $1000 per day (March 2004).  A professional studio often has three management staff and four sound engineers.  Because the musician must recoup all recording costs before they receive any payments, the onus is on the musician to record as quickly and cheaply as possible.  However the creative element can influence the time it takes, with musicians or producers seeking perfection, requiring excessive retakes, the latest most expensive production equipment, multiple recording sites, additional staff (musicians, production staff) and other variables.    An example of recording excess described by Dannen (1991) is ‘Boston’, a 1980’s band that was led by musician Tom Scholz.  Recording of their second album went over budget and overtime. It is claimed this was due to Scholz’s quest for sonic perfection, for example he rerecorded a drum track seven hundred times before he was satisfied (ibid.). When Boston’s third album was two years late and over budget, the label (CBS/Epic) ceased royalty payments to the band (which they had been receiving from their highly successful first album).  This resulted in a letter to the label from Scholz who claimed:   Apparently some people at Epic feel I should be punished for my refusal to sacrifice quality and deliver a record that’s compromised by haste.  In fact, I will 
never foist a second‐rate record on the public to fill CBS’s pockets or my own, (ibid: 137).   Because CBS withheld royalties the band ran out of funds but kept working on the album (after hours from their new day jobs) and by 1985 it was nearing completion.  The third album was released on MCA (another label) in 1986, four years late, and eight years after the second album (Dannen 1991).  It sold four million copies and most probably never recouped outlaid funds, or the seven hundred retakes of the drum track.  Production staff  The producer role varies according to the experience and needs of the music entity, and defining the role at the outset of a project is often a matter for sensitive negotiation. Some musicians want the producer involved with all of the musical decisions associated with a song or album, whereas others, possibly more experienced musicians 
 157 need less production input, and consequently minimise their production costs.  Steve Steckler, an American audio producer, says producing is looking at the big picture, a holistic task of examining and overseeing all of the musical elements in a project (Digman 2004).  The UK Music Managers Forum (2003: 165) describes the role of a producer more dramatically: “the artist may think he is the best person to describe how to approach a particular recording but in many ways the artist may be too close to his art to do this.”  The forum believes there is “great antipathy” towards the idea of artists producing themselves because this too often leads to “over‐indulgence,” concluding the producer is a go‐between “scapegoat” (ibid.).  Passman (2000: 132) describes the role of a producer as being:   responsible for overseeing and bringing the creative product into tangible form (a recording), which means (a) being responsible for maximising the creative process (finding and selecting songs, deciding on arrangements, getting the right vocal sound etc.), and (b) taking care of all the administration, such as booking studios, hiring musicians, staying within a budget, filing union reports, etc.   The mechanical aspects of administration – contacting and co‐ordinating musicians, arrangers and engineers, filing paperwork, etc. – are often delegated to a production coordinator (Krasilovsky & Shemel 2007; Digman 2004).   A producer may be needed to make sense of the overwhelming technologies and tools in the studio, in conjunction with the engineer.  The management of these functions keeps the recording within budget, and that is a key role of the producer.  Producers may come with the studio or be independent.  A label may permanently employ a producer and use in‐house and allied facilities and staff, thus keeping revenues within the label.  Producers are usually paid a fixed compensation (hourly rate or package rate up front) and a percentage of sale royalties (usually three per cent but can range from one to five per cent) (Krasilovsky & Shemel 2007: 35).  Musicians pay for this cost, usually via the advance that is repayable from royalties.  Mastering involves sound engineers who provide a fresh ‘set of ears’ and who edit and mix the layers of recorded material into a cohesive song. The role of mastering in 
 158 traditional music production cannot be underestimated, for example Britney Spears may sing only one take (sings once only for recording) and then tells the producer to “make it up in the mix” (Daniel 2005), requiring engineers to edit it into a quality vocal.  Mastering requires technical skills including the use of complex mixing and audio software and hardware.    The abilities of production staff can be critical in the recording of an album, and hiring them is a critical decision. It is sometimes complicated when the label a band is signed to puts forward label aligned recording staff or sets a recording budget that can’t accommodate their goals. Producers and engineers who can communicate with and understand the audio aims of musicians are important. They can make a band achieve the exact sound they aim for by manipulating recording studio tools (for example echoes and overdubs). Some producers have an identifiable audio style and are sought for it, for example the ‘wall of sound’ style of Phil Spector, the work of Tony Cohen or Rick Rubin, and their approaches are unique and difficult to copy.  Therefore some recording professionals are in high demand, expensive and difficult to book.  Sometimes recording professionals will work without upfront fees for lesser‐known bands whose music they enjoy and take a percent of royalties as payment. In the foreseeable future it appears unlikely that technology will be able to supplant producers and mastering professionals with unique ‘branded’ styles.  However, there are emerging solutions for specialist musicians who cannot afford or cannot catch the attention of the scarce and busy talented recording professionals. These will be discussed later.   Manufacturing  A key element of the traditional music sector model is that it is based around a structured and static music format: the CD.  The manufacturing of vinyl records and subsequent CDs necessitated extensive physical infrastructure. Pressing plants for manufacturing CDs are low margin operations and sometimes viewed as costs centres by major labels (Burgelman, Christensen & Wheelwright 2004).  They require economies of scale to operate efficiently, and this has frequently been a driver behind mergers or closures in the last few decades (Meisel & Sullivan 2002).  For example in 1979 Warner attempted a merger with Polygram primarily to negotiate a licensing agreement for Polygram to manufacture Warner CDs (Dannen 2001: 252).  CD 
 159 manufacturing is heavily polluting and margins may decline further when environmental emissions control legislation is enacted.    The need for physical infrastructure also facilitated (in conjunction with radio) the mass market because manufacturing factories operating at full capacity needed to produce each title in volume.  The major label must forecast sales and estimate the number of discs per title to be made.  If the estimates exceed actual sales then the discs are remaindered (sold at a discount) or worse still returned, written off (removed from inventory lists) and destroyed.  If sales are underestimated then a more difficult decision needs to be made about reprint volumes (and subsequent financial risk of overestimation and remaindering).   Other costs  Given the complexity in traditional music production, many musicians feel compelled to hire accountants and lawyers to: 1. Oversee recording budgets and contracts;  2. Copying of scores for hired musicians; 3. Manage agreements with hired staff (for example, producers); and  4. Allocate music production costs, living expenses and allowances and tax (including recoupable items).    Some musicians may form a production company solely for the production of their music and this may also require legal and/or accounting advice.      Musicians may choose to simply sign entirely over to the label and allow its employees to make all such decisions regarding their careers. The complexities involved may be more efficiently handled by large labels that are able to diversify their risks over many specialist activities with economies of scale (Vogel 2007).  However, the label may cross subsidise its operations and may ‘over‐service’ the music entity. For example the label may choose to record in a subsidiary studio that is more expensive than a non‐subsidiary studio of same standard.  There is little incentive for a label to minimise costs for musicians when such costs are ultimately revenues for another part of the label.  Vogel also notes “recording contracts are unusually complex and reflect artefacts of previous technologies that are of diminishing importance or that have already become totally irrelevant” (2007: 251).  For example, many recording contracts may 
 160 not include royalty revenues from subscription services or use in computer games.  In such instances, the label may continue to take a percentage of revenues to cover ‘packaging fees’, which formerly were used to cover the cost of physical packaging of CDs and cassettes, and secondly may withhold a percentage amount for ‘unsold inventory’, neither of which are relevant to digital music.  
Production: emerging systems Technology developments such as digital production software now enable streamlined, real time composing, especially if combined with recording.  The quality, availability, cost and ease of use of recording software is improving.  This allows musicians to potentially reconstruct how they compose, produce and make music. Digital recording techniques were initially generally restricted to innovators, especially in the electronica music genre (musicians such as Brian Eno etc.) however now musicians across genres are using them. Basically it involves digitising sounds and data into codes (zeroes and ones).    The quality of production studios are still sonically superior, but home based digital technologies may create a different sound.  Various musicologists and industry observers reminds us that it’s the ideas, not the tools that should be the focus in music production (Batcho 2003; Hodges & Haack 1996; Hanson, Hutton & Swenson 2003).  For example a consumer may purchase a 1940s Duke Ellington mono recording with poor scratchy audio but the music still generates the emotive response that is fundamental to quality music. As Hanson, Hutton & Swenson (2003: 8) claim:   music is ultimately about the performance of a person or group. It’s a vibe, it’s an emotion, … we as engineers, producers and musicians get so involved in the technology and the process of music production that we lose sight of what’s important.  They claim it’s more important to maximise the utility of the technology you already own. A band manager claims that audio quality, in some markets is becoming less of a priority: “Hi‐fi is not the top priority for these kids. They’re used to listening to music on phones and through tiny earbuds” (Jaworski & Richards 2008b: 9).  
 161 This thesis will not focus on specific technologies as they are rapidly changing. However as an example, Apple releases free recording software with all Macintosh personal computers (Garageband), which according to the sales literature allows “many of the core features of costlier music production software in an interface easy enough for rank amateurs to handle … with Garageband you can sit alone and create music that sounds like an orchestra played it.  Or you can finally make that CD with your jamming buddies, even if no record firm will return your calls” (Mossberg 2004: para. 3, 5).  Referring to the earlier Boston example, had they been self‐recording, Scholz may have recorded those seven hundred drum retakes without any financial pressure.   Adam King, of the Brisbane independent band Turnpike describes how the recording software has improved over time:   I can remember listening to the Demo Show on Triple Zed eight years ago and everything that came out locally was shit, almost unlistenable ... Now I can’t tell the difference between the latest Geffen release [US major] and the latest Dollarbar release [Brisbane band] (Rogers et al. 2004: 31).   Digital production costs are generally smaller because a traditional studio need not be hired, recording can occur wherever there is a soundproof area.   Right now is an amazing time… You can sit in your house and you can make a record. You don’t need [major label CEO] Clive Davis to come along and give you a quarter of a million dollars. You can do it with a credit card and a Pro Tools system (Jaworski & Richards 2008b: 11).    An illustration of how digital recording enhances production is looping and mashups.  Historically electronica musicians linked sound samples to form the basic structure of a song.  This was a cumbersome process and generated a poor quality ‘artificial’ sound.  However it is now much easier, faster, accurate and flexible. A producer explains loops “introduce a certain ambience to a track, creating a mental picture of where you want to take the listener, …  it helps set the mood,” by providing either a rhythmic base or harmony (Hawkins 2004: 32). Hawkins cites a prominent popular music songwriter, Joe Solo, who claims a loop forms the starting point of production, whether or not it ends up in the final mix (ibid.).  Musicians are now sampling loops from obscure old 
 162 recordings, vocals and instruments. A solo guitar performer in a pub may use real‐time looping during a live performance, that is, they play a few bars of guitar and record it onstage, then while continuing to play would stop the recording and start it looping, and play over the top of it.   Mashups involve cutting excerpts of sounds from recordings and then mixing them with other pre‐recorded sounds to create (mix or mashup) new pieces of music.  This ability fundamentally changes the process of production – composing, recording and manufacturing may occur simultaneously and at little cost.   It forms a new piece of music, based upon former pieces.  This sometimes creates copyright issues, depending upon the extent of reuse.  Digital production software may, to some extent, substitute for a physical professional studio, which removes the largest production cost.  Working from a home or a similar base, musicians can take as long as they like without financial penalty (and some tax benefit), unlike studios.  They still need instruments (which they would already own, or access to sound libraries), digital equipment and internet access.  Most digital recording software is simple enough to use and with some training, the musician may perform tasks previously handled by mixing, engineering, arranging and production staff.  Doing so, the composition may be more immediate to the musician, there are no third parties adding in their interpretation of the composition via recording choices (mix, volume, pitch, microphone placement etc.).  A caveat is that the self‐recording musician needs to be technically competent enough to use the digital recording tools to achieve the desired sound, which production staff may do more easily and quickly. A second caveat is that often the ‘professional ears’ of production staff will enhance a recording.  However, musicians can do home recording at a time that suits them, rather than when a studio and staff are available.  Music production using a laptop also becomes liberating (Krogh and Anderton 2004), allowing the possibility to record, edit, master and mix anywhere and at anytime.   As mentioned, this potentially changes the nature of music in that it captures the real time aspect of it.  A prominent composer, Phil Garrod (Weiss 2004: 135) said “to create a good piece of music, there has to be some kind of real‐time element to keep the spark going, … having all instruments within arm’s reach really helps.”  Musicians may record their ideas before they escape. Hanson, Hutton & Swenson (2004: 8) claim:  
 163 if you agonise over one track, the other ideas bubbling up in your brain never even get a chance – that first idea is bottlenecked at the door. The early part of the song writing phase should be the most freethinking, the least technical ... you can feasibly come up with a whole song in less than an hour, and it’ll be almost like a blackout: you can’t recall how it came to fruition. But it’s often how you come up with the best ideas.  This clearly is a more suitable production process than booking studio time, as the traditional structured studio process necessitates preparation and co‐ordination.  Digital mobile recording processes create challenges when the musicians have to recreate the composition for live performance, but Hanson, Hutton & Swenson (2004) claim musicians can piece them together.  Taking this concept further, the demo may in the future become a new music format because the bulk of music may be released in demo format, fluid and constantly evolving.  It may be co‐created between musicians and their fans over time, and a finite completed product released at the end of the co‐creation conversation.  Examples of bands using a crowdsourcing co‐creation approach to music include ‘Public Enemy’, ‘Radiohead’ and ‘Beck’.  ‘Public Enemy’ were one of the first bands to use this approach by asking fans for input to their music compositions.  Their release titled ‘Revolverlution’ included four tracks reworked by fans, and the album artwork and sleeve notes were created by fans approached by singer Chuck D. on the Public Enemy website community.  Fans could download the vocals, rework them and upload them back to the site for Chuck D. to listen to (Public Enemy 2002).  In 2008 the prominent band, ‘Radiohead’, released a new song in layers, consumers could download the bass, guitar, drums etc., and then mix their own versions of a song and upload their results to the ‘Radiohead’ site.  Similarly, the prominent artist Beck, who was signed to a major label at the time, released song layers in 2006 for fans to remix and also included an experimental home‐made video, saying:   There was something really inspiring about the variety and quality of the music that people gave back. In an ideal world, I'd find a way to let people truly interact with the records I put out – not just remix the songs. … We filmed a series of very low‐budget, homemade videos for all the songs on the record. We 
 164 got a bunch of cameras and a $100 video mixer off eBay and shot 15 silly, impromptu videos against a greenscreen. …  It was just a complete free‐for‐all, done on the fly. We're putting all the videos together right now with the idea of having a visual version of the record that we'll put on the Internet. I'm totally curious to see how the videos will add to the experience of listening to the album. Or maybe they'll actually detract from the experience. That would be funny (Steuer 2007: para.’s 7, 12).  As mentioned, digital music minimises environmental damage (as opposed to CD manufacture) because minimal energy is required to reproduce it, provided consumers do not burn the music onto personal use CDs.  Using Garageband, completed songs can be exported to a website (or potentially to Apple’s iTunes or another online music store) and made available worldwide nearly instantly. Fans can link to the music and comment on the content.  Because digital production is a simple and fast way to produce music, musicians needn’t sign formal contracts with labels that lock them in for three albums or similar. Instead they can place content on websites as often as they wish, for anyone in the world with access (internet, mobile etc.) to hear.   Musician Beck when discussing his flexible approach to recording commented:    I like the idea that I can quickly record a few acoustic songs that I've been working on and immediately put them online for people to download. And then I can record songs with a producer in a big studio for a big label and put them out as a CD, a DVD, and a remix project and let people experience that music in very different ways” (ibid.: para. 16).  Musicians may still seek producers associated with certain audio styles, such Tony Cohen or Phil Spector. At a 2003 Audio Engineering Society Convention the main theme was that the digital audio workstation has fundamentally changed business models that have existed for decades, resulting in a migration from professional recording studios to home and personal studios (Walsh 2003). In a sign of convergence, the United States music instrument retailer Guitar Center became a reseller for Apple products (ibid.). Similarly guitar manufacturer Gibson released a product for linking media with recording applications for the home market.  However an audio engineer 
























Role in supply chain; 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reduces inventory and returns. 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 172 search for ABBA not the label they were signed to. The consumer has no idea of which label ABBA was signed to.  To search by major label is too complicated and insignificant for the consumer and Premkumar (2003) highlights that customers would need to visit multiple sites.  Attempts to date by the major labels to try this approach have failed, for example, Pressplay, a now defunct partnership between Vivendi and Sony.  It is questionable whether a digital storefront is a core role of the major labels and it potentially cannibalises and threatens their relationships with physical retailers.    A similar distribution channel is emerging from joint ventures of technology and major labels, thus removing the ‘major label – intermediary’ link in the chain. For example, the musician would be signed to Sony and then the music will become available for purchase via a Sony owned website (or other medium) and played on Sony electronic products.  Similarly Apple iTunes uses music, from all major labels, to sell its iPod players.  A key factor in the success of this approach is openness to the inclusion of music from other labels, because consumers may be frustrated by limited content availability, and again, do not distinguish musicians by the label they are signed to.  If the financial performance of the major labels continues to decline, technology companies and social networking internet sites may become major labels by default.  Byrne (2008a) shows the various types of major label deals (equity, license only, profit share, manufacture and distribute deals) and emphasises how control by musicians is eroded  as  the  label  stake  increases.  As  control  erodes  so  does  the  potential  profit returnable to the musician as can be seen in the figure below:  
Figure 12: Six distribution models – with varying degrees of musician control  
 Source: Byrne 2008a: figure 2. 
 173   It  is  worth  noting  here  that  most  major  labels  rarely  sign  manufacturing  and distribution  (M&D)  deals  primarily  because  such  deals  provide  them  with  minor financial rewards.  Such deals provide little scope for label and marketing overheads.   
Distribution: emerging systems 
Musician to consumer Byrne highlights (in Figure eleven above) the benefits of the musician to consumer (self‐distribution) approach. The musician retains creative control and a “lot of artists don't realize how much more money they could make by retaining ownership and licensing directly,” and "if it's done properly, you get paid quickly, and you get paid again and again. That's a great source of income," (Byrne 2008a: para. 25).  The musician to consumer channel is the most cost efficient and direct approach but does pose practical challenges.  At its most basic it involves musicians (or their representatives) selling CDs to consumers directly after a show.  Niche musicians with small markets frequently will finish a performance and then work on their merchandise stand. Selling directly to consumers is generally a great experience for musicians and consumers because they may interact and the interaction experience increases loyalty and promotion (consumers tell friends about it). It simply involves estimating sales before the show or tour and carrying enough stock (which may be CDs or, for digital music, passwords to an online site for downloads).  A variant on the musician to consumer channel is the musician providing music downloads on their website. An unsigned musician, Emily Arin has a subscription‐based website where for a US$12 per annum fee, she provides one new song per month (Mraz 2008). Unsigned musician Jane Siberry has a “pay what you can” policy with her downloadable songs.  Her site shows the average price her customers have paid for each track and this “subtly creates a community standard, a generalized awareness of how much people think each track is really worth” (Thompson 2007: para. 16).  For some songs the price is more than the price for the same song via iTunes.  This channel still requires intermediaries including: ISPs; ecommerce facility (for example Paypal); and/or website developer and online security.  However these are comparatively minimal and tend to be either: once off lump payments (website development); 
 174 variable costs (ecommerce payments); or subscriptions (internet service). A website can be constructed cheaply and ISP payments may be absorbed with other activities (for example, if the musician already has internet access at home). This approach features minimal incremental costs for usage, so potentially higher margins for musicians. Another benefit of a standalone website is that the musicians are not locked in to intermediary (online retailer), who may change without warning.   In October 2007 the globally prominent band, ‘Radiohead’, released their album ‘In Rainbows’ themselves, as a digital download and each downloader could nominate a payment amount (plus transaction fee).  Tentative sales estimated that in the first ten days of release 1.2 million downloads were made, paying on average US$5 to US$8 per download (Haskins 2007).  This totals approximately US$6‐9.5 million (minus transaction fees) paid directly to the ‘Radiohead’ group, with none to retailers and distributors.  ‘Radiohead’ singer Thom Yorke said:    In terms of digital income, we've made more money out of this record ['In Rainbows'] than out of all the other ‘Radiohead’ albums put together, forever — in terms of anything on the Net.  And that's nuts.  It's partly due to the fact that EMI wasn't giving us any money for digital sales. All the contracts signed in a certain era have none of that stuff (Cohen 2007: para. 2).    However as flagged previously, this example still included intermediaries – the website developer, ISP and transaction fees.    Another example of the musician to consumer approach (covering both production and distribution) is David Bowie’s ‘Bowie bonds’, where fans or investors could invest in future sales of his music. The Bowie bonds were priced using a discounted cash flow approach (on historical sales), with the aim being that they provide Bowie with independence and funding to produce future music (Papagiannidis and Berry 2007) outside of major labels, and release it directly to consumers with profits going to bond holders.  It smoothed his income over time and minimised his financial risks, rather than relying upon lumpy unpredictable revenues based upon music release dates.  This is a direct model where the support system included managers of the financial instruments as opposed to major labels providing advances.  Because Bowie is an 
 175 established musician, this is less risky than an emerging artist where such investment would be similar to the provision of venture capital.  A similar framework for emerging musicians is ‘Sellaband’, where fans can invest in musician recordings. This will be discussed in more detail later.   The musician to consumer channel does not confine the musician; they may release any type of content without going through intermediary or label channels of approval.  It needn’t be a finished product but instead they could make available a demo, film or interview. Major labels may manage releases more formally and slowly.  The musician may require improved online security, if not to protect themselves then to protect the privacy of consumers who submit personal details to the musician / business.  Most small businesses are able to manage such issues, although musicians may be more prone to abnormal customer behaviours (such as obsessed fans or hackers) than traditional businesses. Despite the potential of this channel, Premkumar (2003) dismisses it because: 1. Emerging musicians may struggle to reach customers;  2. The free music expectancy of consumers creates revenue risks; and  3. Most musicians view this option as a promotional channel until a major signs them. These challenges have abated somewhat in the years to 2008.  Musicians can take steps to improve reach or attention, and social networking sites, search engines and music discovery or relational programs (such as Last.fm) are crucial to this. Some musicians may have a presence on a social network site and use it to redirect consumers to their website. For instance, Australian band ‘The Drones’ has a Myspace page with a prominent banner redirecting viewers to their website.  Premkumar assumes the motives of musicians are to gain mass sales, but instead musicians may profit more via higher revenues from a smaller fan base.  Search engines are important in the digital distribution channel, and have been used effectively but perhaps not by niche musicians. To illustrate, in 2004 the Australian start‐up airline Jetstar bypassed the travel agent commission with their internet sales. In retaliation, travel agent Flight Centre arranged with search engine Google for the results of Google searches on Jetstar to route to Flight Centre websites, and Flight Centre promoted other airlines (Gottliebsen 2004).  Most music fans may use Google or 
 176 other search engines to locate a band website (or presence).  Search engine results could link to a digital music supplier the musicians use.  That is, search engine to musician to intermediary (be it a retailer for example Chaosmusic, or Amazon ; the Label or Musicians themselves if they are selling directly). The websites of musicians are usually quite easy to locate and also contain ancillary products and services such as community forums, tour news, merchandise and biographies.    Premkumar (2003) argues musicians who deal directly with consumers, tend to do so as an interim measure until they sign a contract with a major label. Bhattacharjee, Gopal and Sanders (2003b: 108) similarly claim that such practices serve a “useful marketing function”.  This does not appear to be substantiated in later years, as evidenced by the ‘Radiohead’ example in 2008, where a major established band released an album directly to consumers.   Musician to intermediary to consumer Instead of a musician centralising their online presence on a website they may use an intermediary to do this.  Examples of intermediaries include Myspace, iTunes, Artistshare or Mudda. Artistshare and Mudda contain music supplied in a standard format and consumers may search the sites to access additional content and services such as musician discussion forums, websites, discographies, reviews, product purchase information, even guitar lesson videos given by the musicians and more. This strategy may be successful if the intermediary has a very strong brand name and community.  In some respects the musician tends to lose control in this channel, because their web presence must fit the structure and terms of the intermediary, it is similar to a franchise business model. It is also similar to an online version of a major label.  Another provider is Garageband (not to be confused with the Apple software product named Garageband).  Garageband addresses the issue of needing a strong community by mandating that participants cannot upload any tracks until they have reviewed thirty other tracks on the site. The reviews then feed into rating charts, and top rated musicians are offered recording, publishing or licensing deals. Garageband receives income from Musicians, who pay to upload their songs, and from advertising and paid downloads (Papagiannidis & Berry 2007).   
 177 Product focussed transactional intermediaries include iTunes and Amie Street, which is an online intermediary that uses ‘fan driven pricing’, where songs are initially free to download and then rise in price based on popularity, up to US 98 cents.  Amie Street believes “empowering customers is the best way to maximize revenue for the artists" (Amie Street 2008: para. 6). They appear to also release music from major labels as well as independent musicians. The site also serves a social purpose with a major label CEO claiming:    They know that to successfully sell music you have to provide customers with much more than just a buy button. They give customers a social experience around music discovery that has up to this point been lacking in digital retail (Boltuch 2008: para. 3).   Amie Street may be an interim experiment to determine the price consumers are prepared to pay, and at what point premium pricing can commence.  Ultimately pricing variations by sales volumes over time may determine whether: ‘if a musician has a consumer base of x numbers they can charge songs at $x rate’.  An example is Jane Siberry, where the average of prices per song paid on Amie Street is viewable.  A similar intermediary is Songslide, a music website where consumers their payment amount per song (with a US 59 cents minimum, probably to cover costs). On Songslide the average price per song is US$2.08 (Dubner 2007).  Social networks have been highly successful intermediaries for music discovery. The social network Myspace initially enabled musicians to set up pages for free, and small selections of music may be downloaded at no cost.  After gaining over one hundred and fifty million registered users, Myspace was acquired by News Corporation, who intended to monetise the Myspace user base (News Corporation 2008).  Following the purchase Myspace musicians could offer music downloads for sale. Initially sales were via Snocap (another intermediary), although this proved unsuccessful, again perhaps because of a consumer perception that digital music should be free or easy to purchase, or perhaps because musicians prefer to sell directly. However Myspace has been used successfully by musicians seeking a global market at minimal cost.  This will be discussed in more detail in the promotion section.  Myspace intends to monetise this channel further by using it to sell tickets to performances and other merchandise 
 178 (ibid.). Caution is required though because, as with any intermediary, sites may change quickly and the musician has little influence, for instance, consumers may move to other sites, the site may start charging or may censor or in other ways influence content. RSS Feeds, blogs (web diaries) and other user generated content can also provide pointers to music discovery and distribution.  A final digital distribution channel described by Premkumar is ‘Audio on Demand’ (AOD) and/or internet radio. It uses a subscription model for access to a music catalogue, restricted website or community, for a finite duration (for example five dollars per month).  In this model, which is similar to Pay TV, the consumer doesn’t own the  music, bur subscribes to access a library of music and usually can play it on multiple devices.  If the subscription ends or the company ceases, consumers lose access to the music they’ve invested time in locating, evaluating and managing into lists as part of their subscription.  In the financially volatile music sector the likelihood of a company ceasing suddenly is high.  Similarly AOD channels may not have all music on them, and paying consumers have little tolerance for limited content.  Whilst consumers predominantly believe that music should be free, behavioural factors, specifically a predisposition for ownership (Kahney 2007; Goodell 2003), and fear of losing their collection how hinder take‐up in this channel.  Secondly it is not apparent how musicians are reimbursed via this channel, the perception is that revenues will flow to major labels, and many musician contracts with major labels do not contain clauses for royalties received from internet broadcasts (Krasilovsky & Shemel 2007).  Nonetheless Rick Rubin, former producer and current CEO of major label Colombia USA, believes it is the way forward, arguing:    You would subscribe to music … you'd pay, say, $19.95 a month, and the music will come anywhere you'd like. In this new world, there will be a virtual library that will be accessible from your car, from your cell phone, from your computer, from your television. Anywhere. The iPod will be obsolete, but there would be a Walkman‐like device you could plug into speakers at home. You'll say, 'Today I want to listen to ... Simon and Garfunkel,' and there they are. The service can have demos, bootlegs, concerts, whatever context the artist wants to put out. And once that model is put into place, the industry will grow 10 times the size it is now (Hirschberg 2007: para. 27). 
 179  Music distribution via subscription models may use staggered pricing for levels of access, for example higher fees allow a higher level of access to the musician or music (such as demo’s). Specialist musicians with smaller markets can provide intimacy, which helps maintain loyalty and sustainability. Both specialist and mass marketed musicians may need to use support staff and customer relationship management (CRM) methods and tools. An example is Artistshare.  Subscription based music portals such as Yahoo music or Rhapsody are another intermediary.  In this model consumers pay a monthly subscription that covers access to all music in that portal.  It treats music as a utility and it is priced as such. In this case it may be bundled with other utilities such as a phone bill or social network site subscription. For example in 2008 the global telecom company Nokia released a mobile phone package that includes free access to the Universal music catalogue for twelve months (Nokia 2008). After twelve months consumers may continue access for a minor fee that is added to their monthly phone bill. This is similar to signing to an additional Pay TV channel. This model may not gain traction if the catalogues of all major labels are included as one offering because, as mentioned previously, consumers may not discriminate between music on labels and they access music from a variety of sources. Secondly treating music as a utility undermines the importance to consumers of the belief that their music collection is unique.  To address this, some portals offer lockers in which users can set up play lists.  Thirdly, Kahney (2007) argues people like to own music.  For this approach to succeed, access will need to be low‐priced (bundled free with a mobile phone subscription in Nokia’s example) and offer any music available instantly anywhere. If so, what is being sold is the access medium, not the music (Leonhard 2007).  The process for musicians to be remunerated in this model appears complex.  As a rule of thumb, increased complexity of processes minimises the ultimate return to the musician.  Advertising supported free services Advertising supported music distribution is music made available to consumers at no cost after they listen to an advertisement, or the website they access it from contains banner or popup advertisements. It is a risky approach for musicians who may not 
 180 want to be branded by association with the advertisements.  The intermediary (site) generally makes the choice of advertisers and musicians have little influence on advertisements.  In this model music becomes a customer acquisition expense and advertising is the revenue.  Despite the risks it resembles an approach where musicians are marketed as brands; and may suit a highly niche specialist musician with a close fit to the advertiser.  Musicians do use products and services so might themselves find complementary advertisers, but to negotiate sponsorship may be complex and involve publishers and advertising agencies (this will be discussed in detail later).   Payment may be made based upon:  1. CPM (cost per thousand page views); 2. CPC (cost per click – paid if the viewer clicks on the ad); 3. CPT (cost per transaction – if the site directs the viewer to another one where they become a paying customer);  4. Lead generation (paid for details of potential customers); and 5. Aggregated viewer demographic data sold to third parties. The advertising supported free service approach used by Myspace, and other social network portals, relies upon advertising revenues for funding. Another (non‐product) example is advertiser sponsored tours and performances.  ‘Freemium’ The free‐premium concept describes music that is given away as a sample to attract new consumers, who may then purchase related ‘premium’ music or ancillary products/services at premium prices. This concept relates to scarcity and demand with a ‘sell less for more, sell more for less’ approach (Anderson 2008).  Digital music is perfectly suited to ‘freemium’ approaches because the costs to suppliers of additional distribution volume are negligible. The free music is ubiquitous but serves to increase demand for scarce premium products. Examples include: 1. Nine songs of a twelve song album may be free, and to obtain the remaining three songs the album must be purchased;  2. The entire catalogue of an artist may be freely available as digital music, but an autographed limited edition vinyl package costs hundreds of dollars; and 3. Cross subsidisation, where ubiquitous free music is released to sell ancillary products or services (performances, t‐shirts etc.); and  





 183 succeed.  This conclusion appears to be based from the viewpoint of sector incumbents retaining control. However he overlooks the perspective of the consumer, who might enjoy and be prepared to fund a ‘musician to consumer’ channel, especially if:  1. The music costs less via this channel;  2. Payments go directly to the musician as opposed to going via a major label; and  3. They may enjoy direct interaction with musicians.  In musician to consumer channels the musician may directly manage and control costs rather than intermediaries who on charge the musician.    Lechner and Hummel (2002) confirmed the music sector incumbents are being challenged by emerging business system architectures that are based on virtual communities with self‐organisation and where the participants are of equal status, as can be seen in figure thirteen below.  They conclude “members of a community (adequate organisation precluded) are eventually more powerful and knowledgeable than any vendor, intermediary, or producer” (ibid.: 52).   
 
Figure 14: System architectures in the music sector  
       A= Artist  M=Music Industry  C=Consumers Source: Lechner & Hummel 2002: 45  Bhattacharjee, Gopal and Sanders (2003b) argue music demand is dependent on: price; distribution mechanisms; technology; and music type. They found that piracy increases if music prices increase; therefore lower prices combat piracy. If distribution costs can be lowered and price is also lowered, demand for quality music should increase.  In a 
 184 further study, they confirmed that “good” albums sold more, and lower quality music failed more quickly (Bhattacharjee et al. 2007: 92). However major labels will protect the price of CDs for as long as they can.    In 2008 Jim Griffin of Warner Music proposed a model of collective licensing for music distribution via the internet (Gustin 2008; Anderson 2008; Rose 2008). Griffin proposes that ISPs charge consumers a utility‐like fee (for example five dollars per month) for music use as an additional item on ISP subscriptions.  In effect it proposes that music be treated as an add‐on optional offering for ISPs.  Funds will be dispersed to music rights holders via traditional copyright agencies and processes.  Further details of this proposal were unreleased at time of writing, however it is said to provide ‘unwritten insurance’ to consumers from prosecution for copyright breaches in P2P activity.   It also provides a new revenue stream and a form of compensation to the major labels from P2P.  Historically entities that have tried this approach, in particular Snocap, the legal form of Napster, have been unsuccessful.    However simultaneously to this proposal, music industry associations are lobbying governments and ISPs to introduce  ‘three strikes’ legislation requiring that ISPs monitor their traffic for P2P activity and, after three warnings to offenders, disconnect P2P participants (IFPI 2008b). They will also be banned from signing to other ISPs.  If lobbying is successful and legislation is introduced then it may be more likely that consumers who use music illegally may require the (unwritten but implied) ‘insurance’ of the Jim Griffin proposal.  If so, it may sustain the traditional music system.  As at April 2008 the European Union has voiced privacy concerns against the ‘three strikes’ proposal and support has not been given, despite legislation in France in planning (European Parliament 2008: point 23).   There will be no single distribution channel in the future.  Hughes and Lang (2003) argue that the internet (or a future device) has facilitated fragmentation away from large and established music industry institutions to niche digital community networks of individuals both as musicians and consumers. These community networks are evolving, dynamic and self‐organising.  Music (and musicians?) remains the core driver of the sector, however evolving distribution channels are threatening the power and values of current stakeholders. Easley, Michel and Devaraj (2003) argue that attempts 
 185 to control all the channels and formats of music (and ancillary activities) may prove too costly.  Musicians may have to relinquish control of their product and focus instead on revenue opportunities in ancillary activities.   Key points Traditional Distribution 1. Of physical products is high cost (many players, financial and environmental); 2. Form a barrier to entry for musicians; 3. Necessitate a mass market, which in turn influences music content; 4. Is inefficient, for example, require unsold inventory to be returned and destroyed. 5. Consumers do not search by major label to discover music; and 6. Record stores are open at finite times and consumers must travel to them, but they are also social hubs.  Digital distribution of digital music 1. Enables ‘limitless’ inventory; 2. iTunes contains music from all labels and is generally open to independent musicians; 3. Is immediate and can be transacted at anytime, anywhere with internet access; 4. Has minimal fixed costs, and musicians tend to be paid quickly; 5. Has a low entry point – anyone can distribute digital music to anywhere with internet access; and 6. The potential in the musician to consumer channel has not been fully exploited at time of writing, for examples, musicians can set or ‘game play’ pricing for their products. 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Promotion: traditional systems  
  Promotion is a fundamental marketing activity that involves:  1. Identifying the target market and defining what is to be sold; 2. Market strategy and action programs; 3. Sales management; and 4. Monitoring and controls. Music promotion includes activities such as: video production, advertising, interviews; product artwork; the distribution and placement of promotional products and/or performances for broadcast.  These activities take place over a variety of mediums such as: broadcast and print media, street walls, retail outlets and performance venues (Hutchison, Macy & Allen 2006).    There are several challenges for traditional promotion techniques. The importance of traditional media to music promotion is waning, as evidenced by the increasing rate of physical music magazine closures (Harding 2008b). Increasingly consumers rely on peers and friends in social networks to recommend music, although often those ‘friends’ include reputable music journalists whose opinions they may value. As mentioned previously, historically major labels have been accused of a practice called payola, where promoters give gifts and other incentives to radio stations in return for high rotation broadcasts of their music.  Because television is a mass medium of limited channels, opportunities for the broadcast of specialist music are slim.  Another issue 
 187 with mass‐market promotion is that a musician is a finite resource, a human being, but may be treated as a brand.  Mainstream promotion requires mass market targeting, which means dispersing the finite resource as much as possible, through magazines, television, posters, etc.  Promoting a new release may involve two days worth of consecutive, fifteen‐minute interviews.  This can be tedious and tiresome, as seen in the opening comment of a fifteen minute interview with Norah Jones, one of a series of fifteen minute interviews she had been doing in a block:   VH1: How's your brain? Norah Jones: Pretty fried, but I'll be okay  (Macnie 2002: para. 3).  Because of fierce competition entertainment journalists seek ‘scoops’, and musicians may find their privacy is invaded in order to get a story. Famous musicians may be constantly tracked by paparazzi.  Reality can also be constructed, for example photographers may use photography software to manipulate photographs.  As mass dissemination becomes easier, the potential personal strain on musicians may increase.  The musician becomes a branded product for mass consumption.  In the process their sense of self may be lost or twisted, as perhaps exemplified by Britney Spears (Schmidt 2008).  Thom Yorke of UK band ‘Radiohead’ described it as:    We were trying to avoid that whole game of who gets in first with the reviews. These days there's so much paper to fill, or digital paper to fill, that whoever writes the first few things gets cut and pasted. Whoever gets their opinion in first has all that power. Especially for a band like ours, it's totally the luck of the draw whether that person is into us or not. It just seems wildly unfair, I think (Byrne 2008b: para. 10).  A key theme across all promotional activities and mediums is brand management and this will now be discussed in relation to traditional promotion. A brand can be described as a name or word intended to identify the product or services of a seller and to differentiate them from those of competitors (Kotler 2007).  Brand equity reflects how consumers respond to the brand; it’s an intangible asset that contributes to the 
 188 value of the brand owner (ibid.).  When a consumer purchases music they may perceive they are also supporting that musician.  When events occur that impact the brand, responses must be made to protect it, for example via crisis management activities.  Because musicians are often marketed in conjunction with their music, brand and crisis management is more sensitive than traditional products. Musicians are perhaps more iconic and complex than most brands because as mentioned they are also humans.    Key elements to traditional brand management include ideas generation, diversification and divestment.  Generally musicians are creative so generating ideas comes easily to them, for example a band may have an idea to perform their music as a live soundtrack to a film in a cinema.  Implementing their ideas may differentiate them from competitors (Mason 2001). Niche musicians might form alliances with specialist related entities, for example a swing band should target rockabilly fashion launches, or a hip hop band could target skateboarding events or street parties.  Musicians may be interested in their ‘scene’ and ideas may generate from participation in that scene (Florida 2007). Musicians may diversify into complementary sectors, for example, acting, personal computer games, merchandising, event participation (fund raising etc.) or instrument manufacture.  Doing so, they may use the same service providers (for example, use the same accountant for all activities).  To protect the core brand in which the bulk of investment has been made (for example, the band), Mason (2001) suggests the creation of a second tier brand for non‐core activities and revenues of this second tier should be monitored closely. Any brands in the second tier that are not profitable or damaging to the core brand should be divested (ibid.).  For instance a band member may go solo and release music independently.  If, for example, a member of a heavy metal band released a solo recording of acoustic folk duets it may potentially damage the band brand, and so should cease.   Fans may treat some musicians as icons.  Holt (2003: para. 1) says icons "are built according to principles entirely different from those of conventional marketing." Unlike mere brands, icons "forge a deep connection with culture," competing not just for market share, but "for culture share." He says iconic brands enable people to experience powerful myths:  
 189 that attempt to resolve acute tensions people feel between their own lives and society's prevailing ideology… Icons don't target consumer segments or psychographic types [they go after veins of intense anxieties and desires running through society. Unlike conventional branding and mass music], … icons don't mimic pop culture; they lead it [by making] sense of confusing societal changes, [and they] repair the culture when it's particularly in need of mending (Holt 2003: para’s. 7,39).   They can speak as rebels and draw upon a certain political authority.  Holt’s viewpoints on icons dovetail neatly with the perception of specialist musicians.  They can be rebels, as we have seen with Punk, fighting political causes as with South African anti‐apartheid music, and deeply connected with culture, as we’ve seen with Public Enemy and rap or hip hop music.  Creating icons, Holt believes, is not so much about "getting close to the consumer" as it is "a cultural historian's understanding of ideology as it waxes and wanes” (ibid.: para. 47).  Holt concludes that icons must: 1. Learn to target national contradictions instead of just consumer segments; 2. Create myths that make sense of confusing societal changes;  3. Speak with a rebel's voice (ibid.).   In other words, it's not as easy to maintain an image as it would seem, and it may be unlikely that iconic musicians view themselves in the same way as their brand.  Their challenge may be to differentiate between their personal and professional lives, or to ‘turn off’.   Crisis management activities are important to the maintenance of iconic brands. For example, at times it may involve creating crises, or explaining and troubleshooting others such as illness or injury, poor reviews, paparazzi photographs, or illegal activities of musicians.  For example the singer of Australian band ‘You Am I’ responded to poor reviews of a performance in December 2004 by an open letter on their website that apologised, claiming he was under the influence of alcohol at the time and intended to redeem himself.  Whether or not this was true, the crisis management strategy was to perhaps reinforce his branding (myth?) as a ‘wild rebel’ trying to redeem himself.     Brand management involves the management of advertising.  A lot of popular music 
 190 lends itself to subversive advertising.  Trevor Beattie, a creative director, says "you have to let people discover brands for themselves. Ironically, too much advertising can be the first problem. You've got to keep it low key and get it talked about" (Rogers 1998: para. 17) and Rogers argues that in non‐mainstream channels, the brand owner is not in control.  Beattie believes that the answer is in the medium. "You need to put ads in the 'wrong places' and make people think they discovered it” (ibid.: para. 19).  If an entity has diversified, they should use consistent advertising across all operations.  The Ministry of Sound logo is an example of consistent advertising.    The influence and context of local cultures is important to brand management in global markets because cultures differ by location. For example there can be backlash against Americanisation of music in some cultures.  In Asia songs with one sentence as the sole lyric are popular, whereas it would be deemed boring in other cultures.  In Germany austere electronica music (for example ‘Kraftwerk’) is popular whereas the genre never gained traction in the United States.   When targeting a global market the local market idiosyncrasies need to be considered.  The use of a musician to promote a product or service is financially lucrative for the musician, if carefully managed. Vince Lawrence, founder of music production and brand consultancy Slang Musicgroup, said “Artists know who they are and who their fans are. That's what makes an artist valuable to brands: the fact that they have such a visceral connection with a particular segment of the public. There's nothing like that," (Moran 2008: para. 28).   An example may be ‘Rolling Stones’ guitarist Keith Richards being used in an advertising campaign for ‘Louis Vuitton’ luggage, because “if you’re selling leather bags, why not hire one, too?” (Nudd 2008: para. 1).     
Promotion: emerging systems   Premkumar (2003) argues that as a sole operator going direct to consumers, the musician may incur the cost of advertising, promotion, computing and communications and website maintenance.  He believes musicians do not have the advertising power of the labels, which may be true for mass market channels (to be discussed in the promotion section).  However if the musician were signed to a major label, these costs 






Music Format  # of SKUs CD (standard release)   1 CD (bonus features)   2 Full track download   2 Full track rental (limited use)   16 Full track streaming (á la carte)   16 Full track streaming (subscription)   16 Album download (permanent)   14 Online video download  3 Blog skin (music plays on blog with images)  15 Digital karaoke   16 Music letter (ecard with tunes)   16 Full track download   16 Full track streaming   16 My bell (ring tone melody)   16 Live bell (ring tone melody with remixes)   48 Mix ring (snippets of 3 songs combined into 1 track)   16 Mix bell (same as mix ring, but outgoing)   16 Live bell plus screensaver (downloads ring tone with images)   12 Color call (plays in background during a call)  16 Ring back tone   112 Video screensaver  12 Mobile video downloads   3 Mobile video‐on‐demand   3 Total  403 
 194 positioned to benefit from the shift by promoters to spot selling, or targeting at an individual level.  That is, consumers are loyal (enjoy and purchase) to niche music in their favourite style.  The musicians need not undertake a mass promotional campaign. For example they may use internet radio (and internet television) that can be accessed worldwide.  Regarding brand diversification opportunities, in 2007 the band ‘Nine Inch Nails’ promoted their musical offering ‘Year Zero’ via a global interactive game involving an online scavenger hunt that included real world clothing and hiding USB drives at concerts.  As with most computer games it became addictive and fans that did not play most probably felt like they had missed out on something exclusive.  Similarly singer Avril Lavigne, faced with dwindling interest in her music, released her it in a comic book download targeted at mobile phone users in Asia (Pearlstein 2007).  While ‘Nine Inch Nails’ and Avril Lavigne are mainstream musicians, these examples are relevant to niche musicians.  Instead of lobbying for mainstream magazine or newspaper attention, musicians can create their own zines (self made magazines) and distribute these for free as a promotion tool or for sale as merchandise at performances or other outlets.  Zines could include artwork, photographs, fan contributions, lyrics, road stories or notes on the music and their influences, and most importantly contact details (for example a website link).  The content could be a formal representation of their more popular blogs or forums, and may assist to develop and manage the brand.  Consumer research is critical to promotion, according to the MTV Networks CEO, Tom Freston (Beatty and Hymowitz 2000), and this might be undertaken informally. At another extreme, the band ‘Bare Naked Ladies’ (BNL) invited three thousand fans to a five‐day cruise with the band and management.  The fans were all invited to informally socialise with the band during the cruise, and were invited to a meeting with BNL management to ask questions, offer input and hear what was planned for the band (a formality similar to an annual general meeting of a listed company). The band manager said:   It really becomes a collaborative process … I think I know what the band should do, but I’m not going to address it with them until I know what the fans want them to do. The A&R person inside the label used to be your champion. It’s like 
 195 having 3,000 dedicated A&R people (Jaworski & Richards 2008b: 2).  A key emerging challenge for musicians is findability (Kelly 2008).  Historically artist and repertoire agents would discover musicians to sign to major labels, who would then promote them via traditional channels to consumers.  As the number of music channels increases and the importance of traditional media wanes, how will consumers find music they enjoy? There are many online music sites that enhance findability via recommendations or friend music profiles, such as Last.fm which makes recommendations to users based on their listening history, and social network sites such as Myspace also assist by showing which musicians a user has ‘befriended’.   Alternately specialist musicians could use a location‐based approach to promotion.  Cities may enjoy iconographic status for their unique music and cultures, as discussed previously (Florida 2007).  For example, Seattle was known as the epicentre of the grunge music wave; Manchester as the incubator for dance music; San Francisco is linked with Woodstock; and Memphis, Gracelands are linked with Elvis Presley.  Musicians in Detroit (home of Motown) have taken a location based approach to promotion and collectively formed a site, ‘Online bands’, to promote local bands and their city to the world.  To be findable, firstly musicians need a website.  Initially they may solely use a social network site, or choose to maintain their own, with redirection profiles on other sites.  Musicians who build their own websites may need to consider:  1. Musicians mistake creativity for functionality, designing websites that are creative but not functional (for example, high bandwidth and clutter).  An example of this is the German band ‘Cobra Killer’ website which scrolls sideways; 2. Musicians should not ignore fans and their needs.  At a minimum a database of fan email addresses should be maintained.  Musicians should interact with their audience frequently, or alternately infrequently but in memorable ways. SPAM legislation may impact whether and how musicians email fans; 3. Advertising on websites needs to be managed. Banners can be bought or traded to help fund the site, but may also damage brand value, so if used they need to be appropriate. Ensure search engines link to the website. And the band website should promote and link to other websites (such as aggregators); and  
 196 4. Musicians must remember to pay and renew payments for the online space they rent.   Sites that have not been renewed are often passed on to either gaming or pornography providers, in which case fans may get a nasty surprise (Scott G (sic) 2004).  Traditionally, investments are made by major labels to create music videos, which then compete to be aired on specific programs at specific times on television.  Musicians now can cheaply produce music videos and upload them to YouTube for instant global availability.  For example a key platform for music videos in Australia is ‘Rage’, a program that runs late at night on weekend television.  However instead of watching ‘Rage’ , many consumers now can find and watch the same clips at any time on YouTube.  Musician websites may contain links to the YouTube clips; similarly fans can distribute links to the clips via their social networks.  Instead of constructing their own web presence (via a band site, YouTube clips etc.), musicians may crowdsource their fans to assist with music promotion.  To do so they may need to consider the following criteria:  1. Community; 2. Customisation; 3. Choice tools,  4. Channel; and  5. Competitive value (Vaccaro and Cohn 2004).  The development of a community around music and/or musicians, and the ability of consumers to customise their music experience are emerging as key elements of new models. Central to this is the notion of user generated content, and in the right channel, musicians may provide consumers with the right tools to generate content.  Doing so may provide a source of competitive value.  May and Singer believe that musicians cannot match the marketing strength of the major labels (May & Singer 2001), but label staff may rarely match the enthusiasm of fans. Fans may create hundreds of fan websites dedicated to musicians and their content can rapidly increase exponentially as friends tell friends.  For example, Chris Isaak is a musician signed to the AOL Time Warner label.  Fans worldwide have created their own Chris Isaak fan pages, and one displayed the email address of Chris Isaak’s 
 197 drummer, who was happy to hold email conversations with fans and meet them in person during tours.  The official label site had no such details.  Instead of allowing unmanaged fans to create hundreds of websites that potentially no one will read, fans may be targeted by musicians to more usefully undertake tasks as required.  However, despite the ‘many hands make light work’ claim, this may not be a time saving activity, and the management of user communities may become a fulltime occupation (Thompson 2007).  The major labels appear to have been slow to respond to the user generated content (UGC) phenomenon.  It is a global trend with forceful momentum, as evidenced by ‘you’ being awarded Time magazine’s 2007 ‘Person of the Year’ (Grossman 2006).  UGC is forcing companies across sectors to change their operational structures to compete with new leaner businesses that have captured consumer attention. Thirty six per cent of Australian users regularly engage in participatory media including blogging, RSS, social networking or podcasting (Nielsen/Net Ratings Australian internet and technology report 2006‐7).  A cScape Customer Engagement Report (2007) found forty two per cent of companies plan to apply UGC to their websites in 2008, and twenty three per cent use it already, as can be seen in the table below.  
Table 23: Corporate use of user generated content         Source: cScape 2007: 19.  In the basic sense UGC may simply involve consumers: 1. Writing a review in a blog or social network bulletin or online chatboard about a live performance;  2. Putting music widgets on their website;  3. Reworking music and uploading it to sites;  
  % 2007  % by 2008 UGC  23  42 Corporate blogs  17  35 Podcasting  18  33 Videocasting  17  35 
 198 4. Recording live performances, editing and uploading them to video sites (for example YouTube); and  5. Photoshopping pictures (creating reality) and making them publicly available.   An obvious example is MP3 blogs, where consumers review (and link to) music MP3s they discover.  Making the MP3s available is often illegal, but does serve a promotional function and opportunity to source new music. Another example is Joost, which is a platform for video content where users can upload concert and backstage footage, music videos and other multimedia.  Joost shares advertising revenue with content owners. A band may choose to link to this user content from their sites.    Musicians have not fully explored the potential promotional benefits of using consumers, via user generated content and crowdsourcing activities.  A key driver of UGC is consumer motivation and a primary motivation with music content is social networking. Wikipedia is a prominent example of UGC, and the Wikipedia founder and CEO, Jimmy Wales, people “contribute because it’s fun, because they want to share, because it’s social, or to show their expertise” (McNichol 2007: para. 23).  Wikipedia is another type of online content, but strong synergies exist between music and online social activities.  For example, sharing online band footage engenders social prestige for the content owner. The musician may be the hub, through which various interactions and collaborations between consumers revolve, and the content may or may not be about the music, but the music provides a platform from which consumers socialise.  This is an opportunity that musicians could profitably exploit via premium pricing.  For example, they may allow their online community a higher level of access (backstage video footage, recording footage, demo’s, pre‐release tickets etc.).  Community participants may share personal information.  This helps the musicians to understand and target their community, and may be attractive to niche advertisers or sponsors.  For example communities sponsor musicians signed to Artistshare in return for access to their private websites including blogs etc and can interact directly with the musician. Fans pay for the privilege of closer access.   For the purpose of this study, crowdsourcing relates to outsourcing tasks formerly undertaken by the band (or their suppliers) to fans.  Because fan bases are, to some extent, known and smaller with specialised musicians, the term ‘fansourcing’ may be more appropriate.  Fans have skills they may offer at no cost, although there is a time 
 199 cost for coordination of activities.  For example fans may contribute artwork and design, prepare media releases, advise on appropriate industry contacts, performance venues and accommodation options.  A fan who created designs for a band was described by the band manager: “She’s an avid fan, and she reached out and said if you need any AOL icons or banners for any of your bands, I’d love to do it for you just out of the love [and] she does great work and she’s quick” (Jaworski and Richards 2008b: 3).  Another option is ‘Nimbit’, an online merchandise widget that musicians can add onto any of their websites (or their fans can add onto their sites or blogs) to sell merchandise from one storefront.  If a musician updates their product range or concert calendar, changes are automatically made across all sites.  However ‘Nimbit’ takes twenty per cent of sales revenue for the service.  To attract and organise fans who may assist with music promotion, musicians may need, to some extent, to trust and accept that the output of consumers may be unpredictable and of inconsistent quality. They need to relegate control to some extent (Rogers 1998).  If content released by fans is questionable, bands may negotiate solutions rather than control them. Wikipedia founder, Jimmy Wales advises: “some sites have a lot of controls to prevent bad behaviour. But they end up preventing spontaneous good behaviour… if the community gets mad at us, they can just leave and take the content with them. That alone keeps the relationship honest”  (McNichol 2007: para. 45, 26). However legal issues regarding UGC include the: 1. Security of minors;  2. Privacy; 3. Defamation; 4. Inappropriate content; and  5. Copyright violations;  and active management is required to address potential negative impacts.  Transparency also benefits musicians as a way to build trust and loyalty with fans (Casteifranchi & Tan 2002).  It is disappointing, or phoney when a fan emails a band via their website only to discover that they are not dealing with the band but the label marketing staff.   The online brand of musicians must correlate with reality and with key messages of the musician.  Musicians need to monitor consumer content and be flexible, nimble and fast 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 203 2. Building contacts. How can a musician access the contacts, email addresses and contact policies of various media outlets – locally, nationally and internationally? 3. Preparing media releases. It costs nothing to write and email media releases, but it is a skill to make them newsworthy; 4. Targeting markets.  How can emerging musicians correctly identify their target market, for example, global or local, age and socio‐demographic ranges? They may do this informally through social networks, but may also miss opportunities;  5. Managing critical reviews. Self‐marketed bands are an unknown to music journalists. Musicians on major labels have the benefit of an introduction from label staff whose business is to maintain relationships with music journalists and market the band to them.  Lazy journalists may simply cut and paste promotional briefs received from labels about bands into their articles. In contrast, if a band is unknown to the music journalist they may receive, via the media, a full critical assessment without context, which may be risky; 6. Branding.  Preparing a promotion plan with a consistent brand requires skill. A plan may cover: interviews and industry contacts, packaging and advertising, promotional media and ancillary products; and  7. Timing the promotion plan to the music distribution plan. The promotion plan must be communicated to broadcasters, print media and venues in sync with the release of music or tour.  The aim is to generate demand and then respond with supply the product or service.  If musicians create expectations and then do not deliver on them (tour delays, music bottlenecks) they risk being forgotten.  Key points Traditional promotion 1. Limited opportunities exist within broadcast media – television, radio  ‐ because all musicians compete for limited spots; 2. Television and radio tend to broadcast to mass markets, and to retain a mass market they tend to avoid specialised or experimental music; 3. Professional production and placement of promotional products (music video, posters etc.) is high cost and relies upon established professional promotion networks; 4. There is no substitute for ‘in person’ appearances; and 5. Brand management is important. 
 204  Emerging promotion approaches 1. The internet facilitates direct promotion and deeper reach to a global market outside of mainstream broadcasters for specialised musicians; 2. ‘Fansourcing’ saves financial costs but incurs a time cost; and 3. Emerging challenges and opportunities include: deeper contact (virtual intimacy) between fan and band, user generated content, customer relationship management.  
Performance: traditional systems  
  Live performances have traditionally been an important part of the value chain, but primarily as a promotional activity to increase sales of music products (Hutchison, Macy & Allen 2006).  Touring was not seen as a core function of major labels (and was usually outsourced to events companies).  It was often ‘loss leading’ (Simpson 2006) and any efforts labels made were with the ultimate aim of music and merchandise sales.  Musicians received profits, if any, made on tour. For the purpose of this study, live performance was considered important enough to warrant separate analysis, initially because musicians may spend a high proportion of time touring.  Over the duration of this study, revenues from live performance have become more important.  There is comparatively little academic analysis available on the business of touring.  The information provided in this section is supplemented by observation at music performances and from informal networks of industry professionals.  
 205 Performance activities include: 1. Live performances onstage and via broadcast media (as opposed to promotional interviews); 2. In store performances at retail outlets; and  3. Touring, which includes the following activities, that are primarily logistical: i. Venue booking, scheduling and stage management; ii. Ticketing transactions; iii. Promotion (administration and placement of media releases and kits, show posters, advertising, interviews, updating website); iv. Itinerary preparation for example: accommodation (including catering, laundry); transport and freight arrangements (for equipment and personnel); schedules including maps, addresses and contact details; v. Equipment hire or purchase; vi. Management of tour staff – sound mixers, lighting, security, roadies; vii. Merchandising; viii. Accounting and budgeting;  ix. Troubleshooting (medical, transport, lost crew or items and other logistical issues) (Connolly and Krueger (2005). International touring adds in another dimension of freight, visas and passports, currency handling and language challenges. Tour management is an important yet specialised activity. Perhaps because of this, specialised companies that focus purely on touring and performance management have become major businesses in a volatile yet rewarding sub sector. A ‘well‐placed industry insider’ claimed Australians bought about 750,000 concert tickets worth about $160 million in the five months to November 2004.  However over seventy five per cent of those sales were attributable to three global acts (Scatena 2004).    It is difficult to identify a representative generic breakdown of music revenues by activity within the music value chain to highlight the financial importance of tours.  Artist manager Andy Gould ranked income streams for American musicians in descending order as “touring, merchandise, music publishing, and record sales” (G‐Man 2004: para. 23). Note that this is musician income, not label income.  ‘Flanzbaum’ of 
 206 OnlineGigs confirms the ranking:    I am not sure what the exact numbers are, but in the last few years live touring dollars are surpassing record sales as the real money maker in the music industry. The music is essentially free, but the magic of the live show is priceless (Freeman 2004: para. 18).    In the United States during 2002, thirty one of the top thirty five musician income‐earners gained most revenue from live concerts, and much of the recording revenue for these musicians probably represented an advance on a new album, not on‐going royalties from CD sales.  As depicted in the table below, for the top thirty five musicians as a whole, income from touring exceeded income from record sales by a ratio of 7.5 to one (Connolly and Krueger 2005: 71). The data is from 2002, before the entry of iTunes and legal downloads which have increased the commoditisation of the music product, so the amount for recordings may be less as at 2008.  
Table 26: Income sources for top musicians who toured the United States  
 Source: Connolly and Krueger 2005: 71    Note: More recent statistics could not be obtained.  In the United Kingdom, performance revenues are increasingly supplanting revenues lost from music sales. Page (2007) illustrates this in the figure below, which compares revenues in the UK primary and secondary (auction) ticket markets with recorded music sales.  It shows that as revenues from music products decline, performance revenues increase, and Page predicts this pattern will continue. The secondary ticketing market is central to this and it will be discussed later.    
  Live Concerts  Recordings  Publishing  Total Income Gross income average of top 35 musicians (US$m pre‐tax, estimate 2002)  12.7  1.7  1.3  17.4 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Figure 16: Can ‘live’ overtake ‘recorded’ music? 








 214 However niche musicians may also charge a premium for smaller, intimate performances. Musicians may also enjoy these performances, because in larger venues they tend to only see the first few rows unless the house lights are on. Alternately musicians may become irritated when they are performing to smaller audiences and can hear their audience socially chatting during songs.  Because musicians are finite non‐substitutable resources, it’s important that they are physically and emotionally fit during tours. Being fit may improve the quality of performances, and consequently reviews.  To alleviate tour boredom and repetition, tours may be marketed as ‘events’ in unique settings.  Examples include: performances in the historic Spiegeltent; interesting locations such as wineries; river cruise boats, cinemas and farms; restricting ticket numbers in smaller venues ; or integrating performances into festivals. The choice of venues is important, and considerations include the size, location, refreshments, venue reputation and payment terms. Musicians may research who has performed in each venue.  Venue fees are important, for example whether the venue takes a percentage of merchandise revenues, or if the fee fixed or variable according to ticket sales.   Music promoter Michael Coppel recommends making the performance feel as if it is an once‐in‐a‐lifetime experience (Scatena 2004).   If a band does not tour often, their performance is a rarity, and a premium may be charged on ticket prices.  However consumers may be influenced by their perception of pricing fairness. If they perceive the musicians are charging unfairly high prices they will not purchase tickets in protest, and the brand of the musicians will be damaged. Singer John Farnham held a national ‘farewell’ tour before retirement in 2002 yet continues to perform live (Miles Ago n.d.) and appears to leverage off the expectation that each performance may be his last.  Music festivals are events that spread the risk of touring because the customer base is widened by many acts. Festivals also have other benefits including:  1. Allowing musicians to network with other musicians (this is rare for constantly touring musicians); 2. Ancillary products (music compilations of featured performers, festival merchandise);  
 215 3. Brand enhancement (for example bands that perform at the Coachella festival gain the cachet by association with that festival); 4. Cross selling to a wider customer base, particularly of consumers who may not have paid to see the performer; and  5. Sometimes contracts allow for headlining side‐shows (that is, performing a show elsewhere in the same town, which mitigates transportation costs because the festival organiser has already paid for their transport to the town).  Festivals can potentially charge a premium fee because consumers can see many performances for less than the sum of attending all shows separately.  Outdoor festivals carry additional risks of poor weather, and audio quality challenges.  Innovative ancillary products and merchandise may be cross promoted at live performances.  They provide an opportunity to grow email lists (of attendees); to promote websites for other selling opportunities; and new products may evolve from live performances.   A performance could be recorded on digital video and copies sold straight after the event to the audience.  The musicians may even autograph copies.  Copyright and privacy issues may require consideration (the venue may object, or audience members may not want to be recorded) but these might be managed with notices in the venue and at point of ticket purchase.  In 2004 a video recording service, ‘Smash Touring’, commenced in Australia. It would film live performances and copies were available for purchase immediately after a show. Smash Touring ceased operations soon after launching, however it was replaced by Listenlivenow and Mashcam. The recording of performances offers a new and compelling revenue opportunity for musicians, especially for niche musicians.  It also improves fan loyalty. American band, the ‘Grateful Dead’, allowed fans (called Deadheads) to record their shows for non‐commercial use, and this engendered loyalty: “part of the reason Deadheads were so obsessed with live concerts was that they did participate in some weird, mysterious way” (Barlow 2003).  Niche musicians may perform more flexibly in smaller venues, and so each performance differs and attendees may purchase recordings from different performances.  Because performances are smaller scale, musicians can afford to take higher risks. For example, they can perform different songs or perform songs differently, wear different costumes and performances may not be choreographed.  The 
 216 level of planning each night may simply be a sound check and preparing a list of songs to perform.  How the songs are performed may be entirely unplanned and dependent upon ‘feeding off’ spontaneous crowd reactions and interactions.  Spontaneity and intimacy can result in uniqueness, musicians cannot be substituted (for example, singer Jimmy Barnes cannot be substituted) and so smaller, intimate performances may command a premium price.  This includes live performances that are unique ‘once off’ events, cannot be replicated, and contain risk‐taking (for example technical faults, performer error, spontaneous audience interaction.).    A fan may desire to purchase several recordings of performances on a tour as different spontaneous experiences occur each night.  Most consumers would enjoy a keepsake recording of a special night – it is irreplaceable.   A fan may purchase the recording of a performance to spot themselves in the audience, and they may cut and add that snippet to their social network sites. Doing so increases fan loyalty via personalisation and intimacy and also promotes the tour.  At a festival attended by American band, Phish, Apple donated an internet centre where fans could download free onto CD a selection from 154 Phish songs. Sixty thousand consumers attended the festival and two thousand Phish CDs were burned (Spellman 2004; Schiesel 2004).  Clothing, earplug tins, bags, band branded sun block and other lifestyle items that fit with the branding of the musicians can be offered as merchandise for sale. Another flow on effect from touring is promotional – most bands will experience in increase in hit rates on their websites when on tour, as fans research them, and then seek more information and contact following a performance.  This can be increasingly important if website hit rates are linked in some way to revenues (for example from advertising).  Live performance ticket auctions are legal alternatives to scalping practices.  Ticket auctions have been used in Australia, for example during ‘The Police’ 2007 tour where the best seats in venues were available at auction, and where bids were made and remade up until a set time when the auction closed.  The premium profit went to musicians or event organisers, as opposed to intermediaries.  However in practice this system may also be manipulated.  Bidders may use auction software at any time during 
 217 an auction to automatically trump the highest bid in the last seconds of an auction (within a set upper limit).  In these circumstances diehard fans who are prepared to pay any price may be trumped by anyone using auction software.  If the use of such software becomes prevalent, tickets will not sell until in the last few seconds of an auction.  Given this knowledge, the arbitrage effect will not be as significant than if it was for a sold out tour.  In the event of a sold out tour scalpers are positioned to profit heavily from the resale of tickets.   Social network sites such as Myspace are starting to monetise the sites. Musicians may aim to take a percentage of this revenue opportunity too. For instance, Myspace will have a ticket sales function. A band Myspace page may list their forthcoming shows. Consumers (or Myspace friends of the band) may click on the show they wish to attend and order tickets.  Myspace owner News Corporation (2008) is effectively supplanting Ticketmaster and other ticketing agencies with this route.  It may appear simple and convenient to consumers.  And, because the music is the driver behind News Corporation gaining a percentage on the ticket price as a transaction fee, News Corporation should, in theory, in some way reimburse the musicians.  At the time of writing, it is yet to be seen if this occurs.  Using fans has been discussed in more detail previously.  Relying upon fans to coordinate tours is risky but a positive example occurred when the rock band ‘Marillion’ posted a note on their website claiming they could not tour the United States “due to a lack of record company support.” Fans worldwide “rallied” together to raise $60,000 to underwrite the United States tour, and ‘Marillion’ “undertook its largest North American tour since 1991. Since then, ‘Marillion’ has been able to tour and record several more times all based on direct fan support” (Spellman 2008a: para. 1).  Spellman however does not discuss if and how the record company supported this effort.  Fansourcing approaches may be effective if: the use of fans is centrally managed; musicians know their fans; and use fans for distinct well‐defined tasks. Musicians may analyse their fan base to identify the locations with the highest density of fans to tour.  A band may plan a tour route that is logistically feasible, and then seek assistance from fans in each city, for example advice on venues or putting up posters. Delegation of 




 220 describes the four types of music publishing, followed by four types of publishing deals.  It then assesses the costs and benefits of self‐publishing; discusses current issues in music publishing; and explores emerging publishing opportunities.  Copyright The key piece of Australian copyright legislation is the Commonwealth Copyright Act (1968). The Copyright Act is based upon the Berne Convention, an international agreement, and provides automatic protection to Australian citizens, companies and residents (Australian Copyright Council 2002). The duration of copyright varies by country and music type. In Australia it is generally for the duration of the creator’s life plus seventy years (Arts Law Centre of Australia 2006).  To qualify for international protection under the Universal Copyright Convention, especially in the United States, any reproduction should contain the copyright symbol ©; year of first publication; and owner (UNESCO 2005).  There are five general types of copyright protection: 1. Sheet music (the right to publish); 2. Mechanical (the right to reproduce); 3. Controlled compositions (the right to make an adaptation); 4. Performance (the right to play in public – live, broadcast or synchronised); and 5. A combination of the above (Simpson 2006).  Sheet music copyright refers to the right to reproduce a song onto sheet music, or the right to publish.  The composer generally owns copyright.  Mechanical copyright relates to the license to record a song, or the right to reproduce a song. The copyright is on the song (which may perhaps be in sheet music format or a demo). That is, if a musician wants to record a song, they will need a mechanical publishing contract to do so, and this will be negotiated with the composer of that song.  The copyright on a song is treated as both a musical work (the music) and literary work (the lyrics).   In many cases the musician is also the composer, but a contract is required to this effect.  A contract will stipulate that the musician passes on a portion of royalties received from that song to the composer. A royalty is a percentage of income (for example from the sale of a song) which is payable to a copyright owner under a contract with someone 
 221 who is using the copyright owner’s work (Australian Copyright Council 2002). For example, this is often around 8.5 per cent of the dealer price (not retail) of the recording sales.  A controlled composition refers to the right to reproduce a song, for example to put it onto a CD or make a digital copy.  The performer of the recording owns the copyright. In Australia recording (mechanical) and production (controlled composition) copyright is governed by AMCOS, the Australasian Mechanical Copyright Owners Society Limited. AMCOS collects royalties and distributes them to musicians/publishers.  Performance copyright relates to the right to perform a song in public. For example this may occur during a live performance, or on radio in a shop. This also includes synchronisation licenses, which is the licensing of music to be used with visuals or other audio in advertisements, film soundtracks, computer games, DVDs, mobile phone downloads and other mediums. The song performer owns the copyright.  In Australia this is governed by APRA, the Australasian Performing Rights Association Limited.  APRA measure and collect performance royalties (including internet performance) and distribute them back to musicians/publishers.  APRA and AMCOS are independent companies, however APRA manages the affairs of AMCOS and their offices and staff have merged.  Radio broadcasters maintain logs of broadcasted music for royalty payments; whereas television performances supply reports based upon designated survey periods and live performances are monitored individually (Simpson 2006).  This administration is currently a cumbersome and time consuming task for broadcasters (CISAC 2004a), and costly, for example APRA deducts about thirteen to fourteen per cent of income from its members for expenses (Simpson 2006: 208).    In most cases, musicians do not own the copyright to their music. Musicians often sign over copyright to a publishing company, which, as mentioned, is frequently part of, or allied with, a major label.  Royalties are used to repay advances provided to musicians by labels, and only when these advances have been repaid in full do musicians receive royalties. For example when Paul McCartney wanted to print the lyrics to ‘Eleanor 
Rigby’ (a Beatles song he co‐wrote) onto a tour program he paid Michael Jackson to do so. Jackson had purchased Beatles music catalogue from ATV Music for US$47.5 million (Spellman 2008b). Generally the musician will sign over the copyright ownership to the 
 222 publishing company who will manage it and disburse payments.  There are several problems in this approach, which will be discussed.   Royalties are negotiated depending on various factors including whether or not the musician is established (Allen 2007), and generally range between nine to twelve per cent of the retail price of a CD, although the Copyright Act 1968 (ss 54‐64) stipulates in the absence of an agreement that the mechanical royalty rate be 6.25 per cent (the ‘statutory rate’) of the retail price (Simpson 2006: 199). AMCOS subsequently negotiated a rate of 8.25 per cent of the Published Price to Dealer (PPD) because retail prices vary (ibid.).  Contracts may include:  1. Escalations where a higher royalty is received on higher sales; 2. Different rates for different types of sales (record clubs, internet, retail); and  3. May not be paid until production and promotion costs are recovered. This royalty goes to the publishing company which then allocates it as contracted.  The process of royalty payments is slow, for example, APRA royalty payments are based on six monthly accounting periods and take up to six months after that to be paid (Simpson 2006).   In addition to being slow to pay, most publishers retain a portion of musician payments to cover unsold CDs as a reserve.  In Australia the maximum royalties that can be held in reserve is thirty five per cent for singles and twenty five per cent for long play CDs. ‘Singles’ generally include up to six songs on a CD. ‘Long play CDs’ are generally ten or more songs.  This practice would not be required with digital distribution (e.g. internet downloads).  To address this, half the performance and broadcast royalties collected by the APRA now go directly to composers (Simpson n.d.). However many contracts stipulate that royalties be paid “out of the publisher’s share”, which would be out of the remaining fifty per cent.  Harris and Colegrave (2004: 81) argue many publishing deals try to minimise the number of songs on a CD that they need to pay royalties on, for example only ten out of twelve songs on a CD.  Synchronisation licenses for commercial use of music, such as advertisements, have become a lucrative opportunity for publishers. It is also a ‘lumpy’ yet  rare income source for musicians, for example, even unknown musicians can reap US$40,000‐60,000 for performance rights to a song, whereas established musicians may earn 
 223 “seven figures” (Steinberg 2007: para. 9).  The musician ultimately receives only a portion of those revenues after passing through other elements in the value chain.  Synchronisation licenses are complex deals, and generally necessitate the use of lawyers to negotiate on the copyright owners behalf with the publisher.  Deals are based on territory (where the music will be heard), media type, usage (background music, prominent?), length and version (a cover of it or translated?) to name a few considerations (G‐Man 2003).  Because it is more difficult to sell synchronisation licenses (because opportunities are rarer and competition high) publishers may charge a higher percentage of fee than other licenses, often five per cent of gross receipts. To capitalise on synchronisation licenses, publishers need to package and sell songs to advertisers, film companies, mobile phone companies etc. and the greater the network of the publisher  (who they know and their ‘finger on the pulse’) the greater chance that a song will obtain a higher profile, and therefore potentially a higher success rate.  The composer cannot be expected to know people in the media industry and their needs, however in theory a publisher does.  An emerging threat to this field of publishing is that some agencies are being created to compose songs and jingles that sound similar to popular songs, enough to have the subliminal effect of reminding the listener of the popular song. Such tunes are different enough to avoid paying royalties, and the royalties on the similar songs are lower (and require far less input).  Another role of publishers is to register details of songs in each country where that song may be used and royalties received. The commission is usually between ten to fifteen per cent of total royalty income collected by the sub publisher.  Royalty collection agencies have reciprocal agreements with their counterparts in other countries. For instance the UK collection agency sends payments to the Australian APRA and vice versa.    New production methods such as digitisation mean that controlled composition costs are negligible but publishers still charge a fee for controlled compositions on digital formats. In other words, publishers may still withdraw from musician royalties a fee for CD manufacture and distribution, on internet downloads whose costs are minimal.  
 224 Finally, the synchronisation of music needs to be carefully brand managed. Musicians have traditionally “had a difficult time assessing the ultimate value of creative control compared to fundamental need for royalties” (Pfahl 2001: para 19). Too much exposure can ruin the credibility of a musician, as can be seen by this comment by a participant on Mono, an Australian music chatboard:    It's cool to hear these songs on ads and such and some great songs have been on ads (Search and Destroy/the Stooges ‐ Nike, Start me up/the Rolling Stones ‐ Microsoft, Are you gonna be my girl/Jet ‐ iPod & that phone ad, some song by Sting ‐ Jaguar, etc, etc) i guess because of publishing deals and lots of money, but isn't it dangerous to overkill a song, like Moby ‐ he was the biggest thing in the world then he put all of his songs on ads, soundtracks, everything and sure he would've made a shitload of cash but it really just ended up killing his career. It sort of really dated his songs prematurely  (Mono 2004).  And from the musicians’ perspective, this comment was made available by the band ‘My Friend the Chocolate Cake’ to explain the use of their song in an AMP commercial:   As you may be aware "The Romp" has been licensed to AMP for an ad campaign. We in The Cake have never been in favour of this kind of activity in the past, arguing that it places a song in the wrong context. For example if "I've got a Plan" was licensed to a life insurance company we'd all never be able to listen to the song in the same way again, and given that it's a song that means a lot to a lot of people that would be inexcusable.  This may be the case with The Romp as well, although we feel that as far as ad campaigns go, it's relatively tasteful. The reason we have done this is that David is organising The Morning Star Campaign for early next year (Concert date February 28th at the Melbourne Concert hall, simulcast nationally). The campaign will include a concert, CD and book and is aimed and raising the profile of the plight of the West Papuan people, trying to link it to the similar situation in which the East Timorese people were over the past twenty years. The money raised from the "The Romp" licensing will fund this campaign.  We reckon we can rationalise our prostitution in this way!!!!!! Hope its not too annoying  (MFTCC 2004).   
 225 Basically there are three types of publishing deal, being: 1. Administration; 2. Single song; and  3. Exclusive term publishing agreement.  An administration deal is generally used for experienced and established composers. Such musicians don’t require intensive publicity because they have an established fanbase and are less risky for the publisher.  It comprises a fixed fee of anywhere between 7.5 to twenty five per cent of gross income.   A single song deal is as implied, a deal only for a single song. This is used where the song is to be marketed (for example on iPods, soundtracks) or is a hit single.   In an exclusive publishing agreement, the publisher can receive between twenty to twenty five per cent of gross income (Simpson 2006).  Exclusive term publishing agreement is an agreement where the publisher has copyright to all output of the musician for a stated duration.  A more favourable form of publishing deal is where the musician can lease their copyright to the publisher. That is, the publisher can exploit the copyright for a few years and then it reverts back to the musician. In this way, a musician may enjoy the large‐scale promotional efforts of a major label and the publisher will receive royalties for the contract duration, but when ownership passes back to the musician who will receive full royalties (if they’re prepared to administer them). This would benefit musicians who may have a steady stream of royalties over a long term (for example, the composer of the ‘Neighbours’ theme, who incurs a royalty each time it is played).  Foreign versus Australian protection.   As mentioned Australian music and lyrics are protected by copyright in most other countries, provided they have the © symbol. However, musicians may not know if their song has been played and royalties are being held.  For example, John Greenan co wrote Johnny O’Keefe’s song ‘Real Wild Child’ and Buddy Holly later covered it. From this he received royalties for twenty years and then they ceased.  Years later Greenan noticed a new O’Keefe CD compilation hadn’t attributed him as a co‐composer.  His lawyer then discovered that the Buddy Holly catalogue had been purchased by another company which was holding $10,000 for Greenan because it did not have his contact details 
 226 (Lamperd 2004).  There is no global music register, therefore the countries in which the song may be played need to be identified and then the registry of that country contacted for information on their copyright processes. Even in Australia there are separate collection agencies for the different types of copyright. A global list of collection agencies can be found at the CISAC (International Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers) website although the self‐publishing musician would then need to contact each collection agency separately.  This is an improvement on the process since 2005, when only CISAC members could access this list, according to the CISAC website.   Self publishing In the Greenan ‘Real wild child’ song example, it is worth noting that the song has grossed roughly $2 million.  Half of that went to the publishing company, with the remaining million split between the three composers. Shane Simpson believes that in Australia, composers tend to get between sixty five to eighty per cent of royalties, however this still allows publishers to get between twenty to thirty five per cent (Lamperd 2004).  Can musicians and composers self publish, and what are the costs and risks?  In theory it is a simple process for a composer / musician with a recorded product to self publish in Australia. Firstly they join APRA (membership is free) and list their music with them, via forms that can be downloaded of their internet site. APRA or AMCOS become the owner of the public performance, broadcast and cable transmission rights (Australian Copyright Council 2002). APRA collects the license fees and then twice yearly pays copyright owners. There are some exceptions to this including operas or entire dramatic and musical works.  For composers there is a similar process via AMCOS to collect fees from use of their compositions. Depending on type of license, both AMCOS and APRA are relatively interchangeable despite being separate entities. The APRA website links to AMCOS.  If an unsigned musician wants to retrieve copyright payments from foreign entities it becomes unworkable. There is no collection agency that provides global or territorial coverage, so they must contact each collection agency separately.  As digital music 
 227 becomes more prevalent this should be do‐able however it appears regulatory and system roadblocks remain. Until it is addressed musicians go unpaid for some royalties and foreign collection agencies may hold funds on their behalf.  Similarly if music is performed/ played via the internet there is no agency that collects royalties, as at the time of writing. This agency would need also to be global.  In 2007 a London based global collection agency called Merlin commenced which collects copyright for independent music labels, however Merlin deals with independent labels, not musicians directly.    Secondly, the musician may want to exploit any opportunities for their songs. The musician who created the music is probably in a better position to identify opportunities for it, but may not have the contacts of a publishing company. Similarly a musician may be sensitive to any inappropriate exploitation that may devalue the song or entity.  A plan for exploitation of the song should be developed and put into effect. This could include:  1. Distribution of free promotion copies to radio stations;  2. Posters; 3. Touring; 4. Viral marketing through chat boards; and  5. Other innovative low cost methods.   Musicians need to identify any potential for sales overseas, and whether to register with the relevant foreign agencies. If global chatboards and viral marketing is used demand could easily and quickly escalate, particularly if songs are sold by digital download.  This is discussed in more detail in the music promotion section.  Finally, because as the band is a business, with an ABN and quarterly Business Activity Statements, accounts will need to be prepared and managed, royalty payments made and other administration undertaken that is traditionally handled by publishers.  Band members may negotiate the ratios of royalties each member will receive. The agreement might stipulate whether the royalties are paid after all expenses (for example marketing) are reimbursed. This needs to be in a signed contract. The contract should contain triggers and termination mechanisms (for example if a band member leaves whether they continue to receive performance royalties etc). Music producers may also require a portion of royalties in lieu of wages (Simpson 2006). An outside 
 228 party (lawyer) may be required to draft contracts because when there are one or two songwriters in a band, they receive the bulk of royalties (mechanical and controlled composition). This creates income inequity within the band and may trigger interpersonal dischord.  Bands can negotiate royalty allocation. Some may decide to split royalties evenly amongst members regardless of their input on individual songs.  Litigation may be required in order to protect against or recover funds from copyright breaches or misuse. Such litigation is expensive, time consuming (for example trying to identify an online offender), potentially brand damaging, complicated and may or may not succeed. For example, the management of U2 sued a group called Negativeland for sampling a U2 song. It is estimated that the legal action cost U2 more than they would have received in licence fees from Negativland (Simpson 1999).   New genres of music borrow (samples) use other songs. Sampling infringes copyright if a substantial part of a song is reproduced. ‘Substantial’ need not refer to the duration of the excerpt, but whether it is ‘an important or distinctive part of the original’ (Australian Copyright Council 2002), which can be widely interpreted. This becomes particularly contentious in some music genres that rely heavily on borrowing and mixing sound bites. To seek permission for each sample would be administratively excessive.  To minimise the administration burden, music libraries (for example Sounddogs) contain sound slabs that users may borrow for a fee that includes the copyright processing.  Another solution is for musicians of similar genres to form virtual online cooperatives that are copyright free to members, but copyright remains for anyone outside the cooperative. In such a model members can sample and share their music freely with peers.  Another solution is that musicians simply make their music freely available on the internet. The public can download as much as they like. If consumers appreciate the music downloaded they might mail a cheque to the musicians, or make some other form of payment.  This donation or patronage approach may be exemplified by the initial strategy of American band, the Grateful Dead, of open access for non‐commercial use, community building, and “music as folklore.” Pareles argues this may reflect: “copyright law was designed for sheet music and discs rather than the web”  (2005: para. 9).    However relying on altruism and patronage is risky because funding is 
 229 dependent upon the whim of a patron, or small number of patrons. Secondly music is not a charity, it is a service and product and should be treated as a business, not a charity.  Other service providers do not rely upon donations, and nor should musicians.    A key challenge with copyright is that royalty payments pass through a variety of channels before they reach musicians.  As at March 2008, legal action is pending from musicians over advertising revenues received by the major labels from YouTube, and proceeds from piracy legal action that the major labels have received. Three of the major labels settled legal action taken against Napster, Kazaa, and bolt.com for copyright infringement in 2007.  Napster alone paid US$270 million (Lauria 2008).   Musicians claim that these have not been passed onto them. “I don’t know any artist who has gotten a royalty statement (from their label that includes YouTube money),” said music attorney Chris Castle (cited in Sandoval 2008: para. 3). Music managers say part of the problem is that the record companies are not transparent about their financials. They say artists haven’t been made privy to the financial terms to the deals the labels are striking with YouTube or other websites.  Jay Rosenthal, the legal counsel for the United States Recording Artists Coalition argued:   This is endemic to a lot of areas … The performers really don’t know how they get paid. You just assume you get 50 percent of something. What we want to know is what kind of metadata do they get from these services to show this is what is played. Otherwise if you don’t, then the labels sit on their (butts) and don’t pay the artists because they don’t know how...what’s happening here are old contracts are colliding with new technologies. I’m not saying the labels are wrong for not knowing how to pay. But what’s wrong is not sitting down and figuring it out all the while they don’t pay the performers (ibid.: para. 22).  Brian Caplan, a music attorney said “the bottom line is the labels will feed themselves any rationalisation to keep as much money as possible for themselves and not share it with  the  artist”  (ibid.:  para.  17).    “Sources”  at  the major  labels  claim,  again,  that  the labels  have  not  yet  decided  how  to  distribute  the  funds.  They  also  claim  that  after deducting  costs  of  legal  action  there  was  not much  to  pass  on  to musicians  (Lauria 2008:  para.  9).  A  source  argued  “record  labels  are  experts  at  transferring  money around  and putting  the  onus  on  artists managers  to  find  it”  (ibid.:  para.  12).      Artist 




 232 introduced in this chapter because it is not emerging, it is not in operation anywhere, and is an outcome concept from this exploratory study.  Another approach is Creative Commons (CC), a non‐profit organisation that was formed in 2002 (Creative Commons 2008). Creative Commons provides copyright licenses that facilitate certain uses of content, with some rights reserved.  It does not charge for use of their licenses.  Its aim is for flexible copyright, for example, it provides a framework in which consumers and content owners can interact, copy, distribute, sample and remix music (ibid.). Each creative work is recognised by metadata that contains license status.  The concept of creative commons perceives music as flexible, evolving, interactive and creative, as opposed to a static product (ibid.).  It is slowly becoming a global standard on a country‐by‐country basis. The creative commons approach is perhaps a key platform for the future, as evidenced by the band ‘Nine Inch Nails’, who released an album 'Ghosts I­IV' as a free download via their own website in March 2008.  The project was licensed under a ‘Creative Commons Attribution ‐ Non‐commercial ‐ Share Alike’ license. This means the music is open for non‐commercial use provided users: 1. Must give credit to Nine Inch Nails; 2. Do not offer for sale any part of the album; and  3. Have to release it under a similar license.  
‘Ghosts I­IV’ was a thirty six track instrumental record, and was available in a variety of download options and as a CD. The options were a: 1. Free download featuring the collection's first nine tracks; 2. US$5 download featuring the whole album; 3. US$10 two‐CD set (either via the website or in retail stores after a month); or 4. US$75 deluxe edition, including a hardcover book and a data DVD and a Blu‐ray disc featuring high definition recordings and a slide show; and 5. Ultra deluxe limited edition version for US$300, which features the same items as the $75 version, but also signed and numbered by ‘Nine Inch Nails’ member Trent Reznor (NME 2008).   The ultra deluxe version sold out within twenty four hours, generating US$750,000 gross revenue alone.  Two days later the download website was crashing frequently from demand. First week sales generated US$1.6 million from 800,000 transactions 
 233 (including free downloads), despite the album being entirely available on P2P sites (Buskirk 2008).   Key points Traditional publishing 1. Publishing is complex, heavily regulated and requires specialist advice; 2. Musicians often assign copyright of their music to Publishers; 3. The royalty payment process is slow and complex; 4. To recoup royalties incurred in foreign countries is complex; and 5. Litigation is often required to recoup funds from copyright breaches.  Emerging publishing approaches 1. Digital rights management; 2. Some internet based royalty collection agencies exist that feature royalty micropayments immediately after transactions; 3. One global registration agency for digital music? Creative Commons? and 4. Transmission licenses may be excluded from traditional publishing contracts.  






  Traditional  Emerging High 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costs 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a 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Upfront 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systems 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a 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 237 b) Negative publicity incurred;  c) Piracy continues despite high profile successful court actions; and  d) Before iTunes, no legal alternative to file swapping gained market traction. In addition the incumbents are attacking their potential customers. Incumbents have also attempted to acquire and smother new entrants; for instance, Napster was purchased and stalled by litigation while competing products expanded into the market created by Napster.   Incumbents have also copied the successful strategies of others, for instance the Sony BMG plan of a portal for unsigned bands to upload their music appears to be an attempt to replicate the success of social networks (Sherwin 2007).  They have failed to respond appropriately to these innovations and lost market share.  New entrants are entering segments of the music sector, including promotion and performance. For example, technology firms have commenced music distribution activities. This includes Apple (iTunes), mobile phone ring tone providers, computer game suppliers etc.  To address this, the major labels have initiated 360‐degree contracts with their musicians, where they take a percentage of revenues across all musician activities in all segments. Avalon (2008: para. 11) believes this may mean that musicians pay two sets of commissions, in addition to the percentage that a label normally takes, and musicians may not want to pay twice so may not contract to outside vendors.  If so, this would potentially remove a layer of specialist service providers (tour agents etc.) currently in the sector.  Labels may also forge alliances with technology and/or telecommunications companies to initiate utility pricing for listening via internet streams to music catalogues.  The major assets of labels are back catalogues (copyrights) and promotional networks, and so new musicians are increasingly questioning their usefulness (Papagiannidis and Berry 2007).  360‐degree contracts allow the labels to expand potential opportunities to be useful to musicians.    2. Suppliers are being replaced.  The number of bricks and mortar retailers, recording studios, manufacturing plants and other high cost infrastructure entities is declining.  The number of legal digital music outlets online is increasing.  As at April 2008 Apple was the leading music retailer in the United States (Neumayr 2008).    The major labels were slow to respond to digital music opportunities, possibly due to the risk of cannibalisation of their traditional business models, specifically physical products and pressure from retail suppliers. Many initiatives made to date appear to have been 
 238 intended to defend existing operations (Stern and Deimler 2006: 334) and traditional suppliers are being investigated for collusive pricing (as at April 2007) in the United States.    The major labels can cross‐sell music into other entertainment media within their business, that is, Warner music may appear in Warner films. The major labels have created label music portals where unsigned artists may place their music for discovery. For instance, music in the Sony portal from an unsigned musician may be licensed for use in a Sony film.  This exposure would be an attractive incentive for unsigned musicians to upload their music into the Sony portal, but Sony then owns the rights to that music.  There will always be dominant incumbents in the music sector but in the future emerging innovative suppliers and intermediaries may challenge their dominance. These include companies from other sectors including: a) Technology (for example Apple); b) Software (for example YouTube);  c) Communications (for example mobile phone suppliers); and  d) Media (for example News Corporation with Myspace). It is normal practice for incumbents in any sector to be challenged by innovative startups, but to date the strategic responses of the incumbents have been slow and in some instances have not reflected the structural impact of innovations in digital music.   3.  Consumers are having a high impact on the sector. A new generation of consumers that grew up with free music via P2P sites are now maturing to an age group where they have disposable income. But, as evidenced by the continuing popularity of P2P, and as discussed previously they typically continue to believe that music should be free, perhaps because of a perception that it costs very little to produce and release, and secondly that payments for music go to a system and not the musician.  Their entertainment expenditure is on newer channels, such as computer games.  It could be argued that this has resulted in a decline in musician incomes, but in actuality musicians signed to major labels rarely saw significant returns from product sales because their costs of production were high and advances to cover these costs needed to be repaid.  Consumers today typically have low attention spans  (Seely Brown 2002) 
 239 (attention economy theories will be discussed later).  An opportunity for musicians is that they can now target global markets cheaply, and a few potentially may sustain incomes from micropayments off a global fanbase (Anderson 2007).  Consumers have increased power in this market via social networks: they have forums to communicate their opinions; they participate in social networks, music recommendation, blogs; and have even created new genres of music (mashups).  The role of journalists in traditional media as music tastemakers has diminished because increasingly consumers rely on peers and friends in social networks to recommend music.  Traditionally the output from major labels was a higher priority to music reviewers and media than non‐label music because major labels invest heavily in marketing.   4. Complementary sectors are emerging from the technology and telecommunications sectors. Media and advertising remains complimentary sectors, however emerging within them are new opportunities, including social networks, which can provide a platform for music discovery and promotion by consumer communities.  Traditional media is diminishing in importance as evidenced by the increasing rate of music magazine closures (Harding 2008b), MTV doesn’t play music videos anymore and retailers such as Target are shrinking the retail space devoted to music (Jaworski & Richards, 2008b).    More specifically, complementors include: a) Technology sector; b) Social networks; c) Digital games; d) Telecoms, ring tones; e) Internet service providers; f) Hospitality sector, events management; g) Tourism; h) Advertising; i) Media (film, television, internet and radio); and  j) Musicians signed to major labels increasingly must have other entertainment offerings – such as the ability to dance, cross sell products etc.  
 240 5. Product and technology developments are having a high impact.  Home recording technologies have created new music genres (electronica, rap, hip hop, mashups). Secondly the internet has facilitated easy access to global markets and digitisation has removed the need for manufacture and distribution of physical products. Consumers are becoming more comfortable with online payments as a result of the maturation of digital payment mechanisms and increased security.  Significantly, piracy has eroded royalty income from product sales. Digital rights management, the major label response to piracy, backfired (Craver 2000; Palmer & Cox 2007).  DRM efforts have been cumbersome and adversely impacted consumers and consequently the reputation of music labels.  However DRM theoretically facilitates the management of digital rights.  6. Regulators cannot keep pace with change.  The ability for regulators to control this sector is diminishing because the legislation that covers intellectual property is complex. The regulation of royalty payments, copyright, piracy and intellectual property is complex and requires expert advice. Therefore legal action is costly and slow.  Many innovations in the music sector have been illegal, including P2P, music streaming and personal copying of CDs (in some countries). Sector incumbents are protected to some extent by a strong, well funded lobby group (the IFPI). The manufacture of compact discs is environmentally polluting, involving plastic, chemicals and waste (manufacturing waste and returns of unsold stock) and to date, taxes on emissions have not commenced.   Musicians now operate in global markets, and negotiating global protection for their music is difficult. Theoretically their music may be played anywhere and so royalties can be incurred across countries. This highlights the need for a global centralised royalty collection agency, with consistent practices and payments. To expedite the process an entity has formed to represent independent music labels globally for royalty collection (Merlin).  This still does not cater for musicians who are unsigned; rather Merlin represents independent music labels.  Alternately musicians may opt out of receiving royalties on the basis that it is too complex to administer, and seek income from ancillary activities and merchandise.  The non‐profit Creative Commons organisation can provide multi‐country protection against unauthorised commercial 
 241 use of music.  Environmentally aware musicians have arranged and promoted carbon neutral tours.  7. Competitive rivalry is now volatile and complex.  Competitive rivalry has, over the last century, been minimal because the major labels have operated as an oligopoly. The major labels are under investigation in the United States for collusive online pricing (as at April 2007) (Hannaford 2006; Maul 2007).  Today the number of mainstream musicians is declining (as major labels invest more resources in fewer acts), and their life cycle is now smaller.  This can be seen in the renaming of artist development departments to product development in some major labels.  Labels are also seeking alternate revenue streams from provision of services such as sponsorship of tours, increasing their share of royalties’ income.  This may mean either musician’s may pay twice for services or specialist providers will lose business.  Music sector fragmentation has changed the nature of competitive rivalry.  Rivalry is high, volatile and complex, notably because of: a) Rapid change in the sector;  b) Removal of barriers to entry; and  c) Competing entertainment options vying for the consumer wallet.  Competing entertainment options, some of which may include a music element, include digital games, films, and social networks. There appears to be two clear operational models, being: musicians who sign to major labels that heavily invest to create a product which targets the mass market, usually in a short lived life cycle; and musicians who target smaller markets with higher value offerings over the longer term.  Generally both segments compete in different markets in different ways.  ‘Radiohead’ and ‘Nine Inch Nails’ are prominent examples of high profile bands leaving major labels to operate independently.   Attention economy theories, as described previously, treat human attention as a scarce commodity that has value in an environment of overwhelming options for attention. These theories as detailed by Davenport and Beck (2001) and Kelly (2008: para. 13‐20), attribute the value of attention to intangibles such as: immediacy, personalisation, interpretation, authenticity, accessibility, embodiment, patronage and findability.  Consumer attention is a potential source of new revenue for musicians with smaller 
 242 markets, who can offer a higher, more personalised service than mass marketed musicians. To illustrate, musicians with smaller markets can offer immediacy of access and personalisation.  Consumers may email or sms the musician directly, whereas emails to a mainstream musician would be read and replied to by a staff member and/or go through various channels of edits before a response is made.  Emerging mobile technologies allow the musician to operate wherever they may be, for instance, messages can be sent to consumers as they leave a venue, thanking them for attending a show and giving them a discount code for the purchase of any merchandise online.  Or fans can request in real time (via, for example sms) songs during a performance (Jaworski & Richards 2008a: 1).  This immediacy strengthens the relationship and loyalty (Kelly refers to this as patronage) for specialist musicians. Mass‐market musicians may not be able to offer this level of personalisation; it is not as authentic for a consumer to receive a response from the staff of a major label, or an automated response.  If a consumer has immediate contact with a musician, they are potentially more loyal to them.  If the musician is associated with a brand, the consumer is more likely to be amenable to a brand. For example, Michael Jackson fans may have increased their consumption of Pepsi after Jackson started to advertise it.  The biggest attention economy challenge for musicians is being found amongst the millions of competing entertainment offerings, which Kelly (2008: para. 20) refers to as findability.  There is a value in the ability to be found, and this helps to explain the high valuations on intangible services provided by social networks, and the decreasing relevance of traditional mass‐market broadcasting.  In a traditional promotion model the major label would use their network and distribution channels to promote an album or band. The fragmenting media landscape today means that musicians need to get across as many platforms as possible for exposure (eyeballs) and to create awareness. The fan base may potentially be used for this purpose, as can distribution aggregators such as Tunecore who will distribute songs across service providers for a small fixed fee (US99 cents per track as at April 2008).  The points above highlight a key finding of this chapter, that is, a shift along the value chain continuum from a product approach to a service approach, because the product of music has commoditised from digital distribution and production.  This chapter has highlighted the erosion of elements in the traditional music business value chain, due 




7: DISCUSSION    The proliferation and escalation of digital innovation created a wave of ‘creative destruction’ that impacted most frequently firstly and most heavily on the music sector.  Although change may take years to gain traction in the mass market, there has been an underlying shift towards digital content, and this has far reaching consequences.  In particular, the price of digital content has eroded, partly as a result of piracy and partly because the propensity of consumers to pay for online content is low.  As a result, elements of the music value chain have shifted from a product focus to a service approach with a focus on: intangibles; capturing and holding consumer attention; and providing unique experiences.  Some music services offer opportunities for new revenues and/or cost savings.  Opportunities for musicians to manage their own operations and sustain success have been identified.  This study was initially motivated by the May and Singer (2001) arguments that major labels have little to fear from current music sector changes, because they just need to adjust to a new business model and secondly musicians lack business skills.   This research aimed to address the following questions: 1. What is the nature, cause and potential of emerging business models for music in the context of broadband internet and social media software? 2. Can changes in the digital environment facilitate a financially viable, sustainable business model for specialist music? and  3. If so, can musicians use this model to succeed?   But firstly to summarise the structural changes affecting the music sector.  The growth and diffusion of digital inventions, while slow to gain mass‐market acceptance, have created market volatility, uncertainty and complexity. The major labels, that 
 245 traditionally dominate the sector, have been slow to respond, and their efforts have often failed (for example digital rights management). Structural changes present opportunities for specialist musicians to self manage and sustain careers. Within the context of structural change, the following three sections discuss findings from the three phases of this study: change agents and control; value chains; and musician self‐management.  
Case studies: change agents and control A review of literature on change agents and incumbent reactions in the music sector was undertaken to identify competitive strategies, or clues for how specialist musicians may compete in the emerging digital environment.  It helps to understand factors that led to the past success of change agents when predicting the success of emerging change agents.  The case studies provided insights into the impact of  ‘creative destruction’ in the past, and placed current changes within context.    Key themes for successful change emerged from the case studies and included:  1. A subversive, or revolutionary approach to activities;  2. A charismatic leader; 3. Leveraging off the quality and creativity of ancillary products;  4. A community or tribal culture;  5. Cost containment and lean ‘bootstrapping’ entrepreneurial approaches; and  6. Using new access methods.    The case studies found that historically incumbents defended their positions using:  1. Suppression, for example using propaganda and/or violence; 2. Financial power to acquire change agents; 3. Financial power to flood the market and dilute the agent’s power with imitations; and 4. Legal or regulatory action.  Table fifteen in chapter four summarises key points of the case studies noting: change agents; methods of change; and how those affected by the change reacted.   For example, The ‘Sex Pistols’ used a sense of revolution to build a community base.  The major labels (sector incumbents threatened by this change) responded by offering 

























































































 In conclusion, there are a variety of emerging opportunities that have been identified within the music value chain. Musicians may be able to exploit some opportunities, and doing so may sustain their careers.  The selection of opportunities depends upon a variety of factors, including the aims of the musicians.  “Don’t try to explain it, just sell it” (Colonel Tom Parker, in Tripp 2007).  Over the last century the primary revenue source of the music sector has been music products.  If musicians seek to sell their music product, there are at least four emerging models for selling digital music, as described in the value chain chapter. They are via: 1. Simple transactions (consumer buys a song);  2. Subscription (consumer subscribes to a music service provider which holds catalogues of music, or a musician website where the subscription includes free access to their catalogue);  3. Advertising supported free services (consumer listens to streamed digital music but firstly listens to an advertisement, or can see advertisements on the music site); and  4. ‘Freemium’ sales (music as a loss leader).   The music product cannot be solely relied upon for future revenues.  Other revenue opportunities must be identified.    Expanding from this, table twelve in chapter three provided an overview of some identified music revenue models.  It compared the benefits and challenges of the following revenue sources: subscription; utility pricing; retail; freemium; venture capital; advertising; user generated content and performances.  Some approaches primarily cut costs and so allow musicians to save a larger portion of revenues, whereas other approaches increase revenues. Some approaches mimic the traditional system in an online environment (for example online retailers of compact discs).  Challenges frequently arise from working with dominant players in the system, for example publishers, internet service providers or advertising agencies.  Other challenges relate to issues of scale, dealing with growing consumer bases.  The most potential for new revenues appears to be in offering services. 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Music is an experience When a sector is rapidly changing and highly unstable it helps to focus on the core product or service offering of that sector.  Decisions can then be made around how that core offering/product interacts with the unstable environment. So to navigate the volatile music sector we need to ask: what is music and how does the music sector profit from it?  John Perry Barlow (1994) described information as an activity, a life form.  Digital music may be treated as information.  Music is an experience, a service not a product.  Perhaps business models from service industries are more applicable to the emerging music sector than the traditional manufacturing, product focussed models.  The next section explores this hypothesis.  If we revisit the music sector prior to the invention of the record player (or earlier, such as pianolas) we can see the core music offering: it is a service, not a product. Sound is not a tangible product that can be sold, we all create sound.  But musicologists may tell us that music communicates, it conveys feeling and emotion, it facilitates social events and stimulates memories.  It makes us feel good or feel like dancing or helps invoke another era or culture (Hodges & Haack 1996).  The Mpeg or vinyl item doesn’t do it, the music it contains does. Prior to the inception of recorded music, music was transient; once it was performed it was over, the sound could not be captured except as a memory (although sheet music recorded notations). Since the advent of the phonograph the focus of the music sector has been on the product medium (compact disc, digital rights management, iTunes etc), often at the expense of the message (music) and messenger (musicians).  The compact disc format may become as redundant to society as sheet music or vinyl records – serving a minor specialist market.  Consumers have benefited from this, but because the product is changing so rapidly a refocus is required on what music ultimately is.    By making their music available, musicians deliver a service. Playing or performing music is a service.  With the exception of recent 360‐degree contracts, thinking of music as a product has distracted the major labels. They may have been more successfully positioned today had they maintained a service approach, but rarely in the last few decades have major labels invested in the service aspects of the music sector, preferring alliances or outsourcing to specialist entities. For example they have rarely prominently sponsored social music events such as community dances nor owned 
 253 nightclubs and other venues, or managed tour logistics.  Instead they have focussed on a process of grooming musicians and pushing the product. The products with highest sales generally attract repeated investment.  The consequences of this distraction are evident as the music product commoditises to a price point of zero.    The invention of the record player became the driver for the creation of new infrastructure  (recording studios, pressing plants, distributors etc.) around the production and sale of vinyl. The manufacture, promotion and distribution of music became complex and costly and therefore dominated by the major labels who secured the infrastructure and value chain. Doing so created a barrier to entry. Furthermore these companies produced and/or sold the hardware on which music was played, creating vertical integration.  These companies include EMI, Sony BMG, AOL Time Warner, Festival and Universal. Over the last few decades a common aim of musicians has been to sign a recording contract with one of the major labels, and this model has significant opportunity costs for musicians. It is commonly asserted that the major labels do not always act in the best interests of their artists in the pursuit or protection of profits. The major labels generally treat music (musicians?) as a product to be packaged and sold. This is primarily because product sales comprised the bulk of revenue, as evident in recent years where artist development divisions in major labels have been renamed product development divisions, with a focus on the music product as opposed to the long‐term careers of artists.  The product focus has sometimes been detrimental to musicians who create that product. For example: 1. There are several examples of musicians who have suffered health problems exacerbated by exhausting touring/promotion schedules. A primary driver for tours and performance is to increase product sales.  Tight schedules allow no time or space for creativity so composing new songs becomes much more difficult; 2. The major labels operate large corporate structures to provide services to musicians.  Musicians may be over serviced and subsequently overcharged by these companies.  For instance musicians will be given large upfront retainers and then charged for high quality recording and promotion services when in actuality they can only afford basic services.  In addition the high quality production style may not enhance sonic quality or suit their sound.  The retainers and production 










plays music and details are recorded by play measurement entity.    ‐ registers the consumer to the play measurement entity; and ISP  ‐ bills consumer and passes funds into the central $ pool.    (for example: Musicbrainz, Gracenote) ‐ receives song details from musicians and allocates a unique identifier; and Registr
y 
‐ is linked to play measurement entity;    (for example: Last.fm, consumer streaming stations such as Pandora, Rhapsody, Social.fm, Anywhere.fm. These track plays by consumers across all digital music devices) Play  Measur





















 268    I already use a spreadsheet to track music expenses and income. I’ve been collecting all receipts and dockets related to my music activities over the last few years.  I’ve also created my own spreadsheet to track expenses/income so it was mainly a matter of transferring the data to the model provided. The output was very similar to the output I have on my personal spreadsheet.  The model you’ve provided is a more detailed spreadsheet that’s very useful from cash flow perspective. It reinforced my decision to start tracking all expenses and income regarding my music activities several years ago.  Musicians with the ability to manage were identified, however their expertise tended to involve basic management and traditional music business models.  Feedback on enhancements to the model included advice concerning education costs, mail out per unit figures and CD unit sales.  Nearly all respondents failed to view the ‘Musical map’ model as a decision making tool, instead they perceived it as a financial tool, to be used for accounting after they have undertaken actions.  Seventy five per cent of respondents answered that the model did not make them think of alternate options.  One respondent commented that it was handy because he was doing his tax at the time and another commented: “a large part of managing your own music career is learning to manage your finances.”  Another participant mentioned: “It’s beneficial for musicians to treat their project like a business from a financial perspective.  I think that record keeping is very important.”  However another complained:  “$4/hour cash doesn't constitute income, it just stops my bank balance going backwards.”    Three respondents did see future possibilities after using the model.  One respondent wrote “there are many things that have made me rethink how I plan to manage my career. Whilst the model was thought‐provoking, it isn’t a huge influential factor shaping my current activities.” Another commented: “As a financial model it is very comprehensive. If you wanted to have a complete business model there would be other factors you’d need to consider,” and another commented “there’s certainly no harm in doing it and when you’re starting up and independently managing your music career 





 273 considered. However independent advertisers may be identified and targeted directly by independent musicians in the current environment.  Music that is available via websites it typically perceived by consumers to be free.  Musicians may need to let go of the practice of charging consumers for digital music.  Giving fans what they want increases demand for more offerings, and they will tell their friends and the promotion may grow exponentially and quickly.  Musicians can then seek alternate revenues by, for example: 1. Making gated communities of their websites (as ‘The Who’ did – although this will be more successful a strategy for musicians with smaller markets because they can offer virtual intimacy); 2. Sell premium formats of their music; and  3. Advertising, merchandise and ticket revenues, sponsorship, etc.   Sales of a premium music product may offset the forgone revenues of free digital music.  Ancillary products (t‐shirts, zines etc.) are vitally important to specialist musicians as promotional tools and income.  A scan of musician pages on social networks shows that they network with musician peers and mentors, seeking informal advice on touring and other music‐related issues. Musicians need to know when to seek professional assistance.  This is a skill that comes with experience, but generally as their business grows they will need accounting and legal advice.  Artist managers may be able to help grow their business.  These are all functions that record labels provide however for smaller markets the use of general practitioners may suffice and ultimately be cheaper. This study has identified musicians who can manage their operations in the traditional music system, however they may miss emerging opportunities that can be used to their benefit.  In a volatile industry they may need to manage in a multi‐product, multi‐channel environment that can be overwhelming.  Strategic advice may be sought regarding which channels to use, what to sell, and pricing in the emerging music system.  The recording and manufacturing of music, although becoming cheaper, is a major expense.  Sales rarely recoup the investment made, especially if recorded in a professional studio.  Consumers have typically demonstrated via file sharing they will not pay for digital music, and the growth rates of digital music show they are 
 274 comfortable with its quality. It may be aesthetically rewarding to hold a CD in ones hand, but ultimately the purpose of music is to communicate experiences and emotions, and digital dissemination is cheaper and equally effective for musicians. Musicians should consider making at least some of their music available to consumers for free.  Perhaps a more appropriate copyright system is one where musicians may receive an ongoing revenue stream of royalties from consumer use of their music, rather than consumer purchase.  Artwork and liner notes can also be made available for download via the band website. These continue to be important peripherals, primarily because they acknowledge those who worked on the music, lyrics and artwork. This is one reason why fans will still purchase a CD even if digital music is free and available.  The CD could be made into a premium product with additional information, artwork and/or personalisation.    Musicians might not give away their music to all, perhaps only to consumers for non‐commercial use. They might still use publishers and seek royalties and licensing fees for public performance. Public performance includes if a song is broadcast on commercial media or in venues, or most lucratively, if it is used in advertising or films. The Creative Commons license is a good example of non‐commercial protection, where content can be made available free for personal use, but with restrictions on ‘for profit’ use. The successful release of an album by the band ‘Nine Inch Nails’ in March 2008 is an example of the use of a Creative Commons license. Consumers could download nine songs for free non‐commercial use, or pay a premium fee to purchase rare items for non‐commercial use.  From this example it appears that a future approach may be ‘freemium’ tiered pricing. The freemium concept can be described as ‘sell more for less, and sell less for more’.  Scarce items, for example those that require a connection with the musician, attract premium pricing.  Items that require no effort on the part of the musician to sell may be free and ubiquitous.  This is similar to art products, someone can photocopy a picture for free, or pay for an autographed print, or buy the original at a premium price.  ‘Nine Inch Nails’ had already achieved success via the traditional music system and enjoy a global dedicated fan base, which is perhaps why their approach gained media attention.  The success of this approach will be best tested when a musician who has not already achieved success via the traditional music system attempts it.  New musicians may 
 275 release free music in order to promote themselves in order to build a fan base.  However they could still release premium priced (signed, rare etc.) products that fans could invest in and later sell when the musicians have achieved success.  They will need to release premium priced products to build their niche brand.  This is similar to investing in art. It also treats musicians as artists, with respect. Conversely it also satisfies the public demand for free music.  Generally in the unlikely event that a commercial entity wanted to use music in the Creative Commons scheme, they would contact the musician and negotiate terms directly.  Yet in reality most commercial entities use publishers. A musician in the ‘Musical map’ study noted advertisers or other commercial entities don’t like to speak with musicians directly; they prefer to speak with their management.  This perception is a subtle but key stumbling block that prevents musicians self‐publishing.    In the foreseeable future musicians will still need to use publishers to place their music in advertising, films, video games or broadcasting.  A study by Mol, Winjberg and Carroll (2005) found that major labels created more value from publishing, not because of their scale, but because of the relationships they maintain with other sectors, namely broadcasting. This is very much a closed shop and it will become increasingly so in the mainstream market. For instance, Village Roadshow, a film production company, has set up a music subsidiary whose purpose is to license music for their films and they have aligned with major label Warner Music. Clearly Sony games will use Sony music; Sony musicians may also act/appear in Sony films etc. Advertisers and film producers are rarely going to seek out specific music for their work, they will instead go to publishers who will push their recommendations. If a musician does not have a publisher, then they will not be put forward.  The larger the publisher the more likely that they will be approached; however the degree of competition within a publishing stable for recommendation will consequently be higher. Similarly independent film producers can use the music of specialist unsigned musicians in their films.  Unsigned musicians could target independent producers for licensing opportunities.  To identify and locate such opportunities is difficult and requires either that the musician has a profile so that the music is known by filmmakers, or the musician relies on networking.  Doing so would require a significant time investment by musicians for a remote chance of success, however success brings a large financial payoff. 
 276  Historically independent labels did not have the resources to track royalties and push licensing opportunities. However ‘Merlin’ a global collection agency that represents independent labels means that musicians who are signed to smaller independent labels can receive mechanical royalties, although this is a moot point if music becomes free for personal use. Merlin only has independent music labels as members, not unsigned musicians.  At the time of writing there is no global collection agency of mechanical royalties for unsigned musicians, nor is there a publisher to actively manage licensing (synchronisation royalties in films etc) for unsigned musicians.  Digital music has other benefits that to date remain under explored, being that music can become flexible, fast, musicians can release music as often and as roughly as they like. It need no longer be a static product, locked as reflecting a point in time.  It can become dynamic, updated and reworked as suits.  How many times has a musician recorded a product and then wished they’d made tweaks? Releasing music digitally they can do so, just replace the song online with new improved versions.  With reference to the example of Boston, a band who spent over four years to record an album, instead of releasing an album they could simply have made music available on a website and updated versions as they rerecorded the seven hundred drum takes over four years. They may never even have to finish it, and could still be recording and re‐releasing it today.  Public Enemy take this a step further by posting demo tracks to their website and asking fans to manipulate the songs and upload them back to the band. This kind of interaction locks in fans and keeps them coming back to the website. Website eyeballs are another path to potential future revenues and advertising.   Once musicians begin to experiment, they may be pleasantly surprised at the emerging opportunities;  different  ways  of  doing  things  and  hopefully  alternate  revenues  will begin  to  flow.  This  study  has  identified many musicians who have  sustained  careers and often moved between major  labels,  independent  labels or  their own  labels.   One musician who has sustained success outside of the major label system is Ani diFranco, who  commenced  her  own  record  label  in  1994  with  fifty  dollars.  She  has  released nineteen  albums  and  tours  constantly.  When  approached  by  major  labels  with contracts  she  declined,  preferring  her  independence.    Her  label  now  has  several employees.  A final example is Jonathan Coulton, whose business is discussed below. 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Jonathan Coulton shows a way forward?  Jonathan Coulton is a home‐based musician who successfully uses the internet to maintain his business. His approach is innovative and he has sustained success.  Most information about his activities came from a profile by Clive Thompson (2007).  In mid 2006, a year after he began his music career, more than three thousand people, on average, were visiting his website every day, and his most popular songs has been downloaded as many as 500,000 times; he was making what he described as “a reasonable middle‐class living” of between three to five thousand dollars per month (Thompson 2007: para. 1).  Coulton’s cash flow comes from: 1. Forty one per cent digital‐music sales, three‐quarters of which are sold directly off his own website; 2. Twenty nine per cent CD sales; 3. Eighteen per cent live performance; and 4. Eleven per cent T‐shirts, often bought online.  He has discovered that his fans do not want merely to buy his music:   They want to be his friend. And that means they want to interact with him all day long online. They pore over his blog entries, commenting with sympathy and support every time he recounts the difficulty of writing a song. They send e‐mail messages ranging from simple mash notes of the “you rock!” variety to starkly emotional letters (ibid.: para. 2).    Coulton responds to every contact and spends up to six hours per sitting daily communicating with fans.  He “relies on his fans in an almost symbiotic way” (ibid.: para. 3), “his fans need him; he needs them” (ibid.: para. 5).  This includes: 1. Music Production ‐ When he couldn’t perform a guitar solo for a song, he cursed his “useless sausage fingers” (ibid.: para. 3) in his blog and asked listeners to record their own attempts, then held an online vote and pasted the winning solo 
 278 into his tune. Another fan reformatted Coulton’s tunes for use on karaoke machines. 2. Distribution ‐ Coulton has forgone a record‐label contract; instead, he sells music directly to fans. He offers most of his music free on his site; however fans may choose to pay for his songs.  For physical CD sales, he uses CD Baby, which charges $4 of the album’s price, a much smaller cut than a traditional label would take for warehousing, payment processing and shipping. CD Baby also places his music on the major digital‐music stores like iTunes, Rhapsody and Napster.  3. Performance ‐ When Coulton performs, he:    upends the traditional logic of touring. Normally, a new Brooklyn‐based artist like him would trek around the Northeast in grim circles, visiting and revisiting cities like Boston and New York and Chicago in order to slowly build an audience, playing for 3 people the first time, then 10, then (if he got lucky) 50. But Coulton realised he could simply poll his existing online audience members, find out where they lived and stage a tactical strike on any town with more than 100 fans, the point at which he’d be likely to make $1,000 for a concert (ibid.: para. 4).  4. Promotion via fansourcing ‐ “Coulton’s fans are also his promotion department, an army of thousands who promote his work worldwide” (ibid.: para. 4). They know fame can come through viral word‐of‐mouth, when a friend forwards a website link, swaps music or posts a mobile phone concert video or blogs. 5. Promotion via email ‐ Coulton’s e‐mail volume has grown to as many as a hundred messages a day. During peak volumes, his “replies have grown more and more terse, to the point where he’s now feeling guilty about being rude” (ibid.: para. 2). 6. Promotion via fansourced videos ‐ More than fifty fans have created music videos using his music and posted them on YouTube; at one gig many of the audience members had originally come across his music via one of these fan‐made videos.  For example a fan made a video for his song “Someone Is Crazy,” which was a collection of scenes from anime cartoons spliced together and offered on YouTube:    “She spent hours working on this … and now her friends are watching that video, and fans of that anime cartoon are watching this video. And that’s how 




Future research Further research will strengthen the results of this study.  More specifically, in relation to the ‘Musical map’ study, further research could be undertaken to: 1. Understand the high dropout rate of musician participants.  This may be due to disinterest in the task, which indicates musicians typically are disinterested in management tasks. Another approach may be to add a glossy interface to the decision making model, as opposed to excel, making it appear easier and simplistic (perhaps as a series of questions rather than a spreadsheet of inputs), and then run the test again. This may identify if the ‘boring, complicated’ model itself was to blame for the dropout rate, or whether it was simply that there was no incentive (such as a prize) to motivate responses; 2. Explore why musicians are interested in these tasks. Is it because no one else will do them? Would they prefer an artist manager to do them?  Would this be a more effective approach? and 3. Explore how the skills of participants were developed ‐ through experience? Is this the best way to learn?  There are additional opportunities to examine the social functions of the music system, and their relation to musician self management, that have not been addressed in this thesis.    
 282 There are several areas  for  future research  into emerging business models,  including the  applicability  to  specialist  musicians  of  the  following  concepts:  user  generated content,  customer  relationship management,  the  long  tail,  and  incubators.   These are discussed below. User generated content User generated content is a form of social currency, consumers swap files or concert footage to maintain social networks or meet new contacts.  The one way promotional message from musicians is being replaced with continuing relationships.  If musicians do successfully harness and manage their customer relationships, their cost chain may become that as depicted in table twenty eight of chapter six.  The use of fan driven content may facilitate a sense of community and this has been shown to be a key success factor for specialist musicians.  Digital media has already eroded the activities of production and distribution, and perhaps the next activity in the value chain to be eroded may be promotion.  If musicians can connect with and use their fans they will minimise promotion costs.  As with production and distribution, promotion costs could be minimised, although time costs may rise.  If musicians will not have time to manage their customer relationships they need to weigh the benefit of immediacy and honesty with fans versus the artificial construct of someone else acting on their behalf (which may damage relationships with fans). A solution is to have a smaller (premium paying) customer base or a larger band (with each member contributing). Customer relationship management Managing fan‐generated content is an element of customer relationship management (CRM).  When ‘Radiohead’ released their album, ‘In Rainbows’, downloaders could pay whatever they felt it was worth. A clever add on tactic was to capture the email addresses of those who downloaded ‘In Rainbows’ to create an instant e‐community of consumers who appreciate the band.  The email lists could then be used for marketing other ‘Radiohead’ (and ancillary) offerings.  The list of email addresses could potentially be more profitable than any revenues incurred from music downloads. In the future consumers may alternately use RSS feeds, or similar, to monitor updates, news and activities of favourite musicians.  Instead of a collection of music, they may collect musician websites (that they may or may not subscribe to). 
 283  The internet raises many issues for specialised musicians who use it to interact with consumers.  The paradox of online networking is that if a musician is very good at it, their audience grows rapidly and becomes unmanageable to the point that they cannot provide the one‐on‐one contact that was previously possible.  Some solutions are available to handling the potential deluge, for example the use of software robots to approve friend, fan or subscription requests and other automated administrative tasks.  But the degree to which, and way musicians interact with their audience within different contexts of scalability needs to be examined.  Similarly the psychological impact on ‘ultra connected’ musicians also needs to be examined.  Thompson (2008: para. 23) notes that the intimacy of the Internet has conversely made real life interactions less intimate and more guarded.  He claims musicians “bemoaned the relentless and boring slog of keyboarding” and feeling like they are onstage twenty four hours a day (ibid.: para. 25).  This is not simply an issue of recognising when they need to hire staff or additional resources, it is more complex because the direct personal contact is a key differentiator that specialised musicians can offer.  It provides a competitive advantage over mainstream musicians.    Further research into emerging CRM models and their applicability to musicians who self‐manage is required. Topspin offers (for a fee or percentage of revenue) content management and customer relationship management tools for musicians to deal directly with customers. It may be worth investigating as part of an exploration into CRM opportunities for musicians.  Long tail theories and their applicability to niche musicians Long tail theories argue that the internet and globalisation, amongst other changes in the environment, have eroded distribution and inventory costs and facilitated a business environment dominated by a mass of global niche markets, rather than a world of national mass markets. The music sector is fragmenting, as evidenced by the observation that independent labels comprise about thirty per cent of the total market (IFPI 2008).  In contrast, this study found that there would always be dominant entities in the music sector while there is a mass market for ‘mainstream’ music, because generally a mass market requires mass‐market operators, whose influence tends to 
 284 dominate the market.  The major labels are the current incumbents but this may change, for example, the independent labels mentioned previously have grouped under an entity named ‘Merlin’ and, whilst independently the participants have little control, in aggregate as Merlin they comprise thirty per cent of the market and have the potential to be a dominant force.    The long tail theory argues that scarce resources may command premium prices and ubiquitous resources tend to be priced down (commoditised).  This emphasises the need for niche musicians to differentiate their product ‐ to seek elements of uniqueness and promote them.  Empirical investigation into the concept of ‘freemium’ pricing and how it dovetails with long tail theories may highlight a sustainable strategy for niche musicians.   Copyright models for music services to consumers Similarly further exploration into the viability of a consumer service copyright model, and how it may be put into practice, may reveal a new ongoing income stream for musicians.  It seems fairer for musicians to be rewarded based upon the playing of their work rather than the acquisition of it.  This type of revenue stream may sustain musician careers for as long as consumers play their music, providing a revenue stream similar to that of broadcast royalties, but from consumers.    Music distribution strategies Further study is required to model the financial costs and benefits of each distribution strategy  (transactional, ‘freemium’, advertising supported, subscription etc., as discussed in the emerging distribution models section of this thesis).  An assessment the potential of ancillary revenue opportunities within each distribution model would assist musicians to understand the implications of their choice and make better decisions.  Incubators The May and Singer (2001) claim that artists don’t stick together needs to be explored in more detail. The internet and other media technologies now allow musicians to 
 285 safely interact directly with other musicians. A scan of musician pages on Myspace will reveal a great level of networking between them, with offers to tour together, advice on where to go etc.  So the statement that artists don’t stick together can be challenged.   Another potential area for future research is the concept of bootstrapping or creating, sustaining and developing businesses in a low‐capital and low‐knowledge environment (Basu & Werbner 2001: 239). This is the scenario for most musical startups, and as revealed in the competitive strategies review, the ability to establish operations with minimal financial investment is vitally important to specialist musicians.  A future business model for musicians may consider incubator‐like cooperative environments based around location, music genre, or other interest.  Consumers may support the cooperative based on their interests (for example, there may be a ‘garage music in Melbourne’ cooperative, that includes a website where consumers can identify the relevant musicians) and music scenes may develop.  Using cooperative or  co‐opetitive approaches musicians may collaborate, contribute and develop skills. Incubator participants may build their consumer base and then graduate from the incubator into their own self managed business.  This could be tested with action research.  A possibility may be to establish a (virtual) collaborative incubator. This approach was rejected for this study because: 1. Of the same factors as an experimental case study described below; 2. It may be too costly; and 3. Of the increased potential for confounding variables (for example, it could not be conclusively proven that success was due to any particular business model).    Other methodologies may be used in future studies, including a longer‐term case study of  a  musician  attempting  new  business  models.    For  example,  a  researcher  may monitor a band as they use several emerging digital services and report a comparison of outcomes.  This approach was rejected for this study because: 1. It would need to be measured over several years; 2. Potential  for  a  ‘location  effect’,  where  the  music  entity  location  influences  the outcome; 3. Only one business model could be tried at a time, which would be limiting; and  
 286 4. There would be increased risks for participants.    
Research caveats In undertaking this study, many issues arose that required subjective or arbitrary judgements, rejection of sources, or caution. The following section discusses issues encountered and qualifies some judgements made. Study scope In undertaking the research, wherever possible a global approach was taken because music is increasingly globally available.  However sometimes global figures or commentary were not available so instead sources from the United States and Europe were used as indicators. These may not be representative of the global market.  A secondary focus was the Australian market, primarily because this thesis is written for an Australian University and secondly because Australia is outside the dominant markets of North America and Europe.  Asia, in particular China, is an emerging dominant market and Asian research would have been useful.  Language issues prevented access to research there.  Asian markets are very different to Australia ones, with a high population density and high penetration of technology and communications in most countries, so were less likely to be used as indicators, because this study aimed to avoid a focus on specific technologies.  However because they represent advanced digital economies, case studies on the use of technologies in, for instance South Korea, would have been relevant.  Scope issues were also encountered when discussing musicians, with care taken when distinguishing between musicians who are signed to major labels versus specialist, niche and unsigned musicians.  This was further confused by musicians who had been signed to major labels, gained experience, and then left to operate independently.  Caution was taken to distinguish between mainstream music and specialist music, because they use different market approaches. This study focussed heavily on popular music because it is a dominant genre, however some forms of popular music are specialist with niche markets (for example garage) and niche musicians sometimes reject any attempt to classify their music.  Hence the scope with regards to genres of music and types of musicians was a flexible guide only.  
 287 This study was restricted to English language sources only. As mentioned above this meant the interesting and potentially dominant Asian market was to a great extent omitted.  It also meant that some musicians who may have participated in the study were less likely to.  Data sources Many businesses and websites have been discussed as examples. All businesses or websites mentioned were current as at May 2008.  This does not imply that they are recommended and/or best practice. Many are very small entities and may not be sustainable.  In the volatile music business turnover is high ‐ businesses fail or are acquired frequently. Secondly, emerging digital businesses have been identified that replicate the traditional music business model.  This thesis was written at a time when illegal file sharing of music was rife. Other nations may follow the lead of the French Government as at 2007 and consider legislation compelling internet service providers (ISPs) to report and remove illegal file sharers. ISPs may be forced to monitor internet traffic for file sharing and if a user continues to do so after two warnings they are banned, and their details recorded in a central agency so no other ISP can sign them.  If this is copied by other nations it may effectively halt music piracy, and this would have repercussions across the sector.  Street press, or free entertainment magazines and newspapers are a useful source of information about independent musicians. However the quality of street press varies and most isn’t archived in a way that is searchable and as a result research on mainstream media sources were potentially biased and some viewpoints may have been omitted.  This issue is mitigated by the internet.  This study also used, to a very small extent, informal online chatboards and similar sources for anecdotal clues. Such information cannot be verified totally as authentic, given the large amounts of conjecture, opinion and misinformation in this sub sector.  Hence chatboards and the like were used as guides only.     


































Electronica  Reggae  New Age Jazz  Easy Listening Other – please describe: 
 
For how long have you been active in the music sector (for instance performing, recording etc)? 0‐5 years  6‐10 years  11‐20 years  21+ years  
For how long has your current music entity been in operation? as above 0‐5 years   6‐10 years  11‐20 years  21+ years  
Do you perform outside your city? Please indicate which best applies: every month  every 6 months  every year  rarely 
 



















































































































 324 solely on digital data as opposed to digital sound. For example it can manage volume or tempo changes and transmission of different notes for multiple instruments.  Layers of MIDI are called channels.  Disruptive ‐ Disruptive or disruption in this sense implies an action or product that has altered one or more of the five elements of the music industry structure (being production, publishing, distribution, promotion or performance) to the initial detriment of incumbents.  Incumbents ‐ Those who hold power within the sector, for example, companies commanding market share, political or religious leaders.  Mainstream ‐ Appealing to the mass market, for example top selling music. Although not genre specific, it is exemplified by the Top forty popular music charts.  To appeal to a mass audience, the sound tends to be formulaic (based on what has sold before) and is rarely innovative.  For the purpose of this study it is the opposite of specialised, although there are a few examples where specialised music has become mainstream.  Major labels ‐ The four multinational music companies who control most published music globally.  Payoff  ‐ The return for a decision made.  Probabilistic models ‐ Decision analysis models that assume that decisions made affect outcomes with consideration of risks involved in each decision.  Probability  ‐  The  level  (quantification)  of  certainty  of  the  occurrence  of  an  event.  If certain,  the  probability  is  one  or  zero,  if  uncertain  it  is  fifty  per  cent.  Where  the probability is fifty per cent or equally shared, the risk is highest.  Risk free payoff ‐ Certainty equivalent.  Risk premium  ‐ The difference between a decision maker’s  certainty equivalent  (risk free payoff) and the expected monetary value (EMV). 
 325  Sensitivity analysis ‐ The extent to which payoffs change when the assumptions change.  Signed / To be signed / Signons / or Signing ‐ A contractual agreement where a major label lends to the artist the costs for production, publishing, promotion etc. in return for a portion of profits, once all costs have been repaid.  The label will also organise and manage these processes, which are usually undertaken by subsidiary or related companies.  Specialised ‐ Outside the mainstream. For example, this music may be localised (for example using instruments or formats unique to an locale); of a genre or style with limited interest groups; and/or innovative by using new processes or tools.  Systems – a system describes a “group of interacting, interrelated, or interdependent components that form a complex and unified whole” (Anderson & Johnson 1997: 2).  Systems work within larger systems, that is, the music system operates within a larger economic system.   Uncontrollable  factors  ‐  Uncontrollable  outcomes,  impacts  of  decisions  made  that cannot be guaranteed or where no data exists.  
